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This paper examines the various responses of progressive white southern clergy to school 
desegregation events in Arkansas. I investigate why no major white clerical movement 
emerged to support civil rights, arguing that internal and external factors limited their 
genuinely motivated witness. National and local clergy endorsed Brown for both religious 
and practical reasons, arguing that segregation was counter to Christian brotherhood and 
hurt worldwide evangelism. However, like William Chafe’s progressives in Greensboro, 
too many clergy worked for school desegregation but ignored African American voices, 
believing that their demands unnecessarily inflamed the local opposition and 
unfortunately urged patience and civility instead of justice. Furthermore, clerical 
intervention proved to be less effective than ministers expected. Sympathetic clergy 
experienced physical harassment and congregational opposition for speaking out, and 
local communities simply ignore their messages. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 In her 1949 book Killers of the Dream, Lillian Smith described a play her students 
performed about a female Prince’s coming of age journey. For the journey, the Prince 
picked up four traveling escorts: Conscience and Southern Tradition stayed close by, 
while Religion and Science were up in “the balcony.” When the Prince saw nonwhite 
children and wanted to play with them, her escorts debated whether they should allow her 
to do so. Southern Tradition barred the way, with Conscience’s active acquiescence. The 
Prince then reached out to Religion, which quoted Biblical passages such as John 3:16 
emphasizing a united sisterhood. Conscience declared in response, “I never listen to 
Religion when segregation is involved. No one does, down here.”   
This exchange disturbed an observer, who asked: “Religion is no good as a 
traveling companion as long as it stays up in the balcony. Why doesn’t Religion come 
down here and push Custom back where it belongs?”  
A girl from the balcony answered the question: “But Religion doesn’t do that in 
the South… Religion stays out of controversies. You know that. Our place is up here.”1  
Although Southern Tradition ends up ahead here, Smith’s thinly veiled parable 
about race relations is ultimately optimistic about the potential that a religiously-based 
moral argument had in breaking down Jim Crow segregation. In the parable, only 
Religion’s preference to “stay out of controversies,” rather than outside forces, is what 
kept it penned up in the balcony. When Smith’s students got a second chance to perform 
the play how things could be instead of how they were, religion as love helped “push 
                                                
1 Lillian Smith, Killers of the Dream, 2nd ed. (1961 repr., New York: Norton Library, 1978), 43-48. 
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Southern Tradition off the stage and teach it a few lessons about being nice to other 
people.” Other southern liberals expressed similar optimism regarding organized 
religion’s potential, as seen by Southern Regional Council (SRC) executive director 
George Mitchell’s claim soon after Brown that “we are all of us convinced that the 
churches will lead the South in all of these matters of race.”2  
But by 1963, another writer had a very different impression of white southern 
religious leadership. In his famous “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Martin Luther King, 
Jr., lambasted southern clerical silence. While he initially expected that “the white 
ministers, priests, and rabbis in the South would be among our strongest allies,” King 
soon found out that too many “remained silent behind the anesthetizing security of 
stained glass windows,” and that some outright opposed the movement. While African 
Americans struggled against a tidal wave of local and state opposition, white ministers 
dismissed civil rights as “social issues, with which the gospel has no real concern.”3 
According to King, southern white religious institutions had proven unwilling to descend 
down from the proverbial balcony and exert their moral influence. 
The stark contrast between Smith’s parable and King’s letter is best explained by 
the fact that in the intervening fourteen years between Killers of the Dream and “Letter 
from Birmingham Jail,” especially after the 1954 Brown decision, civil rights campaigns 
sprouted up, gathered strength, encountered fierce opposition, and continued to grow—
while nearly all local white churches failed to take positive action. Although only some 
                                                
2 Smith, Killers of the Dream, 49-50; Mitchell to Charles F. Golden, 20 June 1955, Southern Regional 
Council (SRC) Papers. 
3 King, Why We Can’t Wait (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 89-90. S. Jonathan Bass’s Blessed are the 
Peacemakers looks at the eight white Birmingham ministers singled out by King’s famous “Letter From 
Birmingham Jail,” arguing that they occupied an invisible middle ground between segregationists and 
militant African American demands. See Bass, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Martin Luther King Jr., 
Eight White Religious Leaders, and the “Letter From Birmingham Jail” (Baton Rouge: LSU, 2001). 
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ministers went as far as giving segregation divine justification, most white ministers 
remained in their proverbial balcony, preaching united brotherhood but not practicing it 
courageously. 
This contrast engenders yet more questions: Why? What was it that made 
southern white liberals believe that religion was a potential tool in dismantling Jim Crow 
segregation? Why did local churches remain silent? And most importantly, what does 
their silence tell us about the role of national religion during the civil rights movement? 
This paper examines progressive white southern religious leaders and their response to 
school desegregation campaigns in Arkansas from the Brown decision through the era of 
massive resistance. I contend that throughout this era white clerics genuinely believed 
that racial segregation was un-Christian and sinful, but they by and large failed to channel 
their prophetic urgings into productive activity.  
Closely examining their motivations and inhibitions complicates the differing 
interpretations in the movement’s religious subhistoriography regarding white southern 
clerical efforts in this time period. David L. Chappell’s A Stone of Hope inspired much of 
this work with his claim that the white church’s cautious support provided an unexpected 
boon for civil rights. According to Chappell, when “the white South’s religious bodies 
lined up on one side and its politicians on the other,” they denied segregationist thought 
its legitimacy. Whereas southern religion endorsed slavery during the Civil War, its 
neutrality here allowed the civil rights movement’s superior ideology of nonviolence to 
prevail and win the grudging support of local whites. Although even Chappell concedes 
that racial liberals failed to take concrete action because they “felt the need for other 
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things, especially their own power, much more strongly than they felt the need for civil 
rights,” the larger church deserves praise and not censure for its tacit support.4 
Chappell’s argument is frustrating because it corrects previous historiographical 
excesses by introducing new ones. His claim that neutral churches were indeed beneficial 
supports his overall assertion that religion was vital to the movement, allowing one to 
celebrate dedicated local clergy. Previously, religious historians blamed the limited 
clerical activism in the 1950s on ministerial apathy and cowardice. James Findlay states 
that the National Council of Churches (NCC) refused to take concrete action, contenting 
itself with issuing resolutions that were “little more than slight slaps on the wrist to those 
institutions [perpetuating segregation] and had little or no long-term practical effect.”  
These resolutions, according to Michael Friedland, represented a facile hope that 
segregation would simply fade away, and their limited nature showed that most white 
southern clergy refused to take the concrete steps needed to counter segregationist 
sentiment. Friedland argues that white southern churches in the 1950s stood silent during 
                                                
4 Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel Hill: UNC, 2004), 1-
8, 43, 106-108. According to Chappell, liberal churches ended up prioritizing order and moderation over 
integration, failing to draw strength from their religious tradition—in contrast to African Americans, who 
“got strength from old-time religion.” This work echoes Chappell’s thesis in Inside Agitators: White 
Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1994), where he contends that it was 
not so much the “race dissenters” as the diversity of opinion amongst white moderates that explains civil 
rights successes. He echoes a similar conclusion in his article specifically focused on Arkansas, “Diversity 
within a Racial Group: White People in Little Rock, 1957-1959,” in Arkansas Historical Quarterly 55 
(Winter 1995), pp. 444-456. Other works not mentioned in this study that examine the role of national 
religion in the civil rights movement include Paul Harvey, Freedom's Coming: Religious Culture and the 
Shaping of the South from the Civil War through the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: UNC, 2005), Charles 
Marsh’s God’s Long Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights (Princeton, 1999) and Andrew Manis’s 
Southern Civil Religions  in Conflict: Civil Rights and the Culture Wars (Macon: Mercer, 2002), which 
employs the concept of civil religion to detail the struggle between white segregationists and African 
American activists. Denominational histories also abound, such as Mark Newman’s Getting Right with 
God: Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-1995 (Tuscaloosa: Alabama, 2001).  
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racial discrimination, before northern clergy came South and helped local African 
Americans overturn Jim Crow segregation.5  
Findlay and Friedland underemphasize the amount of white clerical activism that 
existed, however. More recent works use Chappell’s claims of theological diversity to 
justify the basic argument that southern ministers made honest efforts to bring about 
desegregation, whatever the result. Elaine Allen Lechtreck’s dissertation on southern 
white ministers eschews an explicit argument for retelling considerable stories of 
ministerial courage and reprisal, showcasing clergy “being faithful” to their calling and 
arguing that “they deserve recognition and a place in the recorded history of the Civil 
Rights Movement,” regardless of how effective they actually were. In their edited volume 
on movement religious rhetoric, editors Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon comment 
that they privileged speeches from the normally invisible “brave white southern clergy” 
who experienced persecution for their attempts to lead their local communities “to a more 
enlightened understanding of race relations.” James T. Clemons’s history of Arkansas 
Methodists similarly asserts that local Methodists “were, as best they could, promoting 
                                                
5 Findlay, Church People in the Struggle: The National Council of Churches and the Black Freedom 
Movement, 1950-1970 (New York: Oxford, 1993), 11-38; Friedland, Lift Up Your Voice Like a Trumpet: 
White Clergy and the Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements, 1954-1973 (Chapel Hill: UNC, 1998), 18-48. 
By starting in the 1950s, these works also ignore the considerable history linking southern religion and 
southern liberalism, leaving one to wonder what changed in the twenty intervening years. While regional 
historians conceded that southern liberals failed to achieve concrete results in the post-Brown era, they 
affirmed the genuine religious impulses behind southern liberalism and argued that they helped bring the 
South forward. Morton Sosna claimed that dedicated Southern liberals stood out because of their “emphasis 
on religion” and that their efforts “helped create a climate” conducive for civil rights activity, even though 
they themselves “possessed neither the power nor desire to force social change.” John Egerton largely 
exonerates the ministers among “the thin scattering of Southern liberals and progressives and moderates 
who opposed” opportunistic politicians exploiting the race issue for their own benefit. While they lacked 
“the numbers, the discipline, the unity, or the fervor” to successfully steer the South toward desegregation, 
their courageous example showed “the capacity of white Southerners to change, to repudiate racism and 
rise up to the standard of justice and equality” (Sosna, In Search of the Silent South [New York: Columbia, 
1977], 172-174, 206-207; Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights 
Movement in the South [Chapel Hill: UNC, 1995], 624-627). 
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harmony and equality, peace and justice among the races” during the civil rights era.6 The 
central assumption behind Clemons, Dixon, and Lechtreck’s works is that their heroic 
efforts must have done something positive, although what exactly is never specified. 
That being said, Chappell’s particular argument also contains considerable 
weaknesses. Segregationist theology may not have had much clout on the national arena, 
but it retained considerable support in local pews.7 According to Pete Daniel, massive 
resistance occurred because “moderate whites haltingly called for acceptance of the 
Court’s decision, whereas segregationists minced no words in their strident opposition.” 
Daniel claims that churches “offered the best hope for easing the transition from 
segregation,” but that their views instead “reflected the community, with its aggregation 
of sins and shortcomings.” Even if their ministers supported desegregation, “the flocks of 
laypeople did not always follow,” creating a divide between pulpit and pew that silenced 
the minister. Jane Dailey explains that segregationist thought remained strong in local 
pews because congregants feared that interracial youth mixing would inevitably lead to 
miscegenation, which was abhorrent to their sensibilities.8  
One explanation why Chappell deemphasized local segregationist sentiment is 
that his regional scope and top-down approach skewed his views. Chappell uses Billy 
Graham as one minister who effectively championed clerical neutrality, integrating his 
                                                
6 Lechtreck, “Southern White Ministers and the Civil Rights Movement” (Ph.D dissertation, Union 
Institute, 2007), v-vii; Houck and Dixon, Introduction, in Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights 
Movement, 1954-1965 (Waco: Baylor, 2006), 10; Clemons, Introduction, in Crisis of Conscience: Arkansas 
Methodists and the Civil Rights Struggle, eds. Clemons and Kelly L. Farr (Little Rock: Butler Center for 
Arkansas Studies, 2007).  
7 Chappell does a respectable job demonstrating how national segregationist clergy avoided using the Bible 
to positively justify segregation, instead defensively arguing that the Bible had little to say on the matter. 
According to Chappell, this demonstrates that they were “hedging segregationists’ bets, not exhorting them 
with a vigorous call to arms.” Although his argument shows why segregationist theology had little respect 
on the national level, he ignores the significance of such views amongst local congregants rather than local 
pastors (Chappell, Stone of Hope, 108-123). 
8 Jane Dailey, “Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown,” in Journal of American History 91 (June 
2004), 119-144; Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950s [Chapel Hill: UNC, 2000], 180-185. 
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evangelical meetings despite local discontent. However, Billy Graham had the national 
clout to force his way even in hostile climates, whereas local pastors could not simply 
silence dissent without creating dangerous ill will.9 Dailey argues that “ministers often 
found themselves in the cross hairs on the segregation question, as congregants attempted 
to counteract the influence of clergymen in civic affairs and to capture the power of 
Christian righteousness for segregation.”10 Neutrality can not only explain why the civil 
rights movement succeeded, but it can also explain why the movement participants’ 
innumerable acts of heroism and sacrifice produced such limited results.  
If not cowardice or apathy, why then were so many of these resolutions so 
ineffective? One major reason was that, in the words of the Smith parable, Religion’s 
descent from the proverbial balcony on “social matters” like civil rights was contested by 
Southern Tradition. Religious leaders who spoke out in favor of desegregation discovered 
considerable opposition both outside and inside their church walls. Many pro-
segregationist citizens rejected their views as inaccurate theology and disastrous 
Communist-influenced policy, justifying not only disagreement but also active reprisal 
through physical harassment. Disagreement also created unwelcome drama within their 
churches, splitting congregations apart. While white southern ministers’ religious beliefs 
led them to oppose segregation, their moderate political outlooks and vulnerability to 
                                                
9 Chappell conceded this point in his book, writing that “when Graham desegregated his audiences, for 
example, his vast popularity shielded him from scrutiny and retaliation” (Chappell, Stone of Hope, 139-
144). While Chappell interprets Graham favorably, other recent studies on Graham have emphasized his 
disconnect with civil rights leaders. For example, see Michael G. Long, Billy Graham and the Beloved 
Community (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 
10 Dailey 134. While Chappell looks at pulpit-pew dissent as more evidence of a diversity of opinions 
between a polarized white church, he also only considers expulsion a success if the pastor ended up leaving 
(Chappell, A Stone of Hope, 134-135). As Chapter 4 demonstrates, even unsuccessful expulsions 
discouraged ministerial activism. 
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reprisals left them, for all intents and purposes, onlookers in the balcony rather than 
effective advocates. 
Yet too many ministers were content to remain in the balcony because they 
believed they could do the most good there, and did not know how to translate their 
moral call into effective political action. Initially, most supportive clergy bought into the 
southern white liberal belief that, given sufficient time and patience, desegregation would 
occur naturally. Further militancy was not only unnecessary but could very well 
destabilize a peaceful resolution. When future events proved that line of reasoning to be a 
fallacy, many religious leaders clung to their role as impartial arbiters rather than engaged 
activists. They argued that while segregationist excesses were definitely unwelcome, 
much of the blame also lay with the African American militants who provoked violence 
in the first place with their insistent demands. Because these clergy refused to embrace 
civil rights causes, their efforts at mediation were weak appeals which political leaders 
safely dismissed. 
In his 1980 study on Greensboro, William Chafe coined the term “progressive 
mystique” to describe the mixture of “implicit assumptions, nuances, and modes of 
relating” that informed local elites’ worldview. Committed to maintaining their city’s 
image of a “progressive” region that had respectable race relations, Greensboro’s political 
leaders prioritized avoiding conflict and extending only paternalistic support to “civil” 
African Americans. To protect their progressive reputation during the post-Brown era, 
white Greensboro leaders adopted a “politics of moderation” that marginalized both 
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militant African American demands and White Citizens Council members, accepting 
token desegregation while mitigating the possibility of radical change.11  
Whereas Chafe’s Greensboro mitigated massive resistance, Arkansas 
segregationists presented a formidable challenge to local moderates. Arkansas governor 
Francis Cherry drew upon the state’s progressive reputation when he vowed state 
compliance to Brown, claiming that “Arkansas will observe the law. It always has.”12 
When massive resistance emerged, many clergy championed moderate solutions and 
civility, attempting to preserve whatever remnants of the state’s respectable image 
remained. As such, many clergy not only spoke out against mob violence, but they also 
marginalized NAACP activists as unreasonable and not representative of the larger 
community. Their limited political vision hindered both their collaborative efforts and 
their ultimate vision, although it similarly motivated them to take decisive action against 
massive resistance’s excesses. Rather than being complicit in a cynical ploy, these 
ministers were blinded by the “progressive mystique,” which encouraged them to take 
unpopular stands on behalf of inconsequential gains.  
Arkansas is an ideal state to study white religious activity because of the relative 
plethora of available sources. The state’s initially progressive atmosphere meant that 
clerical activity received positive newspaper coverage and that ministers were more 
likely to express even unpopular views, whereas ministers and presses were more 
circumspect in their protests to segregation in a Deep South state like Mississippi.13 
                                                
11 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle for 
Freedom (New York: Oxford, 1980), 7-9, 67-70. 
12 “Cherry Says Arkansas To Obey Law,” Arkansas Gazette, 19 May 1954. 
13 In contrast to Arkansas, Mississippi did not desegregate any of its public schools for ten years after 
Brown, successfully squashing African American challenges through a state sovereignty commission, 
extralegal violence, and a failed attempt to equalize the schools and head off local protests. Charles C. 
Bolton’s monograph on Mississippi school desegregation describes this period with a binary white-black 
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Furthermore, supportive clergy in Arkansas had much to protest against, as the state 
became a hotbed for massive resistance. Although my study goes beyond Little Rock, the 
1957 Central High School crisis was a prominent news story that was replayed on the 
international scale, one that spurred ministers to respond both in the short run and in the 
long run. In Arkansas, ministers could speak out and had plenty of reasons to speak, thus 
providing ample primary source material.  
This paper consists of four main chapters, following a roughly chronological 
order. Chapter 2 observes that national and local religious bodies applauded both Brown I 
and II for heralding a better era of race relations under a “prudent” timetable, which 
would ultimately prove costly. They declared themselves against segregation, arguing it 
violated God’s call for Christian brotherhood and that its existence hurt the church’s 
global prestige. However, Christian thinkers shied away from federal enforcement 
measures, believing that gentle encouragement and proper teaching was the only way to 
encourage Southerners to implement desegregation and that more militant means would 
only provoke unnecessary violence. National complacency toward the decision’s 
implementation bled into the local scene, as religious leaders focused on lending 
assistance to the few model districts willing to desegregate rather than emphasizing the 
moral call of the hour. Church leaders called Brown II’s “all deliberate speed” a wise and 
judicious decision, even as resisters used it as a rallying cry to completely halt 
desegregation efforts.  
                                                                                                                                            
opposition, suggesting that if there were white racial liberals in the state, they largely kept silent. While 
some white public school teachers protested a school closure amendment, Mississippi governor Hugh 
White silenced the opposition by flattening the debate to a simple straw poll between supporting school 
closure of “backing ‘the Negroes.’” See Bolton, The Hardest Deal of All: The Battle over School 
Integration in Mississippi, 1870-1980 (Jackson: Mississippi, 2005), 61-95. 
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Grassroots massive resistance across the state dashed clerical hopes for 
widespread voluntary compliance, as ministers discovered that local whites were not 
amenable to mediation and moral education. Chapter 3 explores the varying tactics 
ministers took to discourage increasingly popular segregationist sentiment preceding the 
Central High School crisis. Ministerial support for the embattled Hoxie school board 
failed to deter local protests, and politicians dismissed clerical opposition to the Southern 
Manifesto as well as four bills against school desegregation. While the many moderate 
ministers who acquiesced to massive resistance deserve some blame, their united but still 
unsuccessful push to fight the bills shows that ministers needed more than just courage to 
succeed. More accurately, clerical activism failed to oppose massive resistance because it 
was a hugely popular movement, and grassroots support for segregation dwarfed its 
opposition and steered political leaders dangerously rightward.  
 The Central High School crisis left both moderate and progressive clergy as the 
lone voices crying out in opposition to mob violence that kept African American students 
out of Little Rock’s public high schools. Chapter 4 looks at the clergy’s divergent tactics 
and the fierce resistance they encountered. It challenges Christians in Racial Crisis, 
Thomas Campbell and Ernest Pettigrew’s 1959 study of Little Rock clergy which 
remains the standard work today. Like Campbell and Pettigrew, I contend that moderate 
ministers failed to present an effective witness, unwisely retreating to law and order 
stances and ignoring African American voices. However, Campbell and Pettigrew did not 
give sufficient consideration to the many limitations placed upon both moderate and 
progressive ministers, who did not merely have to contend with outside harassment but 
also dangerous discord within their churches. Caught between the contradictory duties of 
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condemning injustice and maintaining cordial relations with their congregants, even 
progressive clergy had to watch their words. Far from demonstrating cowardice or 
apathy, ministerial records of the time suggest that the repressive atmosphere constrained 
the ministers’ available options. 
 Unable to influence events on their own, supportive clergy flocked to alliances 
with other racial moderates to bring any peaceful resolution, however limited. Chapter 5 
highlights both the strengths and the limitations of this approach, as coalitions possessed 
sufficient power to quell massive resisters but also muted the progressive clergy’s unique 
demand for true integration, rather than merely desegregated facilities. According to John 
Kirk, the Little Rock school board’s use of pupil placement laws and other gradual 
solutions fit under a banner of “minimum compliance” that “far more effectively 
undermined the process of school desegregation… throughout the South.”14 The 
progressive ministers who joined larger coalitions initially supported minimum 
compliance measures only because they needed allies to overcome the segregationists. 
Much as they had protested against segregated facilities, progressive clergy resorted to 
moral appeals for true integration in later protests against restrictive pupil-placement 
laws, demonstrating that not all white racial progressives supported minimum 
compliance. Despite their apparent successes, the clergy’s limited role in the moderate 
coalition suggests their limited ability to encourage positive change.  
Two quick notes: This study uses the words clergy and minister interchangeably 
throughout the text, and employs “religious leader” when referring to a prominent 
layperson like Congressman Brooks Hays, who was the president of the Southern Baptist 
                                                
14 Kirk, “Maximum Resistance and Minimum Compliance: The Origins of the 1957 Little Rock School 
Crisis and the Failure of School Desegregation in the South,” in Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition 
to the Second Reconstruction, ed. Clive Webb (New York: Oxford, 2005), 94. 
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Convention but was technically never called upon to preach. Much of the 
interchangeability reflects my sources, which draw entirely on Christian and 
predominantly Protestant voices—although Little Rock’s Jewish community joined in 
supporting civil rights efforts.15  
Furthermore, while I take care to identify clergy’s denominational affiliation, I 
eschew larger denominational analysis for two reasons. First, my sample size of active 
ministerial voices is too small to draw anything more than baseless conjectures if I 
subdivided it further into individual denominations, as the considerable activity of a 
handful of Little Rock Presbyterians does not necessarily translate into widespread 
national support. Secondly, my analysis of my sources shows little apparent difference 
across denominations. In a 1961 speech at The College of the Bible, Will D. Campbell, 
then employed by the National Council of Churches (a symbol of ecumenicalism), said 
that his NCC job gave him the chance to take Communion in the Presbyterian manner 
alongside Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians and other denominations in a service 
led by a Congregationalist and a Baptist at a Methodist church. Campbell noted that if 
there was one positive from the contemporary racial crisis, it was “that Christians caught 
in a serious crisis will sometimes transcend ecclesiastical structures and barriers.”16  
                                                
15 For more on Jewish activism in Little Rock, see Carolyn Gray LeMaster, A Corner of the Tapestry: A 
History of the Jewish Experience in Arkansas, 1820s-1990s (Fayetteville: Arkansas, 1994). Rabbi Ira 
Sanders was particularly active around this time. 
16 Campbell, “The Sovereignty of God in Christian Race Relations,” in Southern Churches and Race 
Relations: Report of the Third Interracial Consultation, July 17-21, 1961, ed. Lewis S. C. Smythe 
(Lexington: College of the Bible, 1961), 89-90. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“EFFECTING A TRANQUIL TRANSITION” 
 
 On 23 May 1954, Colbert S. Cartwright, pastor of Little Rock’s Pulaski Heights 
Christian Church, devoted his Sunday sermon to discussing the proper Christian response 
to Brown. He first briefly laid out an argument about why “segregation is totally un-
Christian,” emphasizing that it “ran counter to Christian brotherhood” because it 
encouraged adherents to have “a prideful attitude contrary to Christ’s lowly spirit.” 
Cartwright cited as the “collective judgment of American churches on segregation” the 
National Council of Churches’s (NCC) 1952 resolution, which called for all adherents to 
take a stand against racial discrimination. According to the NCC, segregation was “a 
denial of the Christian faith” and “diametrically opposed to what Christians believe.” 
Furthermore, American race relations reflected poorly on Christianity worldwide. 
Cartwright claimed that, with the world wondering “if we truly walk as we talk,” how 
local churches responded to desegregation efforts “may determine the future peace of the 
world.” Dedicated Christians striving to live out their faith only had one correct option: to 
join with those “who work to implement the decision.” 
Having established the clear moral call, Cartwright discussed how churches could 
assist in “effecting a tranquil transition” from segregation to desegregation “fully with the 
spirit” of Brown.  He personally believed it would be a painless process, drawing upon 
previous examples of desegregation in the military and in interstate travel to predict “we 
shall adjust to the breaking down of segregation [in public schools] much more easily 
than we think.” Although he conceded that “undoubtedly voluntary segregation will 
continue for many years in some sections,” Cartwright assumed that the delay was 
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beneficial because it would provide time for local Christians to convince their 
communities to voluntarily comply with the decision and to “mitigate the fears” of local 
apocalyptic violence. Overall, Cartwright’s sermon was optimistic, expressing his 
expectation that moral education would be sufficient to eradicate segregation’s “spirit not 
only from the statute books but from the hearts of men.”1 
Encouraging such patience and delay would prove disastrous, however, especially 
after 31 May 1955, when the Court ruled in Brown II that public schools should 
desegregate at “all deliberate speed.” While churches applauded the decision as a wise 
step toward implementing desegregation, segregationists and local school boards used the 
language to legitimize delay. According to John Kirk, Brown II’s “overall message to the 
South seemed to be that it could take as long as it wanted to desegregate schools. To 
many, this meant never.” Failing to set a definite deadline resulted not in voluntary 
compliance, but rather in a widespread massive resistance movement that effectively 
stalled school desegregation for years.2 Far from producing a “tranquil transition,” 
clerical support for Brown II would breed violence and defiance in local communities. 
However, white ministers’ conviction that segregation was immoral suggests that 
their unintentional support for policies beneficial to massive resisters was misguided, not 
                                                
1 Cartwright’s sermon was reproduced as “A Challenge: Racial Segregation: Is It Un-Christian?” in the 30 
May 1954 edition of the Arkansas Gazette. 
2 Kirk, “Maximum Resistance and Minimum Compliance,” 80-81. As much as scholars differ on Brown’s 
significance, most agree that the Supreme Court’s gradual delay and Brown II’s doctrine of “all deliberate 
speed” was, at the very least, unfortunate. Richard Kluger’s classic work Simple Justice, an overall paean to 
the monumental significance of Brown, wrote that “by almost any measure, [the delay] gave the South a 
great deal more of what it had asked at the final round of arguments than it gave to the Negro.” Michael 
Klarman, who argues that Brown precipitated massive resistance and overall proved more a rallying point 
for segregationists than civil rights activists, also contends that “the decision seems to have encouraged 
defiance and undermined those moderates who were already taking preliminary steps toward 
desegregation.” For more, see Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and 
Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House, 1975), 745; and Klarman, From Jim 
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford, 2004), 
319-320. 
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malicious. This chapter looks at the religious discourse on the national and state levels 
from 1954-1955, contending that religious bodies nationwide constructed a strong 
argument against segregation that drew from both Biblical and practical reasons. Not 
only did segregation’s existence directly hurt world evangelism efforts, the same 
reactionary elements that vocally endorsed segregation also provided fodder for atheist 
Communists and opposed ecumenical church efforts. However ineffective their support, 
white ministers had ample genuine motivations to wish segregation gone. 
Nevertheless, ministers backed disastrous policy because they complacently 
assumed that desegregation was inevitable, having excessive faith in their local 
congregations’ willingness to let their faith rather than their politics guide their actions. 
Their complacency was also tinged with the realization that while Southerners would not 
protest delay, they would certainly contest “forced integration” or militant enforcement. 
National complacency trickled down into local churches, which by and large praised the 
decision but failed to apply pressure for enforcement. Expecting that future desegregation 
would speed up rather than slow down, local churches assumed that the initial limited 
successes were the first signs of an avalanche rather than a grueling and slow trickle. 
 
In the months following Brown, each major denomination released its own 
resolution praising the decision. The SRC recapped these denominational resolutions in 
its publication New South, citing church leaders and organizations who called the 
decision in line with “the broad Christian principle of the dignity and worth of human 
personality” (United Church Women), a “recognition of the brotherhood of man under 
the fatherhood of God” (Methodist Bishop William C. Martin), and, more simply, “just 
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and right” (Protestant Episcopal Church, Southeastern Province).3 Surveying the number 
of resolutions praising the decision, the Christian Century concluded that denominational 
“unanimity proves that the source of their conviction is found in the Christian faith 
itself…. One can no longer claim that there is a substantial difference on this matter.”4 
The spurt of resolutions praising Brown was the latest round in a series of 
postwardenominational statements declaring that segregation was against the will of God. 
The Christian Evangelist, the denominational magazine of the Disciples of Christ, 
reported that the southern Presbyterians’ Committee on Christian Relations had claimed 
in May 1949 that “since Jesus placed love at the center of the ideal of the Kingdom there 
can be no escaping responsibility by the church to seek actively for a solution of the 
problem of race and human rights upon a Christian basis and as an integral part of a God-
given task.”5 The NCC’s 1952 resolution that Cartwright cited also appeared in the 
Church Woman, the United Church Women (UCW)’s periodical.6 Broadly summarized, 
these resolutions declared racial segregation “as un-Christian, unjust and unbrotherly.”7  
While the context of the debate over segregation drastically changed over the 
years, the Bible verses used to justify racial desegregation stayed remarkably consistent 
from this era on through the 1960s. Dorothy Tilly, one of the two southern members on 
President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, backed her assertion that “there is not 
room in any heart for both God and prejudice” with Biblical evidence. Specifically, Tilly 
wrote:  
                                                
3 SRC, Answers for Action: Schools in the South, 6-7. 
4 Editorial, “Resist Racist Appeals!,” Christian Century, 27 October 1954, 1295. 
5 “A Southern Church Studies the Race Question,” Christian Evangelist, 2 November 1949. 
6 “The Churches Have a Platform—On Segregation,” Church Woman, October 1952. 
7 Resist Racist Appeals!,” Christian Century, 1295. 
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God the Father of all the races of men—all men brothers. Then, remember the 
love teachings of Jesus—His example of crossing all lines and making a woman 
of Samaria the first city missionary; Peter’s house-top experience and the Gentiles 
having the Gospel; Paul preaching to Jew and Greek, proclaiming “He hath made 
of one blood all nations of men,” declaring “there is neither Greek nor Jew. . . but 
Christ is all, in all.8 
 
“Peter’s house-top experience and the Gentiles having the Gospel” referred to 
Acts 10, a particularly popular passage for desegregationists because it featured the 
Apostle Peter’s purposeful evangelism to non-Jewish people, demonstrating God’s 
universality. In a 13 February 1952 editorial, the Evangelist declared that segregation had 
little support in the New Testament and that, if anything, “there seems to be definite 
teaching against it, as may be gained from the experience of Peter in his vision on the 
housetop at Joppa.” In a 9 August 1954 Christianity and Crisis article, Morehouse 
College president Benjamin Mays explained how Acts 10 applied to desegregation by 
quoting a later section of the chapter, where the Apostle Peter “was quick to apprehend 
‘that God shows no partiality, but in every nation anyone who fears him and does what is 
right is acceptable by him.’” In a later pamphlet published during the Little Rock crisis, 
First Lutheran Church pastor Richard C. Jahn also quoted from the story “‘God has 
shown me that I should not call any man common or unclean.’ (Acts 10:28) I must not 
think with contempt of anyone.”9 
Tilly’s quotation of the Apostle Paul invoked Acts 17:26 (“He hath made of one 
blood”) and Galatians 3:28 (“there is neither Greek nor Jew), both central proof texts in 
desegregation theology. Mays claimed that the Galatians verse “sounded the universal 
                                                
8 M. E. Tilly, “Overcoming Prejudice,” Church Woman, January 1953. The “woman of Samaria” reference 
likely refers to the story of John 4, where Jesus had an extensive discussion with a Samaritan woman 
despite the historically rooted antipathy between their ethnic origins.  
9 “Disciples and Segregation,” Christian Evangelist, 13 February 1952; Benjamin E. Mays, “The Church 
Will Be Challenged in Evanston,” Christianity and Crisis 14 (9 August 1954), 107; Jahn, ”What Saith the 
Scripture,” 21 October 1957, Arkansas Council of Human Relations (ACHR) Papers, Box 29. 
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character of the Gospel,” while Jahn cited Acts 17:26 as proof that “physically there is a 
common brotherhood between all human beings.” Martin Luther King, Jr. also frequently 
quoted these verses as Biblical proof texts, especially in his sermon “Paul’s Letter to 
American Christians.”10 
Not only did these religious leaders argue that segregation was against the will of 
God, they also contended it marred Christianity’s international image. Specifically, 
domestic racial difficulties hurt international evangelism efforts and provided fodder for 
Communists abroad, which championed an atheistic agenda that was anathema to world 
Christianity. In her seminal work Cold War Civil Rights, Mary Dudziak contends that the 
federal government intervened in civil rights affairs because it sought to mollify 
international criticism that domestic racial discrimination threatened its international 
image. According to Dudziak, U.S. political leaders had to at least appear to champion 
civil rights reform, trying to “tell a particular story about race and American democracy” 
that accented progress and “triumph of good over evil.”11  
                                                
10 Mays, “The Church Will Be Challenged in Evanston;” Jahn, “What Saith the Scripture”; King, Strength 
to Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 130. When asked to provide an explicitly Biblical defense for 
integration, King cited both verses: “Paul’s declaration on Mars Hill in which he states God has mad [sic] 
out of one blood all nations of men to live on the face of the earth. Again Paul states there is neither Jew 
nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male or female for you are all one in Christ Jesus” 
(King to Wilbert J. Johnson, 24 September 1956, in The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume III: 
Birth of a New Age, December 1955-December 1956, eds. Clayborne Carson et al. [Berkeley: University of 
California, 1997], 378-379). The theological argument persisted throughout the era, with some changes. 
Christian Century editor Kyle Haselden, in his widely-cited The Racial Problem in Christian Perspective, 
argued that the proper Christian outlook not only accepted Acts 17:26 as true, but also provided the “spirit 
which transcends ethnic differences, which is beyond likes and dislikes, and which resolves the conflicts of 
racial interest,” allowing a secular society to desegregate. Haselden also cited Galatians 3:28 as the “Magna 
Charta of Christian human relations,” where “that spirit which makes all one” obliterates all human 
differences (Haselden, The Racial Problem in Christian Perspective [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959], 
155-166, 189-190). 
11 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton, 
2000), 13. Dudziak details how the Supreme Court took international criticism as a factor in Brown and 
how American diplomats seized upon it as a public relations coup. She argues that “Brown was an essential 
and long-overdue affirmation of the story of race and American democracy that the government had 
already promoted abroad” (107). 
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While Dudziak focuses on federal policy makers, American Christian leaders also 
had a vested interest in championing racial progress and opposing world communism. In 
March 1950, World Council of Churches staff member Paul Abrecht condemned 
segregation as “the greatest obstacle to European-American understanding and the most 
powerful weapon in the hands of opponents of American policy.” Segregation, according 
to Albrecht, was “the one thing that makes even many well-disposed Europeans feel that 
Americans preaching about democracy is hypocritical.” Otherwise sympathetic 
Europeans liberals’ objections to American race relations made them vulnerable to 
atheistic communist appeals, weakening Christianity’s potential international appeal.12   
Adopting an anticommunist approach also defended the mainline church against 
reactionary forces that opposed its social agenda. Dudziak observed that domestic fears 
of communism “left a very narrow space for criticism of the status quo,” making 
criticism of the class dimensions behind racial exploitation heresy.13 The polarized 
atmosphere made national church bodies very sensitive to charges like J. B. Matthews’s 
July 1953 article “Reds in Our Churches,” which claimed that at least seven thousand 
clergy were communist agents. Christian publications took these charges seriously and 
emphasized the various differences between Christianity and communism. Christianity 
and Crisis co-founder John C. Bennett called such red-baiting accusations cynical attacks 
from social conservatives looking to “discredit the heritage of the Social Gospel as a 
whole and with it the contemporary social teachings of the Churches.” The Evangelist 
                                                
12 Paul Abrecht, “As Others See Us,” Christianity and Crisis 10 (20 March 1950), 26-27.  
13 One unfortunate side effect of progressive clerics’ anticommunism was that it pushed away radical 
Christians who endorsed communist thinking as a radical solution to racial and economic inequality. The 
debate over communism created a sharp divide between the leaders of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, 
as labor organizer and former minister Claude Williams became persona non grata to Christian Socialists 
like Howard Kester. For more, see Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and 
Prophets, 1929-1959 (Charlottesville, University of Virginia, 1981).  
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also protested, calling Matthews’s accusations irresponsible and defending the church as 
“a leading bulwark against communism in the nation today.”14 Such a reply linked 
American mainstream churches to national efforts to contain communism abroad. 
International scorn for American racism also directly marred Christian witness. 
Reflecting on a recent Asia tour, African American pastor James Robinson wrote that 
Americans who blamed Communists for publicizing domestic racial tensions were 
missing the point. After all, “Communists merely exploit what many of the people we 
respect most are greatly disturbed about when they see the great difference between our 
ideals and actions.”  Asian curiosity about American race relations from both Christians 
and non-Christians left Robinson uncomfortably on the defensive. Robinson recalled one 
discomforting incident, when a Muslim “put me to shame in Pakistan when he asked me 
if the Christians in America could measure up to the brotherhood which has been 
achieved within the body of Islam.” He stated that, expecting the church to do more, “our 
friends around the world state categorically that they cannot have confidence in us as 
long as they see such a large disparity between our professed ideals and our concrete 
acts.” According to Robinson, the short term solution to losing out potential converts to 
other religions was to send more African Americans on world missions, because they 
were generally better received. The longer term solution, of course, was to “demonstrate 
the practicality of the message of Jesus as a solution to group and color antagonisms” 
through racial reform.15  
                                                
14 “The Protestant Clergy and Communism,” Christianity and Crisis 13 (3 August 1953), 107-110; “Attack 
Upon Protestant Ministers,” Christian Evangelist, 29 July 1953, 713. 
15 James H. Robinson, “Race Relations and International Problems,” Christian Evangelist, 11 February 
1953, 134-135, 140. 
   
22 
 
Christian writings praising Brown made sure to discuss its international 
ramifications. According to the Christian Century, the decision “will do more to clean the 
hands of the United States as it comes into the court of world public opinion than any 
other single act by any agency of our government since the return of the Boxer 
indemnity.” The Christian Evangelist echoed this observation, arguing that the decision 
might be “the turning point in the struggle of Western democracy for its survival,” 
threatened by negative propaganda about its sordid race relations.16 
 As partners in the larger American church, southern religious leaders had plenty 
of incentive to maintain their own formal opposition to segregation. The Southern Baptist 
Convention Christian Life Commission’s 1956 working paper “Integration” observed that 
American international prestige had been a considerable factor motivating the Court’s 
decision to eliminate legal segregation. Still, the paper approvingly credited the Christian 
message that condemned racial discrimination, arguing that its tension “between the 
Christian ideal on one hand and the very imperfect embodiment of that ideal in the world 
and even within the Christian fellowship is necessary if real progress is to be made.” 
While Southern Baptists had their own prejudices to conquer, they recognized that “we 
cannot escape the plain teachings of the Bible that every basic principle revealed in it 
knows no limitation,” especially racial ones.17 
 As David Chappell contends, the force of the pro-desegregation argument left 
segregationists on the defensive. E. Earle Ellis, Aurora College in Illinois professor and 
Florida native, contended that the mainline periodicals’ tendency “to identify integration 
                                                
16 “A Momentous Court Decision,” Christian Evangelist, 2 June 1954, 515; “The School Decision,” 
Christian Century, 2 June 1954, 660. 
17 T. B. Matson, “Integration,” Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Commission, 1956, in 
ACHR Papers, Box 29.  
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with Christianity and segregation with the forces of iniquity” was “a basic distortion of 
the issues.” Still, the most Ellis could say in rebuttal was that the desegregationists’ 
argument that “integration was concordant with Christian race relations” did not mean 
that it was “necessary,” and that segregation was allowable even if it was not ideal. Ellis 
had to concede that “few Christians” could “defend in toto segregation-in-practice in the 
South,” instead resting his argument on two contentions that race relations in the North 
were far from ideal and that a gentler segregation could produce better results.18 Even the 
seminarians opposing desegregation admitted that it was in the proper Christian spirit, 
hardly a rallying cry for local segregationists. 
 The religious and practical argument that the national church constructed in 
support of Brown denied white southern clergy the ability to comfortably embrace the 
fiction that disfranchisement-era race relations were ideal. It also gave the minister a clear 
directive to encourage progress and to work with local allies to build a more Christian 
and less violently racist order, proving national Christianity’s ability to redeem society 
before a skeptical worldwide audience. Numerous unsung clerics throughout the region 
cited such reasoning to justify their bold stands in direct opposition to their communities 
for desegregation. 
 The American church failed to channel their moral imperative into an effective 
national movement that championed racial desegregation, however. While they knew 
which way to go, their end destination and plans how to get there remained all too vague. 
                                                
18 E. Earle Ellis, “Segregation and the Kingdom of God,” Christianity Today 1, no. 12 (18 March 1957), 6-
8. Although Christianity Today, the evangelical counterpart to the Christian Century, published Ellis’s 
article, its own editorial stance veered toward the Billy Graham argument that segregation was un-Christian 
but that Christians must be careful not to speak “in the spirit of secular and socializing views” (“Review of 
Current Religious Thought,” Christianity Today 1, no. 2 [29 October 1956], 38). For more on the 
theological debate surrounding desegregation, see Chappell, A Stone of Hope, 105-130. 
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In regards to the Brown decision, Christians nationally and locally assumed that it would 
be a “tranquil transition” and that, given enough time and space, religion’s gentle and 
moderate encouragement would lead white Southerners to voluntarily abandon racial 
segregation.  
Their naïveté led them to almost uniformly embrace delay. Nearly all of the 
sampled publications singled out Brown’s unspecified timeline as a wise and prudent 
decision, expecting that time would solve local obstacles toward enforcement. According 
to the Christian Evangelist, the Court’s decision gave sufficient time for localities to 
“thresh out” the method on account for the “many perplexing problems yet unsolved,”  
and the Century claimed that the ruling’s effectiveness “almost certainly will be enhanced 
by the wise decision of the court to postpone for months” the decision’s implementation. 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s editorial in Christianity and Crisis called the delay “additional 
proof” of the Court’s wisdom, claiming that it “did much to deflect any incipient revolt 
against the decision.”19 In contrast, the Church Woman reported that the southern state 
affiliates who met on 21-22 June “recognized the time factor in adjustment and also the 
immediacy of their efforts.”20 Unlike other organizations, the UCW also emphasized the 
urgency to act in the contemporary moment so that desegregation would actually occur. 
The “perplexing problems” which the Evangelist editorial referred to specifically 
meant discontented local reactions to the decision, which Christian leaders assumed that 
delay would quiet. The Century predicted in its initial editorial that “during the next few 
weeks there will probably be a good deal of noisy protest against this decision” as “race-
                                                
19 “A Momentous Court Decision,” Christian Evangelist, 2 June 1954, 515; “The School Decision,” 
Christian Century, 2 June 1954, 660-661; Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Supreme Court on Segregation in the 
Schools,” Christianity and Crisis 14 (14 June 1954), 76. 
20 “Southern Leaders Confer,” Church Woman 20 (August-September 1954), 30. 
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baiters in politics, in newspaper offices or hanging around court-house squares may vie 
with one another in the ferocity of their threats.” In its official statement on Brown, the 
NCC admitted that “to put the decision into effect will test the goodwill and discipline in 
many communities.” Meanwhile, the Christian Evangelist quoted a New York Times 
editorial claiming that the decision would “touch, and undoubtedly irritate, highly 
sensitive sociological, ideological and political areas of the national life.” In particular, 
the Evangelist feared states would abandon their public school systems, forcing churches 
to choose between allowing public education to wither or taking over a segregated 
system.21 While these editors recognized that desegregated public schools were not 
popular among local whites, they vastly underestimated just how unpopular they would 
remain.  
Because they underestimated the problem, church leaders believed that moral 
suasion and religious appeals could win over recalcitrant white southerners, providing the 
smoothest possible solution to the situation. The Century claimed that delay would 
“particularly give Christian forces in the south their opportunity to calm any storm which 
may blow” and the needed time “to reassure the frightened, to draw up the constructive 
proposals which the court has asked for, and to put the race-baiters in their place.” 
Meanwhile, the Evangelist claimed that because segregation had “moral and religious 
implications of great significance, the churches can and must play an important part in 
interpreting and cushioning the impact of the decision upon public opinion.”22 Recent 
                                                
21 “No School Segregation, Says Supreme Court,” Christian Century 71 (26 May 1954), 627; Statement 
Adopted by NCC General Board Re: Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on Segregation in the Public 
Schools, Chicago, Ill., 19 May 1954, SRC Papers, Reel 44; “The Churches and the Court Decision,” 
Christian Evangelist, 31 March 1954. 
22 “No School Segregation, Says Supreme Court,” Christian Century, 26 May 1954; “The School 
Decision,” Christian Century, 2 June 1954, 661; “A Momentous Court Decision,” Christian Evangelist, 2 
June 1954. 
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history also provided hopeful signs. A later Evangelist editorial cited with approval 
Arkansas Gazette editor Harry Ashmore’s claim that desegregated school communities 
soon realized “it wasn’t as bad as we thought it would be” and that integration could 
happen peacefully.23  
Christian leaders expected that churches could dismantle local opposition through 
interracial committees and by maintaining empathy for recalcitrant whites. The 21-22 
June meeting of various UCW leaders passed a resolution declaring that “the best 
solutions to our many problems can be reached when people of all races work together 
toward a common end, and we urge women to make every effort to bring together 
individuals in free discussion.” Edwin L. Brock also recommended that local Christians 
oppose “dishonest” ways to “circumvent the law,” such as abolishing public school 
education or redistricting school zones to maintain virtual segregation, maintaining a 
“sensibly restrained and unimpassioned” approach and fighting “the demonstrations of 
littleness and ill will.”24 Brock encouraged Christians to operate as the community’s 
moral arbiters and discourage extremist actions, allowing the mass of white southerners 
to freely choose voluntary desegregation. Such a strategy, however, could all too easily 
justify moderation and neglect the just demands of local African Americans in favor of an 
ostensibly compliant plan that perpetuated inequality along racial lines. 
National church structures’ appeals for delay dovetailed with southern liberals’ 
hope that religion’s presence on the stage could overcome Jim Crow customs. Two weeks 
after the decision, SRC executive director George Mitchell described his “right method:” 
“why should not citizens of both races who are seriously interested in education 
                                                
23 “Light on Segregation Issue,” Christian Evangelist, 14 July 1954, 659. 
24 “Southern Leaders Confer,” Church Woman, August-September 1954; Brock, “Christians and the Court 
Decision,” Christian Century, 18 August 1954, 975-976. 
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voluntarily set up a committee in each school unit to discuss this problem and attempt a 
settlement that will be fair?” Churches, in Mitchell’s mind, would provide the needed 
encouragement to organize such groups. He expressed his confidence that “the churches 
are going to rally to their jobs and play a major part in the work that confronts the South 
in the next few years.”25  
Clerical confidence thus led clergy to choose gradualism over other possible 
solutions. As churches would eventually do in the 1960s, they could have lobbied for 
federal intervention, put political pressure on state and national leaders, and marshal 
national pressure against southern racism. Even without knowing future events, several 
contemporaries questioned the clergy’s confidence in their moral suasion capabilities. For 
example, in March 1951, South Carolina governor James Byrnes threatened to close 
down the public school system should the Court rule segregated facilities 
unconstitutional, leaving it for churches to decide between supporting segregation or 
deny needed education. According to Stiles B. Lines, state church leaders chose not to 
respond because they knew that “such a large proportion of churchmen share the 
conservative view on segregation” and they feared “that they cannot count on the support 
of the laity in this case.” Had churches recognized their approach’s inherent difficulties at 
the outset, they might have adopted more militant, and possibly more successful, 
strategies to enforce desegregation. 
Gradualism also relied heavily upon local clergy to spearhead the actual work of 
pointing their communities in the Christian direction. This, of course, begs the question: 
how did local ministers respond to Brown and its immediate aftermath? This study now 
turns to examine local pastors in Arkansas and their reactions to Brown. Like their 
                                                
25 Mitchell to James Sells, 14 June 1954; Mitchell to Lauris Whitman, 31 May 1954, SRC Papers, Reel 44. 
   
28 
 
national counterparts, the state’s religious organizations applauded the decision, but 
remained content with resolutions and pronouncements, believing that gradualism would 
bring about the most positive change. While they made clear their preference for school 
boards to desegregate and played a supportive role in the handful of local communities 
that did so, they did not emphasize the urgency of the hour. Furthermore, even at this 
early stage, clerical activists remained sensitive to community criticism. 
As seen in the beginning of this chapter, Colbert S. Cartwright echoed the 
national church’s views, supporting Brown from a moral perspective but avoiding more 
militant alternatives. Cartwright’s father was none other than the then-editor of the 
Christian Evangelist, whose ideas we have also explored above. While worldviews are 
not transmitted genetically, Cartwright’s biography contains traces of exceptional 
liberalism and a border South upbringing. His exposure to pacifists like Harold Fey (who 
later became editor of the Century) led him to successfully apply for conscientious 
objector status during World War II. After attending Yale Seminary, Cartwright became 
pastor of a church in Lynchburg, Virginia, where he joined with interracial committees to 
address local tensions. After falling in love with and marrying one of the members in his 
congregation, Cartwright and his new wife moved to Little Rock in January 1954, to 
“start life together on equal footing in a new church setting.” In his autobiography, 
Cartwright recalled that before he moved he had inquired about the city’s race relations, 
explaining that he “had some problems in Virginia over those issues and did not look 
forward to more of the same. I was assured that the city had no racial problems and that I 
need not worry on that account.”26  
                                                
26 Cartwright, Walking My Lonesome Valley (Self-published manuscript, 1993), 69-73, 80. 
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However, dismissing Cartwright as an outlier because of his religious liberalism is 
a mistake. Cartwright established his impeccable bona fides before moving to Little 
Rock, meaning that interviewing churches had to have known about them. Furthermore, 
Cartwright’s new pastorate, the three-hundred member Pulaski Heights Christian Church, 
welcomed Cartwright’s political views. During Cartwright’s interview process, the local 
deacons glowingly described the church’s “liberal heritage” and mentioned that its 
previous pastors were “all courageously socially radical in terms of Arkansas culture.” 
The church’s previous history gives credence to the deacons’ assertion. It claims to be the 
first church in the South to freely accept members of other denominations, and its 
previous pastors were involved with the incipient labor movement and served at local 
relocation camps for interned Japanese Americans.27 Pulaski Heights Christian Church is 
also likely exceptional, but its existence challenges flat assumptions of conservatism in 
southern churches.  
Many local church bodies echoed at least elements of Cartwright’s message. On 
the more conservative side, Paul Hayes, pastor of a church in Hot Springs, expressed his 
faith that “the new generation in the South will obey the Supreme Court’s decision with a 
minimum of friction.” Hayes’s statement fails to capture the theological imperative, but 
even a blunt call for law and order was a vote for desegregation.28 Meanwhile, O. L. 
Bayless, Arkansas representative to the Southern Baptist Convention’s Home Mission 
Board, believed that broad Christian leadership and interracial cooperation would do 
                                                
27 Ibid., 76-79; Pulaski Heights Christian Church, “Church History,” www.phcc.lr.org (2 March 2012). 
28 “Pastor Sees Compliance,” Arkansas Gazette, 18 May 1954. 
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more for African American Baptists, hoping for a not unsympathetic but still heavily 
paternalistic relationship.29  
Even explicit racists could uphold the idea that the Supreme Court decision was 
good. In his appeal for Supreme Court compliance, Rev. G. A. McKelvey wrote, “we are 
pretty well aware of the limitations of the Southern Negro,” namely his lack of morals, 
ambition, and initiative, and that “in many instances great hearts beat in humble homes 
and beneath blue denum [sic] overalls and starched cotton dresses.” Yet McKelvey also 
equated white supremacy in the South with the “ugliness and repulsiveness of the goose-
stepping Nazis,” and unequivocally stated that “race superiority, founded on color lines 
alone, is bigotry and egotism at its ugly worst” and was contrary to Biblical teachings.30 
McKelvey’s paternalistic support paled in comparison to his Methodist 
denomination’s enthusiastic support of Brown as in line with “the spirit and teaching of 
Jesus Christ.” The resolution hewed closely to the national line, also praising the “wise 
decision” to postpone implementation, which they felt would give its churches time to 
partner with local communities to desegregate with “clear, calm judgment and Christian 
good-will.”31 Meanwhile, Catholic bishop Albert L. Fletcher reminded state Catholics 
that “the Church considers all men to be equally the children of God” and that Brown 
cleared the legal path for Catholics “to act more freely in giving to all races the same 
benefits she is able to provide for the practice of their holy religion.”32 Much like their 
national superiors, local clergy applauded Brown but did not press for immediate change. 
                                                
29 Bayless, “Arkansas Baptists Will Meet The Need,” Arkansas Baptist, 24 June 1954. 
30 G. A. McKelvey, “Race Relations: A Timely Discussion of a Pressing Problem,” Arkansas Methodist, 24 
February 1955, 3. 
31 “Text of Methodist Report,” Arkansas Gazette, 13 June 1954. 
32 “Official Announcement,” The Guardian, Diocese of Little Rock, 13 August 1954. In his unpublished 
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letter in style appeared to firmly support desegregation, its actual effect “was to establish local option in 
   
31 
 
Clerical support for voluntary compliance passed its first test with flying colors, 
although it was hardly representative of the difficulties ahead. A few days after the 
Court’s announcement, the school boards in Charleston and Fayetteville—both in the 
mountainous northwest part of the state—announced their decision to desegregate their 
school districts for the upcoming school year. Their approaches toward implementation 
varied. Charleston kept its plans secret, only reporting that that it had desegregated after 
the fact to avoid unwelcome publicity on what it insisted was a local problem.33 On the 
other hand, Fayetteville publically announced its efforts to desegregate its high schools, 
and, according to Andrew Brill, successfully accomplished a peaceful desegregation 
campaign with “quiet dignity.” The resulting publicity provides a unique window into 
how local clergy envisioned voluntary compliance, supporting other interested forces.34  
According to observer Stephen Stephan, a sociology professor at the nearby 
University of Arkansas, local ministerial support was a notable reason for Fayetteville’s 
unique desegregation campaign. Specifically, local churches adhered to the national 
strategy of promoting interracial contact—especially among youth—and lending moral 
support to the overall plan. As the local high school student leaders also were involved in 
local youth groups, church activity “helped to destroy the feeling that Negroes would not 
be welcome in the high school.” He noted that while a handful of the out of state letters 
                                                                                                                                            
each parish. Consequently, generally nothing was changed” (Griswold, The Second Reconstruction in Little 
Rock, 21, Sara Alderman Murphy Papers, UA Fayetteville). Its limited impact suggests further the futility 
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33 “Sheridan Rescinds Integration Order, Fayetteville to Mix,” Arkansas Gazette, 23 May 1954; “Classes 
Mixed Since August At Charleston,” Arkansas Gazette, 14 September 1954; Southern School News, 
October 1954, 3. 
34 Brill, “Brown in Fayetteville: Peaceful Southern School Desegregation in 1954,” Arkansas Historical 
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called the desegregation process against God’s will, most letters “endorsed the board’s 
stand as consistent with democratic and Christian principles.”35 
Oral histories mostly confirm Stephan’s initial observations. John Lewis, who 
attended Fayetteville High in 1954, confirmed that many of the high school’s student 
leaders “came out of the Methodist and Episcopal and Presbyterian and Christian 
churches” and that desegregation was discussed in church meetings. Meanwhile, Thelma 
Engler, president of the UCW state chapter, recalled that fundamentalist churches refused 
to allow ministerial associations to endorse integration efforts, but that allied 
organizations “kept the idea of accepting everybody as the ideal.” Engler’s mention of 
fundamentalist churches serves as a reminder that progressive voices were by no means 
unanimous. Still, these testimonies suggest that local churches in Fayetteville helped 
rather than harmed the desegregation process.36 
However, Fayetteville’s situation was quite different than that of Little Rock or 
other school districts that had more difficulty obeying the Supreme Court. Fayetteville 
had pragmatic reasons to desegregate its schools. In his study on early school 
desegregation, Stephan found that desegregation was far more likely to occur in districts 
that were smaller and predominantly white, for economic reasons. As an example, 
Stephan cited Fayetteville—which only had 400 African Americans amongst a town of 
18,000, and only six African American high school students enrolled in its district. 
Lacking a local school for so few students, the school district had previously paid around 
$5000 a year to have them to attend schools at Fort Smith or Hot Springs, sixty to 180 
miles away. William Gatewood points out that Fayetteville’s progressive reputation made 
                                                
35 Stephan, “Integration in Arkansas,” Christian Century, 24 November 1954, 1426-1427. 
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it more amenable to compliance, as it was a college town and Senator William 
Fulbright’s home. Finally, Andrew Brill argues that Fayetteville’s location in Northwest 
Arkansas, one of the bastions of pro-Union sentiment back during the Civil War, meant 
that Jim Crow sentiment was never as strong as it was in other locations. Desegregation 
occurred in Fayetteville because it was also far more convenient and cheaper for these 
districts to desegregate their schools than to maintain segregation.37  
Although the state initially appeared to move toward compliance, clergy 
encountered occasional local resistance. Once the Gazette republished parts of his 
sermon, Cartwright received some mail from eight states disagreeing with his 
antisegregationist stance. Mostly, letter writers objecting to his sermon raised both “a fear 
of mongrelization” and Biblical arguments proving African inferiority. One such example 
came from a Mrs. Robinson, who wrote that “there isn’t a Negroe [sic] in the world that 
God bids me degenerate to their low principles.” Some letters also contained veiled 
threats, such as Earl C. Swider’s: “I understand it you are new in these parts and some of 
us Boys around here play for keeps.” Swider was likely a local, as he mentioned the class 
differences between the well-to-do Pulaski Heights area and the rest of the city.38 
Swider also accused Cartwright of being a Communist dupe and that the “only 
reason this is happening now is Russia,” daring Cartwright to prove that African 
Americans “are not Hypocrites and Not give Russia a tool to hold over their heads.” The 
broad association made between civil rights reform and communist sympathy might have 
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been what motivated Arkansas Methodists to devote a large section of their 12 June 
resolution to it. According to the resolution, “we resent unproved assertions that the 
Protestant ministry is honeycombed with disloyalty. We are unalterably opposed to 
communism, but we know that the alternative to communism is not an American brand of 
facism.”39 Despite these resolutions broadcasting their counter argument that civil rights 
reform actually hurt worldwide communism, supportive ministers remained susceptible 
to red-baiting. 
Such letters reveal that the spirit of massive resistance was present long before it 
materialized into full form. Sheridan, in between Pine Bluff and Little Rock, also 
encountered local resistance in its own unsuccessful attempt to comply with Brown. On 
21 May, the day before Fayetteville announced its own decision, they were the first city 
in the state to announce compliance. However, local opposition forced them to reverse 
their plans the next day, and even after they did still threatened to replace them entirely. 
On a 1 June mass meeting, state representative candidate J. H. Duncan criticized the 
clerical support behind Sheridan’s desegregation, especially the pastor of Sheridan’s First 
Methodist Church, Bryan Stephens. Stephens had opposed the mass meeting, warning 
that “men are liable to resort to violence and bloodshed” in such situations. Highlighting 
Stephens’s mediating role might well have made him a target for segregationist reprisals 
as well. Sheridan’s defiance also inspired hope that the Court’s decision could be 
resisted. According to a local citizen, Sheridan “had given the people of Pine Bluff more 
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hope and inspiration than anything that had happened since the unprecedented Supreme 
Court decision.”40 
Still, such opposition pales in comparison to what similar actions would spark in 
the future. Had state church bodies united in decrying Sheridan’s resistance and reminded 
the school board of its legal duty, they might have overcome local opposition. As other 
districts like Hot Springs and Little Rock discussed possible desegregation methods, a 
hard push from church bodies might have encouraged desegregation to occur before fatal 
national events like the Southern Manifesto stiffened resistance.  
Arkansas churches failed to take advantage of this window because of their faith 
in moral suasion. They could point to its remarkable success in Fayetteville and 
Charleston, ignoring the regional differences that made them exceptional outliers rather 
than representative communities like Sheridan, and dismissing oppositional mail as the 
unfortunate product of a lunatic fringe. In April 1955, assessing the situation, newly hired 
Arkansas Council of Human Relations (ACHR) executive director Nat Griswold claimed 
that “Arkansas has an excellent leadership in the matter of inter-group relations and is 
more ready to do that which is right than any other southern state.”41  
Therefore, when the Supreme Court announced on 31 May 1955 that school 
desegregation should occur “with all deliberate speed,” local clerics praised the decision 
as wise. According to the Arkansas Methodist, the decision “makes possible a more sane 
and deliberate approach to the whole problem involved than would have been possible” 
had it set a fixed date. Griswold also praised the decision’s timetable, claiming that it 
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allowed local concerned citizens to focus on “joint planning to meet properly these 
requirements which recognizably are in accord with our religious teachings and with our 
democratic principles.”42  
National organizations were also optimistic regarding future implementation. In 
its 1954 end of year issue, the Evangelist maintained that “many of the fears [of 
segregationists] have not been realized,” even as it admitted that whole states had ignored 
the decision.43 The Century praised Brown II for its moderation, contending that it gives 
churches “an unparalleled opportunity to raise their voices” for action. In contrast, had 
the Court issued a deadline, “the stage would have been set for an explosion of 
demagoguery which in turn would have been met by a demand for punitive legislation.” 
The Century editorial recognized that state resistance encouraged by southern political 
leaders like James Eastland presented a potential obstacle, but dismissed it as “more than 
a little silly” in light of the moderate tone of the decision.44 Despite the mounting 
evidence that the South would not simply accept Brown, church leaders maintained hope 
that current progress judged future trends.  
 Clerical perspectives dovetailed with those of southern liberals, who remained 
optimistic in May 1955. Days before the Court’s ruling on implementation, Christianity 
and Crisis ran a reprint of Frank Porter Graham’s article “The Need For Wisdom,” which 
urged for a moderate process. Graham wrote that “both those who would require 
immediately complete integration in all communities with the resulting bitter resistance 
in many communities, and those who would use time as a tactic of deliberate 
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noncompliance in those communities” would be responsible for the resulting damage 
locally, nationally, and internationally. According to Graham, time properly used would 
remove the emotional appeals to either nullify the law or to demand for federal 
intervention “resulting in contagious fear and further resistance in the Deep South.” 
Voluntary desegregated communities, according to Graham, would “by their example 
show the way” for others, a domino theory where even recalcitrant districts would 
eventually be forced to desegregate. Like earlier authors, Graham also cast his argument 
in an international scope: 
Standing on the brink of the disaster of a divided world with the hydrogen bomb 
in its bosom, the nations cannot lag in the control of its power, loaded with either 
the doom of our civilization or the hopes of co-operation in its creative uses for all 
people through the United Nations. Let us not lag in our own democracy but 
rather may we in this hour become the fresh source of equal freedom and the 
dynamic center of a spiritual chain reaction for the mobilization of all the races, 
regions, humane cultures, and spiritual hopes of the people so that the universal 
yearning of the people for peace shall in time transform the high potentials of the 
world for war into the co-operation of peoples toward equal freedom, justice, and 
peace under God who “made of one blood all the nations of men for to dwell on 
the face of the earth.”45 
 
In Graham’s vision, the promise for America, if it would abolish Jim Crow and grant full 
democracy to all its citizens regardless of race, was nothing less than the mythic goal of 
world peace.  
While clerical hopes for voluntary desegregation ultimately proved facile, looking 
at the white church solely based on its results clouds our own understanding of the 1950s. 
If one accepts that both national and local church bodies desired to eradicate segregation, 
especially because local racial prejudice threatened missionary activity and national 
prestige, then one cannot resort to the typical reasons of cowardice or apathy. Rather, 
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churches failed to initially mobilize because they believed that the considerable negative 
reaction to Brown would diminish rather than erupt into full defiance. Their initial 
optimism led them to hope that interracial committees and public pronouncements would 
lead local Southerners to voluntarily desegregate in proper time, and more importantly, 
tranquilly. Such a vision led them to downplay the budding signs of local resistance that 
would soon flower and prevent them from raising the more militant tone that civil rights 
clerical campaigns would gain in later years. Unfortunately, local citizens’ growing 
determination to defy Brown, especially in unruly ways, would illustrate just how 
impossible voluntary compliance was as a solution. Massive resistance blindsided the 
clergy’s plans for productive delay, leaving them scrambling for other potential ways to 
mobilize support for desegregated public schools.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“MIRRORS OF PREJUDICE OR COLONIES OF HEAVEN” 
 
The Court’s policy of delay that southern liberals and church bodies supported did 
not lead to compliance. Instead, it led to the emergence of local Citizens Councils and 
southern reactionary politicians. In his classic work Rise of Massive Resistance, Numen 
V. Bartley wrote, “the southern mood leaned toward social reaction, however, and during 
the year following the second Brown decision of May, 1955, massive resistance grew to 
maturity.” According to Bartley, neobourbon political elites swung opinion rightward, 
using redbaiting tactics to hijack the South and gain prominence and power. Although 
Bartley predominantly focused on political actors, he observed that their rise to power 
and the silencing of viable liberal alternatives “was the symptom of a none too healthy 
society.”1 
The state’s open defiance of Brown left local churches in the small minority that 
protested the reactionary turn. While David Chappell’s claim that “the white South’s 
religious bodies lined up on one side and its politicians on the other” over desegregation 
is true, far more people joined the politicians than the churches.2 This chapter examines 
Arkansas clergy’s split responses to massive resistance, observing that they failed to 
influence state affairs. Segregationist virulence shocked many local ministers into silence 
rather than action, pleading for moderation over justice. Still, even the more conservative 
ministers remained necessary allies for the civil rights advocates, and they at least lined 
up alongside the desegregationists ideologically in opposition to local resistance. Even 
when united, however, supportive clergy discovered their opposition alone could not 
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derail a growing segregationist tide that had considerable political sway. By September 
1957, they had discovered just how much courage it took to champion Christian 
behavior. 
This chapter also introduces a new actor onto the scene, the Arkansas Council of 
Human Relations (ACHR), an interracial statewide organization affiliated with the SRC 
that was formed soon after the initial Brown decision. Although not an explicitly religious 
organization, the ACHR’s leadership and rank and file contained many sympathetic 
clergy, including Cartwright—who was a founding member, its vice-chairman, and even 
its president for a while. Sociologist and ACHR member Elaine Ogden McNeil’s study 
on the organization discovered that its members were mostly “personnel in welfare or 
religious organizations, academicians, or wives of such men.” Her 1960 sample of 
members’ professions showed that 17.8 percent of the organization had a background in 
religious organizations or welfare, as opposed to 1.3 percent of the overall state 
population. The percentage was likely even higher in 1955, as many ministers and 
welfare workers were transferred out of the state, “presumably because of the 
unpopularity of their pro-civil rights stand.”3  
 The first state signs of emerging massive resistance appeared after Hoxie 
successfully integrated its entire school system in Summer 1955. A small farming town 
of less than two thousand in northeast Arkansas, Hoxie shared many similarities with its 
counterparts in the northwest part of the state. It also had only a few African American 
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high school students (eight, to be exact) who had to be bused for their education (twenty-
three miles to Jonesboro). Although the town had a primary school for its fifteen African 
American students of primary school age, the building was falling apart and placed in an 
undesirable location, and even the school board recognized that its condition signified 
unequal education. The Southern School News summarized Hoxie school superintendent 
K. E. (Howard) Vance’s three reasons why Hoxie chose to desegregate as follows:  
1) “Integration is “right in the eyes of God.” 
2) Obedience to the Supreme Court ruling that racial segregation in public 
schools is unconstitutional. 
3) It’s cheaper.4 
 
Much like Fayetteville and Charleston, Hoxie fit the profile for school districts that would 
voluntarily desegregate. 
 The initial integration proceeded smoothly, much like in Fayetteville. The only 
sign of local discontent was a rumor that someone had put up a $100 reward to fight 
Vance, which went unclaimed—possibly because Vance was six foot three and weighed 
245 pounds. Jerry Vervack argues that Hoxie’s initial compliance was evidence “that 
peaceful integration was possible in the upper South,” and that the resulting 
segregationist protests was, ironically, the influence of outside agitators and not local 
citizens. According to local sources, trouble only began after Life published a two-page 
photographic essay on the town’s integration process, including a picture of two 
schoolgirls, one white and the other African American, walking arm in arm.5  
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Perhaps not entirely coincidentally, the following week white supremacist 
organizations from outside the town carpet-bombed Hoxie’s streets with handbills, and 
segregationist organizers found enough local citizens to form a grassroots movement 
determined to reverse the school board’s decision. On 3 August, more than 350 residents 
met to organize a boycott of the schools, and on 13 August, Amis Guthridge, the legal 
counsel for Little Rock’s chapter of White America, Inc., spoke at a local rally. The 
rallies even gained the blessing of several segregationist pastors. Local Missionary 
Baptist pastor Robert Watkins delivered the invocation for the segregationists’ 10 August 
meeting, and Wesley Pruden of Little Rock’s Broadmoor Baptist Church, a “friend” of 
White America, Inc., delivered the closing prayer at a later rally.6 Significantly, Governor 
Orval Faubus was not one of the local supporters, choosing to instead remain neutral. 
According to biographer Roy Reed, Faubus declared Hoxie “a local matter and he would 
not intervene.”7  
The resulting pressure forced the school district to close its summer session two 
weeks early, although it reiterated its determination to remain integrated.8 The dispute 
eventually landed in court, as White America, Inc., sued the Hoxie school board for 
breaking minor laws, and the school board countersued the segregationists for impeding 
the federal court order to desegregate. Over a year later, the Eighth Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of the school board, ordering segregationist organizations to desist in their 
efforts to hinder desegregation.9 
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 Although the segregationist campaign to reverse integration ultimately failed, its 
prominence alarmed progressive clergy. Hoxie Methodist Church pastor Rev. H. L. 
“Pop” Robison had followed the Fayetteville script on the eve of school integration, 
encouraging his church’s youth to observe the Golden Rule in their interactions with the 
African American students. He maintained his support for the school board even after 
protests emerged. Robison explained his support in an Associated Press interview, 
saying, “I told my people that the Negroes were brought over in chains and worked under 
the lash and we have to correct that wrong.”10 Robison’s public support made him a 
target for reprisal, as his church went through a schism over the matter and he 
experienced personal harassment when people hammered below his floor and honked 
their car horns outside his house at night to disturb his sleep.11  
The presence of an organized segregationist movement also galvanized state 
liberals, after the ACHR initially ignored integration at Hoxie because “there was no need 
for help, no ‘outside influence.’” When the crisis emerged, ACHR chairman Fred 
Darragh, Arkansas Gazette editor Harry Ashmore, Reverend E. B. Williams, Urban 
League representative Perry Taylor, and ACHR executive director Nat Griswold, a 
former Methodist minister, met to discuss the situation. They eventually decided to send 
Griswold and Williams, who knew members of the school board, to Hoxie “to help 
stabilize the situation.” Arriving on 17 August, Griswold and Williams met with board 
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members, Vance, and a “Methodist minister” (likely Robison) for several hours “to 
bolster their courage and resolution.” In his report to the SRC, Griswold described the 
situation as “bad, very bad.” Specifically, “around the clock calls, anonymous abusive 
language to members of their families, distrust of neighbors” wore down the school 
board, and they were “ready to resign.”12 
Griswold returned to Hoxie on 19-21 and 25-27 August to organize local 
ministers and to find local legal counsel for the board. The heightened tension made it 
difficult for Griswold to rally local pastors to reinforce Robison, despite being armed 
with the national church resolutions promoting desegregation. He met with Hoxie’s First 
Baptist Church pastor J. B. Chandler, encouraging him to call a meeting of local 
ministers to discuss how to publicly support Hoxie desegregationists. Although Chandler 
agreed to call the meeting on 29 August, he later developed second thoughts. In a 26 
August letter, Chandler explained that he had canceled the meeting because “I am of the 
opinion, we are not ready.” He gave three reasons: he had not talked about the meeting 
with the board or the superintendent, the recent refusal of Walnut Ridge’s school board to 
not pursue desegregation, and his belief that the best thing to do at the moment was “to 
spend our time in ‘Watchful Waiting.’”13  
While Chandler’s willingness to give Griswold a fair hearing suggested his 
interest in desegregation, the potential costs of opposing massive resistance were 
apparently too much. It is hard not to imagine that witnessing Robison’s persecution 
firsthand gave Chandler cold feet, and that “Watchful Waiting” was really an excuse to 
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not invite strife and harassment. Griswold recalled his own disappointment after meeting 
with Chandler on the 29th: “fell flat on my face to find that the minister had not called the 
meeting: ‘Decided it would do no good now!’”14  
 The ACHR succeeded in locating a friendly lawyer thanks to ministerial 
networking. While legal counsel did not fit his job description, Cartwright provided 
surprising assistance. He had made regional headlines in June 1954, when he told 
University of Arkansas medical and pharmacy students in a baccalaureate address that 
they “have an inescapable obligation to lead others to judge the worth of persons not on 
the basis of race but of intrinsic human worth.”15 The resulting news coverage caught the 
eye of a Mrs. Bill Penix living in nearby Jonesboro, who wrote a letter praising 
Cartwright’s courage and that she had alerted her husband to the speech. Not only did her 
husband teach local Wesley Foundation students about how the church had not taken “a 
responsible stand in support of the Supreme Court on desegregation,” he was also a 
lawyer.16 Thus, when the Hoxie school board listed legal counsel as one of its needs, Bill 
Penix fit the bill of the “enthusiastic lawyer with moral convictions” the ACHR sought. 
According to David Appleby, Penix provided invaluable assistance to the school board, 
especially with his connections to Arthur Caldwell, a high ranking member of the Civil 
Rights division in the Justice Department.17  
                                                
14 Griswold, “Log for August.” Apparently, Griswold missed Chandler’s 26 August letter three days prior. 
15 Cartwright, “‘What Doth the Lord Require of Thee,’ Baccalaureate Address to the University of 
Arkansas Schools of Medicine and Pharmacy,” 12 June 1955, Cartwright Papers. 
16 Penix to Cartwright, 13 June 1955, Cartwright Papers. 
17 Cartwright, “What Can Southern Ministers Do,” Christian Century, 26 December 1956; Griswold, “Log 
for August”; Hoxie: The First Stand. In the Century article, Cartwright claimed that Griswold remembered 
that a “Little Rock minister” (very likely Cartwright) told him about Penix. In Appleby’s documentary, 
Vance ignores the Griswold/Cartwright connection, saying that after three days in his search for legal 
counsel in the local area, he found Bill and his father Roy Penix to represent the school board. 
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 Hoxie was the first place in Arkansas where voluntary desegregation efforts met 
massive resistance, providing a test case for the clergy’s ability to calm inflamed 
passions. According to the national script, ministers appealing to shared Christian values 
could counter the inflammatory rhetoric of reactionary racists and convince communities 
to peacefully accept the end of Jim Crow. Judging the clergy by that script, they failed. 
Robison’s initial efforts to smooth desegregation and his later heroism likely had a 
positive impact on the situation, but the segregationists continued their rallies with the 
blessings of their own pastors. Chandler’s diffidence and eventual refusal to call a 
meeting together, furthermore, show that the courage required to actually implement 
moral suasion was far higher than theorized. Ministers found out not only that their pleas 
were not decisive, but also that their official titles provided little protection from either 
expected or actual harassment. Silent moderates like Chandler ended up providing little 
effective support, weakening the potential reach clergy had. 
 However, Hoxie also showed that ministers could do more than simply speak out. 
While Griswold’s attempt to rally local clergy failed, he succeeded in his other two goals 
of boosting the school board’s morale and finding legal counsel. It is significant that, 
according to ACHR sources, Griswold recruited Penix not because of his legal skills but 
because Penix’s wife vouched for his Christian motivation and distaste for segregation. 
Penix’s recruitment served as a promise that there were also committed laypeople with 
valued skill sets who believed that segregation was un-Christian. Mobilizing them could 
provide just as valuable a service to beleaguered school officials as their publicized pulpit 
messages. 
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 However, partnering with officials would only work if the officials were firmly on 
the side of compliance. Both Jerry Vervack and David Appleby give deserved credit to 
Superintendent Vance and the local school board for standing firm despite experiencing 
similar harassment, while Elizabeth Jacoway castigates Little Rock superintendent Virgil 
Blossom for his efforts to forestall and minimize similar attempts. Later events would 
prove that Hoxie was the exception for school desegregation campaigns. The ACHR soon 
discovered that few people were as willing as Vance to stand up to reactionary forces. Far 
more often, local officials buckled under local pressure to affirm Jim Crow. Although 
itself a success, the Hoxie campaign foreshadowed many of the difficulties that white 
southern progressive ministers would experience in later years. 
 Hoxie’s slow and conflicted move toward integration might have scared off other 
school districts in the state, as none of them desegregated their public schools for the 
1956-1957 school year. Instead, over a hundred senators and congressmen signed the 
Southern Manifesto on 12 March 1956 pledging “all lawful means” to resist 
implementing Brown. Furthermore, several historians contend that, at least in Arkansas, 
massive resistance forced the political leadership to follow, not the other way around. 
Elizabeth Jacoway and Roy Reed argue that electoral pressures pushed Governor Orval 
Faubus, who initially had a moderate reputation, rightward during and after his 1956 
reelection campaign. Jacoway focuses on how challenger Jim Johnson, an Arkansas Delta 
native who helped rally Hoxie segregationists, ran a successful race-baiting campaign 
that “shut off Faubus’s wiggle room” and forced him to take a stance supporting 
segregation to stay in power. Reed argues that Faubus was legitimately worried about 
Johnson’s candidacy, while his political instincts told him that he could safely “ignore the 
 
 
48 
 
left, the NAACP, and the noisy but small band of white liberals.” Both arguments help 
explain why he endorsed implementing a pupil placement plan in his reelection campaign 
to make sure that “no school board would be forced to mix the races while I am 
governor.” Appearing restrained in comparison to Johnson’s encouragement of outright 
defiance, Faubus’s plan allowed him to label Johnson a “‘purveyor of hate’ who was 
profiting from stirring racial tensions” while maintaining an overall segregationist 
stance.18 
 As resistance became a reality, differences emerged within the supportive clerical 
ranks. While not fully representative of the continuum of views, one can broadly group 
them into moderates and progressives. Both sides agreed with the national vision that 
churches encourage local communities to voluntarily comply with the Court’s decision, 
but differed on tactics and emphasis. Moderates emphasized the voluntary aspect, urging 
that desegregation occur tranquilly and orderly, and that ministers should mediate 
between extremists on both sides.  While their success was inevitable, in the meantime 
African Americans should simply be patient until the day when local white officials 
could hand them their well-deserved rights. 
Progressive clergy differed in emphasizing the ultimate need for compliance. 
They saw Brown as a positive step reflecting democratic and Christian principles, not an 
inconvenient order crammed down the South’s throat, which only deserved obedience 
because it was the law of the land. They usually participated in interracial committees 
                                                
18 Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis that Shocked the Nation (New York: Free Press, 
2007), 40-45; Reed, Faubus, 175-179; Southern School News, April 1956, 2, 8; May 1956, 10; July 1956, 
9; September 1956, 15. While the Little Rock school board had a desegregation plan in place, its continual 
pleas for delay left local NAACP leaders discontent. 
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with African American elites, which disabused them of the notion that the NAACP was 
the pro-integration version of local Citizens Councils.  
One must remember that these are merely labels, and that people’s attitudes 
toward desegregation fluctuated throughout this period. Jason Sokol argues that 
understanding individual white southerners is “even more complex because they were not 
fixed, but precarious and mutable. Few forces shook them so thoroughly as the struggles 
of the civil rights movement.”19 While even Cartwright initially emphasized voluntarism 
following the Brown decision, he later endorsed coercive means as he recognized that 
voluntarism was causing more harm than good. Many formerly moderate pastors evolved 
into progressives, and not a few progressives urged caution when circumstances dictated. 
While the broad groupings help make general claims, it remains an imprecise 
measurement regarding individual views. 
 However, significant differences emerged between moderate and progressive 
clergy regarding Arkansas congressman Brooks Hays’s decision to sign the Southern 
Manifesto. A self-proclaimed New Dealer, Hays was also a respected Southern Baptist 
layman who would become president of the convention in 1957. He supported the 
ACHR, praising its clerical activism in encouraging voluntary compliance. He even 
applauded Cartwright for his 23 May 1954 sermon praising Brown, writing, “I am glad 
                                                
19 Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975 (New 
York: Knopf, 2006), 15. Sokol’s work, which primarily focuses on the ‘60s, has several anecdotes about 
how people initially sympathetic to segregationist organizations felt distaste as they became more extreme. 
One particularly representative one details the story of Margaret and Jim Conner of New Orleans, who 
refused to boycott the desegregated public schools—initially because she did not want to watch over her 
four schoolchildren during the day, and later because she despised group coercion. According to Sokol, her 
initial moderation “wilted when she confronted a highly charged situation” (135-139). 
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that you recognize the appropriateness of Christian ministers speaking out with reference 
to problems of this character.”20  
One compelling vignette illustrates Hays’s desire to improve African American 
welfare, albeit through paternalistic means. In January 1957, Hays wrote a letter to 
George Mitchell asking for a interest-free student loan for Terry York, who was the first 
African American student to attend Arkansas Polytechnic College. According to Hays, 
York, who was also working a full-time job as a fry cook, had talked with him about 
maybe getting one day off, but “he can’t afford to lose the money and his employer is 
non-cooperative.” As a result of Hays’s intervention, Mitchell contacted Griswold on 
behalf of “a friend of mine in Washington, D.C.” in order to arrange the loan.21  
 Hays was also a self-proclaimed moderate, whose stated motivations for signing 
the Manifesto reveal his distaste for both the declaration’s bombastic claims and the 
specter of federal intervention. In his 1958 book A Southern Moderate Speaks, Hays 
wrote: “while [the Manifesto] contained items which to me would have better been 
omitted, I believed the declaration was an honest reaction to the injury the South believed 
had been done to its way of life.” While Hays was no fan of Plessy, he had misgivings 
about the ways that African American activists could use Brown to force compliance on 
unwilling citizens. Specifically, Hays contended that both the Citizens Councils and the 
NAACP were responsible for sabotaging previously peaceful race relations, as both sides 
clashed in ugly and costly snafus like Autherine Lucy’s failed attempt to desegregate the 
University of Alabama. Even as incidents like Hoxie challenged the myth that the South 
would voluntarily and smoothly comply, Hays stubbornly clung to the notion that 
                                                
20 Hays to Cartwright, 31 May 1954, Cartwright Papers. 
21 Hays to George S. Mitchell, 2 January 1957, SRC Papers; George S. Mitchell to Nat Griswold, 14 
January 1957, SRC Papers. 
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“‘permissive integration,’ in communities where social opinion has become amenable to 
this development,” was the ideal strategy. The Manifesto, which specifically focused on 
“forced” integration but ignored voluntary cases, was acceptable, if not ideal, to the self-
proclaimed “states rights liberal.” 
 Hays also claimed that his participation allowed him to drastically mitigate the 
Manifesto’s language, but his reasoning is less plausible. Hays stated that he and a 
handful of other Southern moderate legislators had “refused to sign the document unless 
it removed all mention of the doctrines of nullification and interposition.” However, Hays 
ignored that the more extreme legislators would continue to make plenty such statements 
after the Manifesto’s signature and that the Manifesto, by only removing mentions of 
legal chicanery rather than explicitly condemning these tactics as illegal, failed to 
resemble anything close to a moderating statement.22 Much like J. V. Chandler, Hays’s 
reasons for signing the address fail to address core issues of morality—a particularly odd 
stance when these leaders, at least publically, echoed the need for southern Christians to 
courageously advocate love, a united brotherhood undivided by race, and resolution to 
the long-standing racial discrimination afflicting the land.  
Ironically, the Southern Baptist Convention’s Christian Life Commission, which 
Hays chaired, explicitly stated in its resolution the next month: “There is no reason for us 
to avoid these issues or couch them in evasive language or sentimental speech.”23 Likely, 
                                                
22 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 88-96. Immediately before discussing Brown, Hays mentioned his 
support for eliminating segregation in interstate travel, contending that was an area that the federal 
government could exercise its jurisdiction.  
23 Quoted in Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 203-204. On 6 March, only a few days before Hays 
signed the Manifesto, the Christian Life Commission issued a statement blaming “violent and radical” 
reactions to the Court decision. Instead of rejecting it, however, the commission recommended that 
Southern Baptists “accept the Supreme Court decision as the law of the land,” as it “is in harmony with our 
democratic concepts and with the principles of the Christian religion.” As a convention, Southern Baptists 
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Hays was keeping one eye on his reelection campaign, knowing that he would face 
segregationist Amis Guthridge, who would undoubtedly use any refusal to sign the 
Manifesto as political leverage. Seeing that Hays would lose his seat two years later for 
his efforts to mediate the Central High crisis, such fears had merit. Still, as the ACHR put 
it, political “expediency hardly seems to call for joining the unreconstructed dixiecrats in 
deceiving responsible citizens into believing that there is a perfectly legal way of 
circumventing the Court’s decision.”24 
Progressive clergy saw Hays’s stand as a betrayal. When he met with African 
American Little Rock ministers while running for reelection, one of the pastors criticized 
him for signing the Manifesto, saying: “I simply cannot understand how a man with your 
background in good race relations could fail to maintain a high moral position.” Hays’s 
memoir emphasized the happy ending, where he expressed his belief that their 
“criticizing a white man to his face and doing it forcibly” was itself evident of the new 
times. While the pastor “might be right” that Hays should have not signed, all who 
attended agreed that “our honest disagreements could be reconciled on the basis of social, 
religious, and political actions of an educational nature” rather than government 
mandate.25 While true, it ignored the fact that the Manifesto encouraged local citizens to 
resolve these disagreements not with communication but with force, repression, and the 
phantom threat that Communists and left-wingers were upsetting the South’s customs. 
Hays’s sympathy toward the ACHR likely protected him from its public criticism, 
but leaders privately encouraged him to at least modify his statement. They sent a protest 
                                                                                                                                            
knew that “we may need to go slowly and carefully, but we do need to recognize that our practice is far 
below the Christian ideal” (T. B. Matson, “Integration,” 1956). 
24 “Manifesto of Legislators,” ACHR Newsletter 2 (March 1956), in ACHR Papers, Box 25. 
25 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 86-96, 207-210; This World: A Christian Workshop (Nashville: 
Broadman, 1958), 95.  
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telegram off on 12 March, to which Hays responded the next day reiterating his belief 
that federal intervention was damaging and unnecessary. Still, Hays reiterated that he was 
“EAGER FOR CHURCH LEADERS TO KNOW THAT I HAVE NOT ABANDONED MY EFFORTS TO 
SECURE JUSTICE FOR MINORITY GROUPS AND END TO THE HARSH AND CRUEL ASPECTS OF 
SEGREGATION.” He also wrote Griswold specifically to promise a longer statement, 
mentioning that he was “glad your organization is available to help toward solution.”26 
Griswold and Darragh privately met with Hays on 29 March, where Hays was “very 
apologetic” and promised a speech “clearly voicing the view that the ‘separate but equal’ 
doctrine was long overdue for an over-hauling.”27 Hays failed to actually produce such a 
statement, blaming the problem on insufficient time. No matter his claims of sympathy, 
he refused to publicly recant.   
Similar letter writing campaigns to Governor Faubus, Senator Fulbright, and other 
legislators produced even less success. Donald K. Campbell, pastor of The Presbyterian 
Church in Crossett (Jim Johnson’s hometown), reported to the ACHR the results of his 
own letter writing campaign. According to Campbell, Faubus and Fulbright “walked all 
around Robin Hood’s barn without saying anything,” Congressman William F. Norrell 
was also evasive, and Senator John McClellan “wrote a letter that practically burned up 
the paper it was written on; at least I gather he was honest when he signed the thing.”28 
While behind the scenes support could pay off, it required that local leadership ignore the 
expedient solutions and political realities.  
                                                
26 Hays to J. Kenneth Shamlin, 13 March 1956,  ACHR Papers, Box 25; Memo from Hays to Griswold, 13 
March 1956, ACHR Papers, Box 25; Hays to Cartwright, 20 March 1956; Cartwright Papers.  
27 Griswold, “Log for March,” March 1956, ACHR Papers, Box 27. 
28 Campbell to Griswold, 28 March 1956, ACHR Papers, Box 5. 
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If Hoxie was the first sign of grassroots resistance, the Manifesto signaled the 
hour’s desperate need for positive clerical action. The ACHR not only pressured Hays, 
but also attempted to rally statewide clergy. In its pamphlet “Simple Steps,” printed soon 
after the Manifesto, it gave a blueprint on how school boards and community 
organizations could build general community support to support potential desegregation 
campaigns. The pamphlet’s purpose, according to the ACHR, was to put into action 
“good faith compliance” and reiterate that compliance with Brown was actually possible, 
and that only the “intent to obey the law, its letter and spirit, is needed.” The pamphlet 
recommended interracial committees, close communication between involved parties, 
and publicity efforts to inform the local public.29  
More directly, the council organized an interracial group of seventy ministers on 
15 March to draft a potential counterstatement to the Manifesto. On 6 April, the group 
met again to discuss a draft of “A Declaration of Christian Principles,” directly in 
opposition to the Manifesto’s official name, the “Declaration of Constitutional 
Principles.” The Declaration, meant “to reiterate some relevant Christian principles that 
seem to be forgotten,” drew authority from “our several church fellowships” who 
pronounced Brown “in harmony with Christian theology and ethics.” It started by 
reiterating the theological argument, observing that “holy writ counsels that we should 
not call any man common (Acts 10:28) for whom Christ died,” therefore making racial 
distinctions irrelevant.  
The Declaration urged politicians to not resist desegregation and focus on other 
issues. They condemned state legislative counter action, which “succeed only in 
                                                
29 ACHR, “Simple Steps In Compliance With Court’s Decisions on Segregation,” [c. April 1956], ACHR 
Papers, Box 10. 
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generating groundless fears and spreading of hatred.” In terms of action points, they and 
reaffirmed their support for public education and urged that state candidates running for 
office refrain from discussing race,. Finally, they expressed their “deepest concern over 
the present widespread inflammatory campaign” preying on latent racial prejudices 
concerning “social relations and intermingling of the races.” In response to the 
segregationists’ constant playing of the miscegenation card, the ministers urged that state 
citizens remember that “the selection of one’s friends and companions is still a matter of 
personal taste and choice” (emphasis original). They concluded with the well-worn plea 
that all citizens address desegregation with “Christian spirit and testimony,. . . without 
rancor and bitterness.”30 Several boards echoed the Declaration with their own 
resolutions. On 19 April, the Disciples of Christ’s state board reaffirmed Brown and 
requested that politicians running for reelection avoid race, and on 7 June Little Rock 
Methodists reiterated their support for “Christian goodwill.”31 
While the Declaration’s explicitly Christian argument echoes pre-Brown II 
resolutions and moderate clerics’ claims, juxtaposing them reveals considerable 
differences. The ministers devoted considerable time condemning reactionary behavior in 
the state legislature, but, unlike Hays, it exempted the NAACP from blame. The 
declaration also lacked the national resolutions’ initial optimism for a tranquil transition. 
Drawing different lessons from the post-Brown era, progressive clergy believed that the 
present time demanded more vigorous action on behalf of compliance, even if it meant 
                                                
30 Cartwright, Draft of “A Declaration of Christian Principles,” 6 April 1956, ACHR Papers, Box 21. Hays 
claimed that an interracial delegation presented the Declaration , confirming that it moved beyond the draft 
form (Hays,  A Southern Moderate Speaks, 206-208). 
31 Southern School News, May 1956, 10; July 1956, 9. 
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some force. The handful of progressive clergy continued to press for forthright action 
where moderates equivocated because they feared the consequences. 
However, progressive clergy initially saw their moderate brethren as potential 
allies still committed to desegregation, who needed encouragement rather than 
condemnation. One can read Cartwright’s two articles written for a national audience 
written after the Manifesto as an attempt to sway uncommitted clergy and laypeople 
toward supporting compliance.32 His first article “The Church, The World, and Race,” 
published in the July-August 1956 issue of the Disciples’ missionary organization World 
Call, reemphasized the moral scope of school desegregation in stark contrasts. Cartwright 
emphasized the New Testament church’s call to be a “colony of heaven” set apart from 
worldly customs and that the Apostle Paul “in letter after letter… reminds his churches 
that within the church the big distinctions of which the world makes much and deems 
important has no place.” For proof, Cartwright cited Colossians 3:11 as proof, which 
echoed the Galatians 3:28 claim by saying “here there cannot be Greek and Jew, 
circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, 
and in all.” In an era where prejudice ran unfettered and “the issues in regard to racial 
desegregation of the public schools are so complex and so filled with satanic emotions,” 
Cartwright challenged southern churches to determine “whether we shall simply be 
mirrors of our communities’ prejudices or whether we shall regard ourselves as colonies 
of heaven expressing in our fellowship something of that brotherhood which is like to 
that above.” Cartwright’s rhetoric reduced moderate clergy’s various excuses into a 
simple dichotomy between being faithful to God’s will by supporting Brown, or aiding 
                                                
32 Cartwright himself never makes this claim. In his autobiography, Cartwright claimed that his 1956 
articles “set out to cast the racial issue in terms of theological discussion” (Cartwright, Lonesome Valley, 
93). 
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Satan’s work by reflecting community prejudices. Emphasizing the religious dimension 
could help sway uncommitted pastors and laypeople toward the cause and was an 
example of the bold moral suasion that the Declaration encouraged. 
 Still, Cartwright might have had more room to criticize segregation because his 
church was uniquely tolerant. One admirer, A. H. Norcom of Sulphur, Louisiana, had 
once praised Cartwright as one of the very few ministers “willing to make their professed 
beliefs [with] the force it should be in resolving this question.”33 Cartwright’s reply to 
Norcom deflected the praise, crediting his boldness to the fact that his church, “although 
it often does not agree with me, guards very diligently the freedom of the pulpit.” 
Cartwright was not alone in thinking such statements. Barbara Clayton of nearby 
Texarkana also congratulated Cartwright on the article, but admitted her first thought was 
“how could a minister in Little Rock make such statements and keep his church?” While 
she thought her pastor was sympathetic to desegregation and wanted to express similar 
sentiments, “if he did he would not last out the week.” Even though failing to speak could 
be construed as abetting “satanic emotions,” many pastors had a lot to lose for going that 
route.34 Much like how Hoxie represented a particular situation, Cartwright was placed in 
a uniquely suited position. 
 Secondly, Cartwright’s article failed to spell out the persistent question: just how 
does one accomplish the Lord’s work and implement Brown? In the World Call article, 
Cartwright left the answer vague: “there are many ways a church can set itself apart from 
                                                
33 Cartwright, “The Church, The World, and Race,” World Call, July-August 1956, 17-18; Norcom to 
Cartwright, 21 July 1956, Cartwright Papers. 
34 Cartwright to Norcom, 24 July 1956, Cartwright Papers; Clayton to Cartwright, 8 September 1956, 
Cartwright Papers. 
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its community’s prejudices and racial animosity.”35 Vague answers make potential 
solutions easy—after all, even moderates like Hays readily agreed with the fact that the 
Citizens Councils were negative influences and that Christian brotherhood should be 
extended to African Americans. 
 Cartwright addressed these possible objections in his next article, a December 
1956 article for the Christian Century titled “What Can Southern Ministers Do?” If “The 
Church, The World, and Race” made the call to act clarion clear, “What Can Southern 
Ministers Do?” pleaded for any positive action. In Cartwright’s words, "what is of prime 
importance is that southern white ministers do act, carrying out their actions not only 
with enlightened consciences but with intelligence and imagination.” For pastors who 
feared congregational dissent, Cartwright noted that cooperative action in ministerial 
associations often protected individual pastors from full-on revolt.  
While Cartwright conceded that clerical activism “must be done with a view to its 
possible results; otherwise it becomes irresponsible brashness,” he observed that not a 
few pastors used the fear of congregational dissent as an excuse. Rather than encourage 
martyrdom, Cartwright recalled Louisville superintendent Omar Carmichael’s 
observation that ministers there had employed several tactics in support of school 
desegregation. Cartwright paraphrased Carmichael’s observation that some ministers 
made bold calls for desegregation, while others made general comments, and others had 
taken an individualistic approach. Significantly, “all these approaches were helpful.” 
In his autobiography, Cartwright claimed that he submitted the article because, 
“upon analyzing the usual approach of ministers either to speak out in protest or seek to 
                                                
35 Cartwright, “The Church, The World, and Race,” 18. 
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be mediators, I found them generally ineffective.”36 In the article, Cartwright wrote that 
“ministers must be mindful that the power of public speaking is limited,” and that often 
there was a “time for him to accomplish his purposes by other means.” As an 
explanation, Cartwright explained that Griswold had not openly confronted the crowd but 
instead provided necessary moral support for Robison and the board—which even a 
moderate like Hays often did. Cartwright also mentioned his connection to Bill Penix, 
implying that pastors could use their networks to find committed laypeople similarly 
dedicated to urging compliance.37 
In many ways, the Century article, when paired with his World Call one, seems 
directed to win back moderate support and serve as a call to arms against regional 
massive resistance. “The Church, The World, and Race” reminded readers of the 
theological dimensions behind the struggle, adding a pointed jab that inaction suggested a 
lack of spiritual fervor. Meanwhile, “What Can Southern Ministers Do?” eschewed 
championing any singular strategy for the claim that any minister or layperson genuinely 
desiring desegregation can pitch in and do his or her part to the best of his or her ability. 
Such a message sought to unite moderates and progressives together to do the Lord’s 
work and root out the “satanic emotions” that had taken root in their home communities. 
Cartwright expressed optimism in his earlier letter to Norcom, writing that “at least in 
Arkansas, I am finding that ministers are increasingly growing in the conviction that the 
gospel of brotherhood must be demonstrated both in word and deed. There is a leaven at 
work which God will prosper.”38 
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37 Cartwright, “What Can Southern Ministers Do?,” Christian Century, 26 December 1956, 1505-1506.  
38 Cartwright to Norcom, 24 July 1956, Cartwright Papers. 
 
 
60 
 
Cartwright’s work dovetailed with the ACHR’s larger efforts to mobilize clerical 
activism. In honor of the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ)’s 
Brotherhood Week and “disturbed by the general climate in Arkansas,” the ACHR 
invited ministers from all over the state to participate in interracial partnerships to discuss 
and clarify potential responses. Of the some 300 invited, fifty ministers showed up, 
including Little Rock pastors Dunbar Ogden, Dale Cowling, and Cartwright. Among the 
notable people who declined was Hoxie Methodist pastor H. L. Robison, who expressed 
his regrets for being unable to show up, but that “we are getting the Segregationists back 
into the life of our local Church and some of my personal friends in the congregation feel 
that accepting your invitation might hamper our local approach.” Specifically, the family 
of one of his youth group’s student leaders “was ready to commit mayhem at one time,” 
meaning that his attendance at a suspiciously integrationist event could re-spark the 
schism.39  
Robison’s absence aside, the commitments of fifty ministers demonstrated 
continued interest. In their 28 January 1957 report, Griswold and Chris Mercer expressed 
their confidence that “the churches are still our strongest ally and direct approach to local 
situations,” and that local churches were using ACHR services.40 While the moderate 
clergy’s reluctance to fully embrace true integration would have future consequences, 
progressive clergy welcomed their assistance in opposing massive resistance.  
Both moderate and progressive clergy found the state legislature’s attempt to 
expand state executive power to defy Brown deeply disturbing. On 11 February 1957, the 
                                                
39 Griswold to James Dough, 17 December 1956; Griswold to Friend, 25 January 1957; Team Assignment 
Sheet, [c. February 1957]; Robison to Griswold, 17 January 1957, ACHR Papers, Box 5. 
40 Mercer and Griswold, Quarterly Report of the Executive Directors to the Board of Directors, 28 January 
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Arkansas House of Representatives introduced four bills, No. 322-325, designed to 
enforce segregation in the state schools. Eventually passed just sixteen days later as Acts 
83-86, the four bills officially declared an act of emergency in response to federal court 
decisions on desegregation, primary school students’ “peace, health, safety, and general 
welfare,” and various groups “engaged in certain unregulated activities which are 
designed to hinder, harass, and interfere” with Arkansas’s domestic health. Put together, 
the four bills proposed a state sovereignty commission that would collect required 
financial records from local institutions and gave school boards greater leeway to defy 
federal court orders. According to Harry Ashmore, they were not only unconstitutional, 
but they signaled an unwelcome new era where state force would be used to preserve 
segregation.41  
 Both moderate and progressive church leaders united to protest the bills, raising 
objections to their intended impact to halt desegregation as well as their potential threat to 
pulpit freedom. The Arkansas Christian Missionary Society (ACMS) criticized both the 
purpose and scope of the bills, predicting that their passage would result “in racist acts of 
terror which Arkansas has thus far been able to escape” and that requiring churches to 
surrender their financial information interfered with the separation of church and state. 
Other religious organizations echoed the ACMS, as the Greater Little Rock Ministerial 
                                                
41 Arkansas Congress, House, Acts No. 83-86, 26 February 1957, Orval Eugene Faubus Papers; “Behind 
the Bills on Race Segregation,” Arkansas Gazette, 12 February 1957. Acts 83 and 85 revolved around 
controlling dissent within the state, especially the NAACP. Act 83 proposed a state sovereignty 
commission entrusted with the duty to protect Arkansas “from encroachment thereon by the Federal 
Government or any branch, department, or agency thereof” by any means necessary, and given power to 
“require all persons, firms and corporations” to surrender records and books to the commission, investigate 
suspected threats, and subpoena witnesses. Act 85 required that organizations periodically report their 
donations and expenses to the state sovereignty commission, giving the commission access to 
organizations’ financial records. Meanwhile, Act 84 abolished compulsory attendance in integrated school 
districts, and Act 86 authorized school boards to seek legal counsel in defending segregation, even 
supplying refunds from state funds. 
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Association reiterated that Brown “is in accord with Christian principles and democratic 
principles.” Meanwhile, local Quakers contested Senate Bill 28, a fifth bill requiring a 
loyalty oath, for suggesting that “truthfulness is not ordinarily to be expected in everyday 
affairs.”42  
 Both progressive and moderate pastors raised their own individual objections to 
the bills the following Sunday. Cartwright accused the bills of pandering to the 
segregationists, warning that their passage meant that “the flames of prejudice and hatred 
will spread to deny many persons regardless of color their inalienable rights of freedom 
of speech and assembly” through “violence and bloodshed,” and that their goal was to 
“silence the prophetic voice of the pulpit.” In contrast, St. Luke’s Methodist Church 
pastor Elbert Jean said that the bills “would destroy the right of public hearing and the 
right of appeal,” and that if the legislature wanted to enforce segregation, it should do it 
“constitutionally.” First Methodist Church pastor Aubrey G. Walton also read an editorial 
critical of the legislation and then asked his congregants to make up their own minds, 
further suggesting a moderate approach. While Jean and Walton’s stands were less 
radical than Cartwright, they still indicated their clear opposition to the bills.43  
Organizational and individual criticism, combined with the efforts of state senator 
and Disciples layman C. E. Yingling, helped slow the process down. Governor Faubus, 
who had initially declared his opposition to “forcible integration,” responded to the 
protests by recommending that the legislature hold a public hearing rather than 
                                                
42 Arkansas Christian Missionary Society, Press release, 12 February 1957; Greater Little Rock Ministerial 
Association Executive Committee, Press release, 12 February 1957; Testimony by Robert L Nixom on 
Behalf of the Little Rock Meeting for Worship of the Religious Society of Friends Before the House 
Committee on Public Health and Practices of Medicine, 11 February 1957, ACHR Papers, Box 5; “Two 
Groups Open Fire on Segregation Program,” Arkansas Gazette, 13 February 1957.  
43 “Segregation Bills to Receive Airing Tonight,” Arkansas Gazette, 18 February 1957; ACHR Report, [c. 
17 February 1957], ACHR Papers, Box 5. 
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immediately approve the bills, which the state senate did by a 16-15 vote.44 The 
Women’s Society of Christian Service (Methodist Church), Quakers, Disciples of Christ 
Arkansas Convention, and individual ministerial delegations attended the 18 February 
meeting to testify against the bills. Among the more moderate arguments, Mrs. M. E. 
Scott of the Methodist Women’s society argued that the bills “would be an abridgement” 
of Arkansas citizens, while Mrs. Frances S. Eliot reiterated the previous Quaker complain 
that subpoenas and secret questioning violated their “right to seek truth.” Both Immanuel 
Baptist Church pastor W. O. Vaught and St. John’s Seminary rector James F. O’Connell 
employed Nazi imagery in their objections. Vaught compared the sovereignty 
commission with the Gestapo, while O’Connell observed that the bills bore 
uncomfortable parallels to Nazism, which was also based on segregation and master race 
theory.  
On the more progressive side, Second Presbyterian Church pastor Marion A. 
Boggs reiterated the argument that segregation was un-Christian. African Methodist 
Episcopal state bishop Sherman L. Greene pushed even further, arguing that “even more 
basically, [the bills] are offensive to the very essence of Christianity and destructive of 
the Bill of Rights to which all citizens look, regardless of race.”45 Ministerial appeals 
again ran the gamut of moderate and progressive opinion, raising different objections, but 
                                                
44 William W. Hughes and Ray Moseley, “Backers Maneuver 4 Segregation Bills Toward Vote Today,” 
Arkansas Gazette, 15 February 1957; Moseley, “State Senate Balks at Segregation Talks, Sets Public 
Hearing,” 16 February 1957; Lester M. Bickford, “Disciples Assail Segregation Bills,” Christian 
Evangelist, 6 March 1957, 309. The state senate approved the hearing by a 16-15 vote. 
45 Frances S. Eliot, Statement of the Little Rock Meeting for Worship, 18 February 1957; Mrs. M. E. Scott, 
To the Members of the Senate Committee on Constitution, [18 February 1957]; Sherman L. Greene, 
Statement to the Constitution Committee of the Arkansas State Senate, 18 February 1957, ACHR Papers, 
Box 5; Charles Allbright and Moseley, “Bills on Segregation Defended as Legal, Deplored as Unjust,” 
Arkansas Gazette, 19 February 1957. 
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each requested that the state legislatures revise, if not defeat entirely, bills granting 
excessive executive power to halt Brown.  
 In terms of results, the groundswell of protest had little effect. Despite the 
hearings, the legislature passed the four bills the next day, and Governor Faubus signed 
them into law just nine days later. The protests had created some amendments along the 
way, but none of them addressed protecting civil rights or religious freedom.46  
One is hard-pressed to find major fault among the clergy themselves for their 
failure to defeat the segregation bills, however. While Chandler and Hays bowed to 
massive resistance in both the Hoxie crisis and the Southern Manifesto, the widespread 
outcry surrounding the segregation bills also failed to make a dent casts into doubt 
whether disunited and disengaged moderates were really the singular reason that clerical 
opposition failed. After all, if the Findlay and Friedland thesis is true that clerical disunity 
and moderate inaction prevented the southern churches from making an impact, then one 
would expect the united clerical protest around the bills to have a larger impact than it 
did. 
Furthermore, Cartwright’s post-Manifesto appeals for united clerical action, 
regardless of its source, as well as wider clerical opposition to the bills, make one wonder 
just how disunited clergy really were. In a 23 May 1957 letter to Wilma Dykeman, 
Cartwright commented that “it is hard for me to even think back to my thoughts at the 
time of the first Supreme Court decision,” indicating the continuing evolution of his 
political views to match his moral conviction. If there was one good side effect from the 
protests, it was that the hearing committed “a good number of ministers in the state to 
                                                
46 Moseley, “Arkansas Senate Approves Bills to Resist Integration,” Arkansas Gazette, 20 February 1957; 
“Faubus Signs Segregation Bills Into Law,” Arkansas Gazette, 27 February 1957. 
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taking a public stand for the Supreme Court decision.”47  As the next chapters show, 
some people introduced here would take larger roles opposing segregation in Little Rock. 
Cartwright’s own evolution shows that, at least for clergy, political identification could 
make revolutionary shifts fairly quickly. 
This is not to completely absolve moderation. Both Chandler and Hays present 
unfortunate examples of how moderation could cloak expediency in times of crisis, and 
both definitely underprioritized African American demands. Moderate clergy too many 
times endorsed minimum compliance solutions, setting their sights on token 
desegregation rather than fundamental justice. Although purportedly in the middle, 
moderates like Chandler, Hays, and Jean seemed more concerned with addressing 
segregationist concerns, ignoring African American voices and often times losing their 
support.  
However, it is to suggest that the main difficulty was, to flip Dr. King’s words 
around, “the hateful words and actions of the bad people” more than the “appalling 
silence of the good people.”48 Here I disagree with Tony Badger, who argues that 
massive resistance’s emergence “owed as much, I would argue, to moderate failings as it 
did to the misconceived logic [of delay] of Brown.”49 While the united clergy made their 
own fair share of errors and moderate religious leaders especially deserve some blame, it 
seems a stretch to credit massive resistance’s rise to their failures alone—especially when 
one takes into account the dedicated positive actions of local organizations like the 
ACHR. Rather than a top-down political takeover, the true reason massive resistance 
                                                
47 Cartwright to Wilma Dykeman Stokely, 23 May 1957, Cartwright Papers. 
48 King, Why We Can’t Wait, 86. 
49 Badger, “Brown and Backlash,” in Massive Resistance, 46. 
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emerged was that local citizens wanted to contest school desegregation, not cynical 
politicians using grandiose language to inflame a neutral populace.  
Much of it is that the region’s religiosity does not necessarily lead to greater 
ministerial influence in social affairs. The Griswolds and Cartwrights were less effective 
than the Jim Johnsons and Amis Guthridges in mobilizing support because 
segregationists told local citizens what they wanted to hear, while clergy told them what 
they did not want to hear. To quote Conscience in the Lillian Smith play, “I never listen 
to religion when segregation is involved,” or, presumably, when it spoke up on matters 
outside of its approved domain. As Hoxie Methodist pastor H. L. Robison’s experience 
shows and as the next chapter explores, local communities were willing to use quite 
drastic means to silence the critical voices from the balcony.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PERILS OF PROPHECY 
 
 The Little Rock school board, under the pressure of a federal court order, finally 
prepared to desegregate Central High School at the beginning of the 1957-1958 school 
year. Hoping to mollify local citizens, it went against local black demands and selected 
only nine African American high school students. However, on 3 September, both the 
state National Guard and a local mob turned away the Little Rock Nine, starting a three-
week long process that eventually resulted in federal paratroopers providing the 
necessary protection to enforce the court order and admit the Little Rock Nine.  
 Needless to say, there is little in such a process that suggests “voluntary.”  Still, 
most local churches pushed for compliance even as the local community seethed at 
“forced integration.” Much like their February 1957 fight against the segregation bills, 
churches’ rhetorical strategies and tactics varied. Several ministers reiterated the clear 
theological basis for desegregation, made symbolic stands of brotherhood, and criticized 
the school board for its begrudging and token approach to the situation. Many others 
retreated to appeals for law and order, urging simple compliance with the law of the land. 
Both camps’ appeals were largely ignored and they both became targets for irate local 
citizens and not a few of their own congregation members.  
This chapter and the next examine religiously-motivated activism and repression 
from the 1957 Little Rock crisis through the 1958-1959 “Lost Year” when the city shut 
down its public high schools rather than desegregate. This chapter specifically focuses on 
the ministers’ ineffective attempts to discourage resistance and the local repression they 
faced on behalf of their public stands. It is in dialogue with Ernest Q. Campbell and 
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William T. Pettigrew’s 1959 book Christians in Racial Crisis, which gave a 
contemporary analysis on how Little Rock ministers responded to local events. The 
product of first-hand observations and interviews of forty-two local ministers conducted 
from October 1957-December 1958, Christians in Racial Crisis investigated why 
ministers failed to provide “the united and forceful leadership many expected.” One 
important factor they spotlighted, which deserves more extensive treatment than it has 
received in the historiography or will receive in this paper, was the influence of the 
several “small sect, fundamentalistic” pastors that embraced segregation, such as 
Broadmoor Baptist Church’s Wesley Pruden.1 Campbell and Pettigrew’s insightful work 
shines most when describing the competing interests that restricted sympathetic clerical 
activism, detailing the institutional pressures that enshrined the minister’s “responsibility 
to preserve the church as a church, that is, to maintain church unity and with it an 
institutional program.”2 
 However, Campbell and Pettigrew overemphasized local clerical agency, blaming 
clerical ineffectiveness on cowardice and apathy. Specifically, they divided their sample 
of twenty-nine antisegregationist ministers into three categories: fourteen “inactives” 
(those from moderate-sized churches who failed to act), seven “influentials” (those from 
big churches who gave little support) and eight “innovators (those whom they saw as 
“responsible for most of the religious support publicly given”). The innovators 
                                                
1 Both Elizabeth Jacoway and Karen Anderson give considerable credit to Pete Daniel’s contention that 
segregationists “inherited a flawed history that conflated segregation, the Lost Cause, religion, and sex” 
(Daniel, Lost Revolutions, 1). Much like Jane Dailey, Anderson argues that high school desegregation 
hearkened southern white parents’ fears for “their daughters’ budding cultural and sexual autonomy,” and 
that miscegenation was a powerful organizing tool for segregationist organizations like the Mothers’ 
League (Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School (Princeton: Princeton, 2010), 
71-77. Meanwhile, Jacoway calls fears of miscegenation the “bedrock” that motivated local massive 
resistance to desegregated schools (Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, xiii). How these themes particularly play 
out in segregationist clerical rhetoric remains an interesting and underexplored question.  
2 Christians in Racial Crisis, viii, 108. 
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condemned segregationist obstacles in their pulpits, pushed for African American 
brotherhood, and took courageous stands; the other two groups were content to push for 
“compromise and neutrality,” and after some pro-forma protests, disengaged from the 
process—although the influentials privately believed that desegregation was right.3 
However, one must take by faith whether their subjective classifications of which pastors 
belonged where was accurate, as they neglected to reveal names.  
 Campbell and Pettigrew contended that the main limitations mitigating clerical 
protest in Little Rock were “not intrinsic but are imposed by the institution itself”—
emphasizing internal dissension over external considerations. They may have 
overemphasized clerical agency in Christians in Racial Crisis because it was written to 
convince churches to take action. Like Lillian Smith, Campbell and Pettigrew believed 
that the church was “potentially the most effective agent of social change in the South in 
the decade ahead,” and that it could realize its potential if more clergy followed their 
prophetic impulses and publicly condemn segregation, swaying moderates to their side.4 
However, future events would show that white clerics played at most a supporting role 
for dedicated African Americans creatively agitating for rights in their local communities.   
 While Cartwright largely appreciated the book, he also questioned their emphasis 
on the minister’s public role. As mentioned in the last chapter, Cartwright by 1957 
believed that sermons and pronouncements only had a limited effect and that other types 
of clerical activism could also influence local events. He observed that Campbell and 
Pettigrew were “able only to study Little Rock ‘after the fact’ of chaos” and thus did not 
incorporate Hoxie or the February 1957 protest in their analysis. That blind spot might 
                                                
3 Ibid., 63-84. 
4 Ibid., 135. 
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explain why they, “strangely enough, had little if any conception of the responsibility of 
Christians to work through secular organizations to achieve their ends,” ignoring that 
“changes do not usually come about except through some kind of organized approach.” 
After the book’s release, Cartwright pointed out that Pettigrew “assumed there was 
silence just because you did not happen to know of anything that was said or done,” 
although he conceded that “your conclusions from inadequate evidence were probably 
correct.”5 Informed by the clerical struggles to assert their voice in the past two years, 
Cartwright emphasized the necessity of working with other sympathetic voices in 
coalitions against massive resistance. 
While cognizant of the hostile atmosphere that clergy worked in, Campbell and 
Pettigrew underestimated just how susceptible clergy were to community pressure. 
Supportive ministers had to balance between their prophetic impulses and their 
congregation’s wellbeing, knowing that supporting racial reform would stir up 
dissension, discord and other deleterious effects amongst the very same people who paid 
them to guide their spiritual lives. Furthermore, speaking out drew the larger 
community’s ire, harassment, and threats of physical violence. In the polarized times of 
massive resistance, even many ministers’ support of moderate policies was highly 
unpopular. While it is likely that a more united and forthright stand from clergy would 
have helped the situation, the vehement resistance that effectively restrained their activity 
made such a stand unlikely. 
                                                
5 Cartwright to Liston Pope, 7 December 1957, SRC Papers, Reel 141; Cartwright to Oliver R. Whitley, 19 
March 1959, Cartwright Papers; Cartwright to Pettigrew, 20 July 1959, Cartwright Papers. Cartwright’s 
objections aside, he largely appreciated Campbell and Pettigrew’s work. In his letter to Pope, Cartwright 
wrote that he “was impressed with their competence” and had “every confidence in their ability.” 
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 As mentioned in the last chapter, another complication was that individual 
ministers’ views could and often did change in response to local events. Events like the 
Central High School crisis completely dismantled assumptions about the South’s 
fundamental decency and challenged previously complacent ministers to participate in 
improving local race relations. Dunbar Ogden was one such minister. Born and raised in 
the Deep South, Ogden held pastorates in North Carolina and Virginia until clinical 
depression forced him to temporarily retire in 1951. After a three year break from the 
ministry, he became pastor of Little Rock’s Central Presbyterian Church in 1954. Prior to 
the school crisis, Ogden’s most public action was participating in the ACHR’s 
Brotherhood Week interracial discussions in February 1957.  
In June he became president of the local interracial ministerial alliance, which 
was why Daisy Bates called him in early September when she sought white support for 
the Nine’s initial attempt to desegregate Central High. Ogden later recalled that he had 
initially questioned whether ministerial support was wise, asking her if “it’s part of the 
work of religion to participate in a movement that might be thought of as more political 
and social than of a churchly nature?” According to Bates, Ogden was initially hesitant to 
march not only due to “simple fear” but also because he “was still thinking in terms of 
‘separate but equal,’” not recognizing just how unjust Jim Crow was. He urged his fellow 
ministers to use their pulpits on 1 September to urge “goodwill and understanding” 
regarding desegregation and to pray that it would commence smoothly, neglecting to 
mention its theological necessity.6   
                                                
6 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock (1962 repr., Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, 1986), 189-191; 
“Little Rock Quiet on Eve of Opening Integrated Schools,” Arkansas Gazette, 2 September 1957; Dunbar 
H. Ogden, My Father Said Yes: A White Pastor in Little Rock School Integration (Nashville: Vanderbilt, 
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 However, marching with the Nine on 3 September gave Ogden the personal 
experience to affirm Cartwright’s claim that segregation stirred up “satanic emotions.” 
Not only did he watch a segregationist mob threaten to lynch high school student 
Elizabeth Eckford, but he also saw the National Guard refuse to act on the Nine’s behalf 
and instead order them away from the school. Ogden later told Bates that when he “saw 
the stored-up hate in the mob and their contorted faces, when he heard them screaming 
not only for the blood of the nine Negro children but for him and all connected with 
him,” he realized just how vicious the emotions that fueled Jim Crow were. Ogden later 
described to his son that while he had a “prophetic experience” that made him fearless, he 
had plenty of reasons to be afraid. Specifically, Ogden recognized the clear danger 
confronting a violent mob capable of “lethal retaliation” and responsible for “the acid-
throwing and drive-by shootings that he knew could maim and destroy children.” This 
experience, according to Bates, changed Ogden from a moderate to the “lone voice 
crying to the conscience of the people” when other ministerial voices failed.7 
 Cartwright’s experience provides an illustrative example of the sharp opposition 
speaking out publicly could cause. Cartwright was also emotionally affected over 
witnessing Eckford’s terrible experience, but was unsure how to properly respond. In a 
letter to graduate student Eleanor Haney, he recalled feeling “emotionally involved, torn 
up inside over the thing and recognized there would be some disturbance if I did speak, 
                                                                                                                                            
2009), 22-23. According to his son, Ogden’s sermon notes on 1 September contained a reminder to “ask for 
God’s guidance in the matter of INTEGRATION in our public schools.” 
7 Bates, Long Shadow, 191-192; Ogden, My Father Said Yes, 27-29. Although she was once part of the 
ACHR board, Bates excoriated other ministers for failing to take as bold a stance as Ogden in support for 
desegregation, instead choosing to retreat behind silence, reconciliation, and appeals for law and order. 
Bates specifically singled out Cartwright and NCC troubleshooter Will Campbell, who also attended the 3 
September march, as pastors who offered private prayer but neglected public mention (Bates, Long 
Shadow, 87). Painting Ogden as the lone martyr, however, diminishes the clear risks that other ministers 
took in their own disapproval of mob action and even cautious support for desegregation in the midst of 
vehemently opposed citizens and congregants. 
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felt extreme frustration at trying to say anything relevant.” Cartwright recognized that 
there was no guarantee that public speaking would actually produce positive results, and 
it could quite possibly alienate uncommitted segregationists away from his influence and 
put his own livelihood and his church’s institutional health at risk. Such factors, however, 
failed to counteract that “he was appalled at the vicious white reaction and ashamed of 
being a white person,” and conscience demanded he do something to condemn local 
violence and support the Nine.8 
Cartwright ended up devoting his sermon the following Sunday on his eyewitness 
account of Eckford’s solitary walk through the mob. Haney noted, significantly, that it 
“does not, in other words, attempt to remind the congregation of its responsibility or 
argue the case for desegregated schools,” even as Cartwright had previously made such 
sentiments clear to his congregation. Rather, Cartwright’s sermon focused purely on 
Eckford’s Christian character. Having interviewed her the previous Wednesday, 
Cartwright claimed she drew courage from Psalm 27 when confronted by “the war-like 
mob vomiting the filth of a lifetime’s accumulation upon her,” equating them to the 
“wicked, even mine enemies and my foes” in the Biblical verse. Cartwright pointed to the 
moral issue at stake behind desegregated schools: “we shall be in danger of losing our 
own souls if in the midst of great impersonal issues, we lose sight of some very bright 
children of high moral character who want an education—an education not available to 
them in formerly Negro schools.”9  
Other ministerial voices joined Cartwright and Ogden in condemning the mob 
violence opposing school desegregation. While Ogden avoided specifically mentioning 
                                                
8 Eleanor Humes Haney, “A Study of Conscience As It Is Expressed in Race Relations,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale, 1965), 125. 
9 Cartwright, Lonesome Valley, 245-253; Haney, “Study of Conscience,” 127. 
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desegregation the following Sunday, his sermon drew from Luke 4 and reminded his 
congregation of Jesus’ mission to “set at liberty those who are oppressed.”10 Both pastors 
were among the sixteen ministers who issued a statement on 4 September criticizing 
Governor Faubus for calling out the National Guard and also among the twelve who 
confessed their community’s “corporate sin and guilt” for neglecting a Christian response 
that reflected God’s love toward all His children. Ten Northwest Arkansas Presbyterian 
ministers issued their own resolution “as Christians and citizens” urging Faubus to 
withdraw the Guard and instead allow for desegregation to occur. University Baptist 
Church of Fayetteville pastor Walter Johnson brought up the international dimension, 
imagining that “the devil must laugh… in glee” when events like Little Rock hindered 
missionary efforts abroad.11 
Cartwright ultimately obeyed his conscience, but his fears over speaking out 
proved to be unfortunately prescient. Even though Pulaski Heights was a remarkably 
progressive church that had supported pastors criticizing internment and respected the 
freedom of the pulpit, the 8 September sermon triggered a minor schism that ultimately 
resulted in thirty members, about a tenth of his congregation, leaving Pulaski Heights. As 
evidence of the deep antipathy they held toward Cartwright, they refused to attend 
                                                
10 Ogden, My Father Said Yes, 41-42. 
11 “Faubus Action Is ‘Deplored’ By 10 Pastors,” Arkansas Gazette, 7 September 1957; “A Pastor Speaks: 
More Notes on the Little Rock Story,” 11 September 1957; “Constant Prayer Seen By Ministers as Only 
Hope in Racial Crisis,” 13 September 1957. Elizabeth Jacoway argues that the school board’s 
incompetency forced Governor Faubus to call out the Guard and that Faubus legitimately feared violence. 
She cites a hearsay conversation where Faubus said, “if I don’t call out the Guard, people will say that I 
knew there was going to be a race riot and I didn’t have courage enough to stop it before it occurred” 
(Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 115). Cartwright also contextualized the decision as not Faubus’s personal 
fault. In one of his nationally published articles on the crisis, he wrote that Faubus’s decision “was the 
natural outcome of every step the Little Rock school board had taken” in its reluctance to comply and its 
refusal to seek community help (Cartwright, “A Lesson From Little Rock,” [c. 21 September 1957], 
Cartwright Papers). 
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worship the following Sunday, requesting that the deacons administer Communion rites 
to them separately.  
Cartwright initially attempted to downplay the impact, but the congregational 
revolt definitely weighed on his mind. On 23 September 1957, known as “Black 
Monday,” the National Guard was withdrawn and the Little Rock Nine were pulled out of 
Central High after mob violence turned on African American reporters and threatened to 
invade the school. That same day, Cartwright wrote a fellow pastor describing how local 
tensions had “torn up everyone emotionally,” reflected in his own congregation’s “flare-
up which I think we will weather.” Optimistic note aside, the dissent continued to annoy 
him. In a 30 October letter to his father, Cartwright confessed frustration at the 
dissenters’ constant sniping at “every additional thing I say,” and that “I would be just as 
happy if the thing came to a head, and those who are leaving would depart. It is quite a 
strain.” Although it may disrupt donation, their departure would “result in a more 
harmonious group, and we may pull together and accomplish more.”12  
While Cartwright’s willingness to let the dissenters walk suggests that Pulaski 
Heights would survive the schism, his later recollections reflect the discord and 
disharmony it created.  E. B. Whitaker, one of his congregation members, wrote him a 
confidential letter on 22 October criticizing his cavalier attitude toward the 
segregationists. Whitaker gave Cartwright a pass for his political views, assuring him that 
“no one wants to dictate to you, what to think or preach.” The problem, however, was 
that Cartwright forgot that the pastor’s “first duty is to all members of your 
congregation,” and reaching out to the disenchanted was “more urgent than to some 
                                                
12 Cartwright to Robert D. Chambless, 23 September 1957, Cartwright Papers; Cartwright to Dad, 30 
October 1957, Cartwright Papers. 
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social reform regardless of how compelling right you think such reform to be.” Rather 
than believe that it was “okay to run members off because others will come in to take 
their place…. You cannot criticize people and hold up to ridicule and scorn their 
prejudices and at the same time lead them into adopting a christian [sic] attitude.” 
Whitaker interpreted Cartwright’s refusal to concede to the segregationist minority as an 
abuse of power and an abandonment of his pastoral duty to care for the spiritual health of 
every one of his members, especially those that disagree. Whitaker’s concluded with a 
veiled threat: “If I ever leave Pulaski Heights Christian Church, it will not be because I 
disagree with the minister, which I rarely do, but because I am tired of strife and turmoil 
and intolerance of intolerance.”13 Schism and church drama affected not only the out-
and-out segregationists but many others who blamed the pastor for disrupting 
organizational unity by taking an unnecessary stand on a controversial social issue. In his 
autobiography, Cartwright wrote that while the church had survived, “its minister was left 
drained empty. The congregation was weary. Community morale was at low ebb.”14 
Whitaker’s intense discomfort with Cartwright’s running battle revealed the white 
supportive clergy’s precarious balancing act between taking prophetic action and 
maintaining a healthy church. According to Campbell and Pettigrew, the minister is 
taught to “rest the case for his personal competence on the responses people make to his 
ministry,” and that opposition and failure in this goal “is a shattering personal 
experience.”15 Even if members like Whitaker stayed, their grumbling was something 
that a pastor could not simply ignore, especially as he had his own duty to shepherd his 
congregation’s wellbeing. Role conflict helps explain why Cartwright, in his 
                                                
13 Whitaker to Cartwright, 22 October 1957, Cartwright Papers. 
14 Cartwright, Lonesome Valley, 117-118. 
15 Campbell and Pettigrew, Christians in Racial Crisis, 119-120. 
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autobiography, wrote that Whitaker’s letter left him feeling “myself to be a failure as a 
pastor.” Even though he never recanted his clearly just motivations for speaking out, his 
sense of failure highlights the tension that supportive clergy faced, being the spiritual 
mentor to the very same people whose behavior they believed were perpetuating 
injustice.16 That this happened at Pulaski Heights, which had previously supported 
Cartwright’s freedom to criticize Jim Crow segregation, suggests that other churches 
likely had even less room to maneuver without sparking congregational opposition. 
Role conflict also provides a gentler explanation why clerical protest diminished 
rather than grew after the explosive events of September 1957. According to Bates, most 
clergy feared upsetting outspoken segregationists and “began tempering their public 
remarks or became silent in full retreat,” suggesting Findlay and Friedland’s cowardice 
and apathy theory. However much the church’s overall ineffectiveness makes the theory 
plausible, the national church’s benefits from seeing Jim Crow disappear and many of the 
local clergy’s consistent support for Brown in the years preceding Little Rock challenges 
the easy assumption. While altruism and Christian brotherhood can prove to be thin reeds 
of support, healthy self-interest can help even the cowardly find courage; H. L. Robison 
and Cartwright’s actions suggest that pastors did concern themselves with local affairs. 
Rather than simple cowardice and fear for their own personal safety, ministers feared 
what such discord could do to their measures of success and their jobs.17  
                                                
16 Cartwright, Lonesome Valley, 162-166. 
17 Bates, Long Shadow, 92. Most scholars ignore the psychological part of role conflict, assuming that 
white sympathetic clergy were more interested in status than civil rights. For example, Karen Anderson 
claims that church leaders’ ideological need for consensus and “commitment to the construction of 
harmony” meant they “ceded power to conservative and moderate members of their churches, who could 
use threats to leave the church or withdraw financial support to great effect” (Anderson, Little Rock, 85-86). 
For Cartwright, however, it was not just the schism but the ripple effects that truly affected him.  
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 The moderate clergy’s signature event to address the crisis also demonstrates 
theologically based support for civil rights, even as its limited goals made it practically 
irrelevant. On 12 October 1957, around six thousand Little Rock citizens gathered in 
eighty-five places of worship to pray for peace to return to their cities. Their platform 
specifically avoided endorsing integration, and instead encouraged prayer for law and 
order to return, for replacing prejudice with compassion, and for “resistance against 
unthinking agitators.” The Christian Century applauded the call to prayer, assuming that 
such an event must have boosted the spirits of those committed to “their unpopular, 
perilous job of restoring sanity to a shaken community.”18 Hindsight, however, shows 
that the call to prayer had seemingly little effect, likely because of its ill-guided emphasis 
on reconciliation over reiterating the clerical argument for desegregation. The Day of 
Prayer is a prime example of how the politics of moderation hurt desegregation efforts, 
claiming to be supportive while lacking substance.  
Campbell and Pettigrew scathingly criticized the prayer meetings in Christians in 
Racial Crisis. In their eyes, the day of prayer was a minimum-level protest that fulfilled 
the clergy’s “own needs to act” and comply with “the national demand for ministerial 
action,” and they “symbolically washed their hands of the conflict” soon afterward.19 It 
was weak enough that President Eisenhower, school superintendent Virgil Blossom, and 
Governor Faubus all endorsed the event, despite their competing interests in the larger 
crisis. The first two urged the clergy to pray for peace to return, while Faubus’s letter 
                                                
18 Homer Bigart, “6,000 in Prayer in Little Rock,” New York Times, 13 October 1957; Brown, Bigger than 
Little Rock (Greenwich: Seabury, 1958), 97-98; “Prayers for Little Rock Prayers,” Christian Century, 23 
October 1957,  1251. In his memoir, Blossom singled out the call to prayer as an example of local citizens 
“who continued efforts to solve the integration problem peacefully” (Blossom, It Has Happened Here 
[New York: Harper, 1959], 138). 
19 Campbell and Pettigrew, Christians in Racial Crisis, 68. 
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praised its focus on “reconciliation” and reducing tension over assigning “blame” to 
individuals. The fact that each different side could openly support the event is ample 
evidence of its blandness.20  
While Campbell and Pettigrew’s assessment of its results rings true, the 
motivations behind the Day of Prayer services were more than simple ritual. During the 
February protests, many ministers avoided criticizing segregation itself but instead 
focused on its potential threat to religious freedom. The Day of Prayer also placed the 
clergy as a major public voice in the city against segregation, even as it sidestepped the 
initial issue. Local segregationists certainly did not welcome their efforts to mediate. The 
League of Central High Mothers, which supported segregation, lambasted the Saturday 
event as a coded call for “race-mixing,” and a small group of fundamentalist pastors 
scheduled their own prayers dedicated to preserving segregation the night before.21 
Looking at organizer Robert R. Brown’s own background and reaction to the 
Central High School crisis also challenges the idea that the Day of Prayer was simply 
meant to appease outraged national opinion. Brown was born in Kansas, raised in Texas, 
received his B.D. from Virginia Theological Seminary, and served as a priest and rector 
in various cities in Texas and Virginia before being called to serve as Arkansas coadjutor 
in 1955 in response to the previous bishop R. Bland Mitchell’s declining health. 
Mitchell’s political views can best be described as conservative—while he initially 
supported Brown solely because it echoed Christian principles, he also observed that such 
                                                
20 “Text of 3 Letters to Little Rock Bishop,” New York Times, 4 October 1957. 
21 Campbell and Pettigrew, Christians in Racial Crisis, pp. 27-29. Little Rock historians generally echo 
Campbell and Pettigrew’s negative assessment. Friedland echoes Campbell and Pettigrew’s criticism that 
the prayers of guidance “left something to be desired,” while Anderson cited Nat Griswold’s criticism that 
it “was reconciliation without ethical discrimination.” Jacoway’s own assessment was also negative, 
observing that over half of the participants were Catholics, who maintained a separate set of parochial 
schools that were nominally desegregated but had only sparse African American attendance. See Friedland, 
Lift Up Your Voice, 35; Anderson, Race and Resistance, 85; Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 203-204. 
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passages did not mean “that racial or biological differences were obliterated, but that they 
were secondary.” Mitchell had also endorsed the Southern Manifesto as “the right note of 
sanity and moderation, it seems to me, as against the unbridled passions of the 
agitators.”22 Christian principles aside, Mitchell’s public statements emphasize the first 
aspect of voluntary compliance far more than the second. 
Juxtaposed with Mitchell’s conservatism, Brown’s social views appear quite 
progressive. Brown’s response to “Black Monday” was to use his authority as state 
Episcopal bishop to issue a pastoral letter decrying the violence. Confessing that his 
previous silence “failed dismally” to produce a peaceful agreement, Brown wrote that the 
day’s events “urges us to our knees in shame over our inability to exert an adequate 
Christian leadership in this hour.” Brown repeated the national consensus that segregation 
was heretical and that Episcopalian doctrine declared that “Christ’s teaching is 
incompatible with every form of discrimination based on color or race, both domestic and 
international…. We consistently oppose and combat discrimination based on color or 
race of every form, both within the Church and without, in this country and 
internationally.”23 Brown contended that the segregationist protests contained “some 
embryonic characteristics of Hitler’s Nazism” and that “intelligent Christian people… 
acknowledge that Christ died for all men, regardless of race; they agree that integration 
must come and that it ought to come.”24 
 His pastoral letter provoked a hostile reaction, and several bystanders charged 
that he was bringing disgrace upon the local churches through his “attempt to destroy the 
                                                
22 “Supreme Court Decision,” Arkansas Churchman, February 1955, 6; “Troubled Times,” Arkansas 
Churchman, April 1956, 2. 
23 Brown, “To the Churches of Little Rock,” 23 September 1957, Cartwright Papers. 
24 Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock, 20, 131. 
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handiwork of God by advocating the mixing of members of the white and colored 
races.”25 More alarmingly, hundreds of “self-styled authorities on Biblical exegesis” 
simply dismissed his argument and “reserved the right, suddenly, to interpret Christianity 
according to their prejudices and began to present proof-texts for their own entrenched 
position rather than for the truth of the Word of God.”26 Brown’s attempt to interject into 
the crisis larger church moral support for desegregation provides less evidence for 
moderation’s weakness than for the local community’s willingness to ignore clerical 
condemnation on racial matters. 
According to Brown, the Day of Prayer was just one part of a larger “Ministry of 
Reconciliation” to restore peace to the city. In his 1958 book on the crisis, he cited 2 
Corinthians 5:18 as scriptural justification: “And all things are of God, who hath 
reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of 
reconciliation.” In Brown’s mind, Christian reconciliation was not mere “conciliation” 
emphasizing unity over justice, but desired “the spiritual restoration of man from enmity 
and estrangement with his brother” and sought to “open their minds, calm their passions, 
and restore the lines of communications with each other.” Against Campbell and 
Pettigrew’s criticism that ministerial action ended soon after 12 October, Brown protested 
that the call to prayer was supposed to be only an initial step toward finding a satisfactory 
solution to the crisis, and it was supposed to be followed by interracial discussions and 
                                                
25 Ibid., p. 80. Jacoway claims that Brown’s letter revealed his ignorance that local citizens “responded to 
racial issues with more deeply rooted beliefs than his newfound understanding of the demands of the 
‘brotherhood of man,’” and that it reflected his elite assumption of leadership (Jacoway, Turn Away Thy 
Son, 196). I would argue, however, that Brown was reflecting the broad national consensus discussed in 
Chapter 3, and that he was far from alone in reflecting the attitudes of local clergy regarding the Central 
High crisis.  
26 Brown, “Little Rock and the Churches,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 13 (January 1958), 21-22. 
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clerical intervention. As the city’s moral compass, religious leaders had a duty to model 
Christ’s loving sacrifice to redeem their world around them. 27 
That being said, Brown’s explanations on theological reconciliation leave a lot for 
the twenty-first century onlooker to desire. I contend that while Brown’s sympathy 
toward desegregation was genuine, his endorsement of gradual and moderate techniques 
like the Day of Prayer reveal a condescension and paternalistic attitude toward African 
Americans, unfairly equating them with local segregationist violence. According to 
Brown, reconciliation was the only process that could bring ideal moral change without 
excessive provocation. He said that when desegregationists raised the issue of moral 
injustice, they were “holding a mirror up to a small boy to show him that his face is dirty, 
without providing soap, water, and a washcloth.” Though necessary to reveal the 
problem, the response of church people should not only risk whatever “persecution, 
rejection, and indifference” to condemn injustice, but also champion healing through 
united and concerted action.28 Such explanations helped justify away militancy as 
needless provocation, holding out for the impossibly perfect resolution rather than 
addressing what he saw as the central problem at hand: the local tensions that made any 
type of progress impossible.  
Brown also saw spiritual reconciliation linked to political moderation. In contrast 
to the individualists who neglected the Biblical mandate to take action and the 
integrationists who “could see no possibility of compromise on such virtues as 
brotherhood, personal dignity, the rights of free man, or on such vices as discrimination,” 
Brown praised a middle group of clergy. According to Brown, this group recognized the 
                                                
27 Brown, Bigger than Little Rock, 99-101; Campbell and Pettigrew, Christians in Racial Crisis, 37. 
28 Brown, Bigger than Little Rock, 88-91. 
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“rightness of the perfectionist position,” but thought “that it was better to compromise on 
perfection in order to establish a present condition which might more nearly approximate 
it” [emphasis original]. They believed that “the desegregation issue called for the wisdom 
of the serpent and the gentleness of the dove,” quoting Jesus’ advice in Matthew 10:16. 
By only quoting Scripture while describing the moderates, Brown hinted that they were 
the ones adopting Christian means toward Christian ends.29 
One major weakness in Brown’s platform of reconciliation was that while it 
certainly considered the viewpoint of local whites, it neglected local African Americans 
and refused to explicitly endorse the protests’ morality. In his 1959 book Bigger Than 
Little Rock, Brown stated without source that one fourth of Little Rock’s African 
Americans disapproved of integration and that the NAACP was “not our kind of people” 
and that the NAACP was “quite intolerant and suspicious of their less aggressive people.” 
To Brown, this was just one sign of the intra- and interracial “communication 
breakdown” occurring all over Little Rock due to the actions of “aggressive 
organizations” of both races.30 Such declarations marginalized the African American 
activists whose voices one would need most in order to actually accomplish significant 
reconciliation and justice. 
Brown’s condemnation of the NAACP gives one pause when one considers just 
how he translated theological reconciliation into daily life. While Brown criticized 
extremists like the Citizens Councils, he also commented that the white Southerner’s 
attitudes toward race had “been ingrained for generations and requires understanding” 
and “time to adjust themselves and time for the southern Negro to grow in the 
                                                
29 Ibid., 67-69. 
30 Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock, 28-34. 
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responsibilities of citizenship.” He also claimed that mandated school desegregation had 
its flaws, raising questions about the Brown decision’s legality in regard to states’ rights 
and rejecting federal intervention as unnecessarily polarizing. By prioritizing reducing 
violence over addressing injustice, Brown was championing a peace that, in the words of 
Dr. King, was “purchased at the price of capitulating to the forces of darkness… [and] 
that stinks in the nostrils of the almighty God.”31  
Brown and other moderate clergy who supported desegregation could have done 
far more to push for justice, and they remained unfortunately susceptible to a 
“progressive mystique” that effectively neutralized their protest. However, the evidence 
suggests that they genuinely believed that moderation would lead the way toward true 
integration smoothly, rather than a premediated attempt to erect what John Kirk describes 
as “minimum compliance” with school desegregation. In both the Day of Prayer and the 
segregation bills protest, they demonstrated unusual amounts of courage, sacrifice, and 
conviction to freely express their views, which were far from popular to the people whose 
support they needed. Their principled stands in the face of not insignificant opposition 
make it hard to label their actions as cowardly and expedient.  
  While moderate calls for law and order and reconciliation hardly seem 
courageous when juxtaposed with Eckford’s solitary march through a segregationist mob, 
such calls during massive resistance’s heyday evoked considerable opposition. Dunbar 
Ogden’s clear sympathy for desegregation made him an obvious target for a similar style 
of harassment that H. L. Robison experienced years ago, but the retaliation campaign also 
hit Congressman Brooks Hays, whose endorsement of reconciliation and general 
                                                
31 Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock, 19; King, “When Peace Becomes Obnoxious,” 18 March 1956, in The 
Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume VI: Advocate of the Social Gospel, September 1948-March 
1963, ed. Clayborne Carson et al (Berkeley: UC, 2007), 258. 
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sympathy for African American welfare made him vulnerable despite his signing the 
Southern Manifesto in 1956.  
Ogden’s public profile unfortunately made him a clear target for harassment, 
much like how white pastor Robert Graetz was treated during the Montgomery bus 
boycott. While Ogden’s home was not bombed, he soon became “the favorite target for 
abuse in the white community,” receiving an avalanche of hate mail and crank calls. 
Ogden received countless late night and early morning calls accusing him of “race-
mixing,” “mongrelization,” and being a “nigger lover.” According to Ogden’s wife, the 
“hate calls and hate mail… could hurt him so deeply” that she volunteered to field most 
of them.32 Ogden’s positive relationship with the African American community did give 
him one unexpected benefit: during the school year, black men patrolled his street and 
even hid in the nearby bushes to protect the family against possible violent reprisal. It is 
telling that they felt that Ogden needed their protection, however.33  
According to Campbell and Pettigrew’s glowing profile of Ogden, his close ties to 
the South made these accusations even more painful, revealing that his “efforts in the 
cause of racial justice disassociate him from a tradition and a people he loves.” They 
quoted the most vehement accusation thrown at him: “Judas betrayed a Man, Benedict 
Arnold betrayed a nation, and you, my friend, have betrayed a race!”34 Local sentiment 
saw clerical activity for desegregation not as a courageous stand for the Lord, but a 
Yankee maneuver to further shame the South. 
                                                
32 Ibid., 63, 69. 
33 Ogden, My Father Said Yes, pp 70-71. Graetz published a firsthand account on the boycott and his 
personal experience (Montgomery: A White Preacher’s Memoir [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991]). 
34 Campbell and Pettigrew, “Vignettes From Little Rock,” Christianity and Crisis 18 (29 September 1957), 
134-136. 
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The harassment continued to affect the family even after Ogden and his wife left 
in 1958. Segregationists switched their target to their son David, who was also accused of 
being a “nigger lover” and being in an illicit relationship with Bates. It soon escalated 
into physical abuse, causing him to leave the city. The family believes that the emotional 
scars from the abuse likely were what drove David into a deep depression, resulting in his 
committing suicide two years later. According to Dunbar III, his father took David’s 
death hard, occasionally saying to him that “I killed my own son. Sometimes I feel guilty 
as hell.”35  
 What ultimately drove Ogden away from Little Rock was not harassment so much 
as the lack of congregational support he received at Central Presbyterian. Like 
Cartwright, Ogden experienced severe role conflict as his congregation split over his 
public support for civil rights. Ogden identified his congregation as “my people,” making 
the church’s 60% decline from two hundred attendees in Fall 1957 to eighty in Spring 
1958 all the more painful. One possible reason for the decline was that several members 
attempted to organize an internal boycott, urging their fellow members to not tithe or 
attend church until Ogden left. Despite receiving support from crucial members such as 
elder Gardner Lile, declining contributions were his ultimate undoing. Fearing for their 
church’s future, the church’s elder board with a reason to cut his salary by 30%, driving 
Ogden to find another pastorate out of state. The acrimony between pastor and 
congregation was still present two years later, when the church declined his request to 
attend the church when he returned to Little Rock to attend his son Jonathan’s graduation. 
One clear reason for the church’s turmoil was that it had lost many members who 
disagreed with their pastor’s stance on civil rights. However, their departure had a 
                                                
35 Ogden, My Father Said Yes, 68-70, 144-147; Bates, Long Shadow of Little Rock, 194-196. 
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boomerang effect on the rest of the congregation. Congregants blamed Ogden for the 
schism, as his constant speaking on social issues did not fit their understanding of a 
minister. Several Central Presbyterian members expressed their expectation for the pastor 
“to conduct services, to preach love and brotherhood, and do things according to 
procedure”—meaning that “this integration business is not exactly what his congregation 
pays him for.” Even those who personally agreed with their pastor ended up supporting 
his departure, prioritizing the church’s welfare above the pastor’s message. Lile gave 
voice to his allies’ thoughts, claiming that they “love and respect you. We feel that you 
are doing what you think is right. We here are with you.” Still, they eventually “have to 
save our little church” over allowing him to continue speaking.36 Much like how 
Whitaker protested Cartwright’s sermon, many Central Presbyterian members 
sympathized with their pastor’s political views but disliked his use of the pulpit to 
support divisive issues.  
While Campbell and Pettigrew blamed institutional church structures that 
supported church growth and stability over social activity, their blame gave insufficient 
credit to how much clerics cared about the strife affecting their pastorates. Brooks Hays 
captured such tension perfectly: as the clergy “listens sympathetically to the minority’s 
plea, he must have a keen sensitivity to the needs of his own congregation.”37 Concerned 
clergy still had to balance the conflicting prophetic and priestly roles, proclaiming the 
Biblical mandate to act justly while shepherding their congregations’ spiritual wellbeing. 
These conflicting duties ended up circumscribing the options they had available.  
                                                
36 Ogden, My Father Said Yes, 59, 107-113. As a sign of his personal loyalty, Lile transferred membership 
to another church after Ogden left. 
37 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 227. 
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As Hays would discover, such advice did not apply only to clergy but also to 
dedicated Baptist laymen like himself holding public office. Hays had not only endorsed 
Brown’s Day of Prayer, but had played his own key role in the initial days of the crisis 
working as a go-between between President Eisenhower and Governor Faubus, 
attempting to get both sides to reach a solution of voluntary compliance with the court 
mandate to desegregate the high school.38 Such moderation made him politically 
vulnerable in the racially charged political arena of massive resistance. Although he 
fended off Capital Citizens Council president Amis Guthridge’s challenge in the 1958 
Democratic primary, he lost his congressional seat in the general election to 
segregationist school board member Dale Alford, who declared his candidacy eight days 
prior and won via a write-in campaign. Apparently Hays feared Alford’s challenge, as he 
even ran an ad setting himself up as the stronger candidate for segregationists. The ad 
claimed, somewhat accurately, that while Alford signed off on Little Rock’s initial 
desegregation plan and supported the federal court mandating desegregation two years 
later, Hays had signed the Southern Manifesto and continually opposed federal 
intervention.39 
While his ad emphasized his segregationist bona fides, Hays’s interest in general 
African American welfare made him susceptible to public anger. In between Guthridge’s 
challenge and Alford’s write-in campaign, Hays had accepted an invitation to speak at the 
African American-dominated National Baptist Convention (NBC)’s annual conference. 
                                                
38 Jacoway describes Hays as a “naïve” patsy in between Faubus and President Eisenhower, whose 
moderate philosophy made him capitulate to Attorney General Brownell’s refusal to grant an orderly delay, 
afraid to upset him for political reasons (Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 130-162). 
39 “Dale Alford Voted FOR L.R. School Board Plan of Integration,” [c. 1958], Hays Papers, Box 47. The 
ad fits with Jacoway’s description of Hays’s overall strategy to emphasize his own consistency against 
Alford’s opportunistic defense of segregated principles (Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 283-284). 
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Later explaining his actions to Eleanor Haney, Hays wrote that although he was 
cognizant that speaking there “would damage me politically… it was my duty to appear 
at this fellow convention of fellow Baptists.” Furthermore, withdrawal might have upset 
NBC president J. H. Jackson, and “the morally sensitive official must be alert on the 
matter of affronting Negro people.”40 Hays’s son also declared his open opposition to the 
proposed plan to close the public schools, which brought public ire on the family.41  
According to John Kyle Day, the tense atmosphere made it easy for opponents 
like Governor Faubus to exploit Hays’s moderation to oust him from office. Eugene 
Newsom, who ran opinion polls for the governor, noted a few days before the election 
that voters disliked how “Hays has never made himself clear on the Integration issue.”42 
While Hays accepted his later defeat and refused to call for a recount to account for 
possible voter fraud, he still found the results disappointing. Sardonically, he said that he 
felt like someone that a donkey kicked in the head, fighting to stay alive so to escape the 
epitaph “Kicked to Death by a Jackass.”43 
Christian observers nationwide saw Hays’s defeat as a testament to his 
courageous stand on behalf of moderate principles. A S. S. Moore from Louisiana 
congratulated him for staying the course, writing that “you have lost an election, but you 
have set an example and given a witness that will be a challenge to all Christians 
throughout our land.” The Baptist General Convention of Texas president E. Hermond 
                                                
40 Letter to Eleanor Humes Haney, 10 September 1963 and 9 December 1963, quoted in Haney, “Study of 
Conscience,” 218. 
41 John Kyle Day, “The Fall of a Southern Moderate: Congressman Brooks Hays and the Election of 1958,” 
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42 Newsom to Faubus, 24 October 1958, Faubus Papers, Box 1000. 
43 Day, “The Fall of a Southern Moderate,” 241-264; Elizabeth Carpenter, “Hays Says Faubus Broke 
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Papers, Box 47. Day’s article emphasizes the previous friendship that Hays had with Faubus and 
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record as disappointingly similar to Alford’s. 
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Westmoreland echoed Moore’s sentiments, writing that “your gracious Christian stand on 
a vital moral and spiritual problem should be highly commended by all Christian people.” 
Bill Penix, who represented the Hoxie board two years earlier, wrote that Hays’s defeat 
“is another bit of weight to help speed our trip to the bottom.” Even J. H. Jackson wrote a 
consolation note to Hays, observing that his defeat convinced African Americans that 
massive resisters “will without provocation attempt to destroy upright men irrespective of 
the color of their skin.” Although local African Americans viewed Hays far more 
pessimistically, national Christian sentiment claimed that Hays’s support for civil rights 
made him, much like Ogden, a victim of local hate.44  
Finally, local officials tarred the ACHR with a broad Communist brush for the 
organization’s activities to organize local clergy. State attorney general Bruce Bennett 
held a three-day session from 16-18 December 1958, accusing progressive fgroups of of 
Communist influence. According to Bennett, the ACHR was suspect because it held ties 
to the SRC, which had “been cited as subversive by the House Un-American Activities 
Committee, the Senate Internal Security Committee, and the Attorney General of the 
United States,” and the NAACP, whose officials “have an almost incredible tie-in with 
communist and communist front organizations.” As the child of the “pro-communist” 
SRC, the ACHR was also “organized for the purpose of instigating and pushing 
integration in Arkansas.” Most dangerously, it received funds alongside the NAACP and 
SRC from the Ford Foundation’s Fund for the Republic, which employed Arkansas 
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defended his embrace of moderation despite the “good deal of prejudice” that contemporaries placed on the 
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Gazette editor Harry Ashmore.45 According to Bennett’s conspiracy theory, the ACHR 
was part and parcel of a broader Communist attempt that involved Thurgood Marshall, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Daisy Bates, Ashmore, and other prominent African American 
or white southern liberal activists. 
The ACHR reply drew heavily on its ministerial population and national church 
support, also hewing closely to the national church’s anticommunist defense. The ACHR 
proudly declared its affiliation with the Fund for the Republic, observing that other 
groups that the Fund supported included “religious groups associated with all major 
faiths” and “educational, professional, and patriotic organizations.” While it conceded 
that Bennett accurately described its overall purpose to bring about desegregation, its 
emphasis on interracial cooperation and mutual respect placed it “in accord with the 
declared faith of every major body.” Its religious impulses placed it in overall accord 
with the committee’s purported goals to eliminate Communist influence as it would 
inevitably “result only in discord and destruction in the South.”46 
However, its final parting shot subtly indicates its own opinion on just whom 
were truly advancing worldwide Communist interests. According to the ACHR, global 
communism’s “spirit is that of arrogance and mistrust. It is dangerous because it divides 
men and ruthlessly crushes persons. Opposed to it is a Christian dynamics. It is more 
powerful. It is beneficial because it unites men and gently exalts persons.” The ACHR 
claimed its devotion to the latter, working toward the goal of a unified and desegregated 
society. Although left unspoken, Bennett’s heavy-handed attempt to silence the ACHR to 
                                                
45 Special Education Committee, Transcript of 16-18 December 1958 Session, ACHR Papers, Box 5; 
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1958, SRC Papers, Reel 141. 
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preserve a segregated and divided society made him, not Griswold, more Communist in 
spirit than the loyal ACHR.  
The problem with red-baiting, however, was that one could not fully escape its 
grasp. Years later, a William Ruck took issue with a three-page statement from Griswold 
regarding public education. Rather than address Griswold’s actual arguments, he argued 
that local citizens should “turn a deaf ear” to the ACHR because its ties to the SRC and 
its “questionable background” meant that it was another secretive organization that 
“strive for the suppression of the majority and create racial discord under the cloak of do-
goodism.” For proof, Ruck cited Bennett’s testimony about the ACHR’s devious 
connections.47 However unfounded it was, state suspicion gave locals the license to freely 
marginalize progressive voices, regardless of how much their actual message might 
otherwise make sense. 
 If one looks purely at the results rather than the broader circumstances, Arkansas 
clergy are definitely found wanting. Stretching back to their failed attempt to overturn the 
segregation bills, clergy found their voices at best ignored, and at worst attracting the 
wrong type of attention. While David Chappell contends that even token resistance was 
better than segregationist encouragement, it is clear that their Christian witness failed to 
deter massive resistance. However, moving the question from whether the clergy 
effectively resisted to why they failed to sway public opinion raises puzzling 
contradictions. Regardless of whether people listened to them, vocal supportive clergy 
paid a steep price for saying that violent segregationist resistance to Brown was 
unacceptable. Rather than apathy or fear, three primary factors suffocated clerical 
opposition to massive resistance.  
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The first reason was that faith and willingness alone are insufficient conditions to 
jump-start a movement. While Robert Brown possessed a powerful theological tool for 
organizing Christians specifically with his concept of reconciliation, he never got a truly 
representative group of people together to work out a positive platform of change. In his 
unsuccessful attempt to appeal to segregationist voices, he shut out the NAACP, which 
represented a significant portion of the very same African American community whose 
education he was ostensibly attempting to improve. Furthermore, reconciliation is a two-
way street, requiring the active participation of each party. Although Brown recognized 
that some coercion could be needed, he failed to provide a compelling vision that other 
religious leaders could get behind. While Cartwright initially endorsed even moderate 
solutions as some active form of opposition, the ineffectiveness behind the Day of Prayer 
protests suggests that the progressive mystique looked like a poor alternative to massive 
resistance.  
 Another reason was simply that speaking out invited retaliation. Much like 
African American activists—though to a much lesser degree—white liberal religious 
leaders received hate mail, were accused of harboring Communist sympathies, and had to 
fear for their lives.48 Many saw each of these religious leaders as part of a larger 
conspiracy forcing unwelcome “race-mixing” and an assault on a traditional way of life, 
and sought either to harass or expel those who criticized their views. Hays’s political 
defeat and David Ogden’s suicide reveals that even moderate dissent could bring about 
serious consequences. 
Finally, white supportive clerics had their own unique problem: many of the 
people who harbored segregationist sentiments attended their congregations and sat in 
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their pews. Cartwright especially struggled with this contradiction, confessing to Eleanor 
Haney that “I certainly don’t like conflict…. I don’t like to have people dislike me or 
have people antagonistic toward me.”49 Ministers like Cartwright remained particularly 
sensitive to criticism that they were neglecting their pastorates to take up social action 
crusades that all too often produced little tangible results. These pastors’ responsibility to 
proclaim truth and reveal injustice conflicted with the also important call to nurture their 
congregation’s wellbeing. Role conflict made their decision to take public stances all the 
more costly, especially in undermining their personal conviction that they should pursue 
prophetic leadership. It also stood in contrast to the community support that many 
African American clergy enjoyed, for example Martin Luther King’s local leadership in 
the Montgomery bus boycott.50 
 The extreme antagonism clergy experienced also suggests that average Arkansas 
citizens were complicit in their support for massive resistance. The strong divide between 
pulpit and pew shows that all too many white southerners were not simply waiting for 
progressive leadership to lead them away from segregation, but rather continued to 
fervently cling to Jim Crow despite available alternatives. Far more than a simple refusal 
to come down from the balcony, the Little Rock crisis shows the crucial fallacy behind 
the southern liberal supposition that segregation was simply an ancient relic that would 
easily disappear. Rather, when push came to shove, even sympathetic laymen like 
Whitaker preferred maintaining the stable past above working toward a better future. It 
                                                
49 Haney, “Study of Conscience,” 126. 
50 For evidence of this support, see the extended transcript of the Montgomery Improvement Association 
Mass Meeting in Holt Street Baptist Church, 5 December 1955, in The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Volume III: Birth of a New Age, December 1955-December 1956, ed. Clayborne Carson et al (Berkeley: 
UC, 1997).  Still, many African American ministers who declined to participate in civil rights protests may 
have felt a similar squeeze in raising “social issues” specifically, or taking actions that threatened their 
institutional safety. 
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would take broad vocal leadership from many concerned people to overturn massive 
resistance, relying on a broad politics of moderation platform that muted clerical 
activism. Such a coalition could achieve concrete, albeit limited, results. Unfortunately, it 
also muted the clergy’s unique moral conviction that “neither Jew nor Greek,” nor any 
other racial distinction, should exist in both sacred and secular spaces. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SIMPLE JUSTICE AND HUMAN DECENCY 
 
 Even though Arkansas ministers discovered the ramifications for publicly 
criticizing massive resistance during the Central High School crisis, they could still 
influence local affairs as part of a larger coalition. Applying the lessons of Hoxie, 
Cartwright especially emerged as an advocate for practical solutions to implement school 
desegregation, featuring both progressives and moderates alike. As local resistance 
embraced increasingly extreme alternatives such as closing the high schools, other vocal 
dissenters joined the clergy in protest, successfully scaling back the most extreme 
segregationist policies like shutting down public education. This chapter focuses on how 
ministers supported larger moderate/progressive alternatives, arguing that while larger 
coalitions provided limited results, they also lacked the moral clarity that religious 
conviction provided.  
Clerical marginalization left progressive voices powerless against what John Kirk 
has called “minimum compliance,” the plan that moderates employed in Arkansas. Kirk 
contends that, by sidestepping ethical obligations and requesting that only a handful of 
students attend desegregated schools, minimum compliance not only allowed massive 
resistance to flourish for a time but also reasserted itself as the only logical alternative 
after the crisis. In Kirk’s words, “when massive resistance failed, self-styled moderates 
used the furore it created to justify their already established policy of minimum 
compliance with the law.” He agrees with Numen V. Bartley’s claim that the shift from 
massive resistance to minimum compliance was relatively smooth and represented “no 
real break from the past,” because massive resistance had changed the landscape where 
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“token efforts to comply nominally with the letter of the law of the land, while often 
evading its spirit, came to be hailed as “progress,” However, Kirk disputes Bartley’s 
claim that it was the accidental results by “well-meaning leaders,” insisting that it was 
instead a “much more calculating and premediated attempt to circumvent the Brown 
decision.”1 
In contrast, Matthew D. Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis contend that this argument 
“misses much of the political conflict and historical contingency which marked that 
moment in time.” Claiming that the Kirk/Bartley argument focuses too much on 
“political elites,” Lassiter and Lewis instead claim that examining local responses to 
extreme segregation “demonstrates the ways in which shifting attitudes among whites 
undermined massive resistance and formed a popular consensus for accepting limited 
desegregation before most political leaders were willing to take such a stand.” While 
popular resistance to massive resistance policies did not bring about full integration of 
public schools, it “heralded substantial political and educational changes in Virginia,” 
providing the groundswell to overturn the old political oligarchy in the upcoming 
decade.2 
                                                
1 Kirk, “Massive Resistance and Minimum Compliance,” 76-98; Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, 342-
343. R. Scott Baker’s monograph on school desegregation in Charleston, South Carolina concurs with the 
Kirk/Bartley thesis, writing that “the most durable resistance to African American demands for 
desegregation came from moderates not extremists.” Baker describes how the Charleston school board used 
test scores and other means to restrict the number of African American students (Baker, Paradoxes of 
Desegregation: African American Struggles for Educational Equity in Charleston, South Carolina, 1926-
1972 [Columbia: South Carolina, 2006], 127).  
2 Lassiter and Lewis, “Massive Resistance Revisited: Virginia’s White Moderates and the Byrd 
Organization,” in The Moderates’ Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Segregation in Virginia, eds. 
Lassiter and Lewis (Charlottesville: Virginia, 1998), 1-21. In his study on SRC leader Benjamin Muse, 
Lassiter concedes that minimum compliance had its own limits. He writes: “as massive resistance receded, 
the initial desegregation achieved through the rhetoric of open public schools and economic progress all too 
often represented compliance with the minimum requirements of the law followed by conservative 
retrenchment, not the beginning of more fundamental racial change” (Lassiter, “A ‘Fighting Moderate’: 
Benjamin Muse’s Search for the Submerged South,” in The Moderates’ Dilemma, 201). 
  
98 
 
Looking at Arkansas ministers provides further evidence for Lassiter and Lewis’s 
claim that the switch from massive resistance to minimum compliance was far from 
smooth. Furthermore, each of the above authors fails to convey that local progressives 
supported minimum compliance only as a way station to full integration. Progressive 
clergy’s religious justification that segregation was immoral and that God demanded truly 
integrated facilities left them especially uneasy with pupil placement, which hardly 
reflected true Christian brotherhood. As massive resistance faded, the more radical clergy 
spoke out against minimum compliance, ultimately to little avail. Still, clerical dissent in 
the transition period is worth analyzing to discover potential alternatives and shed light 
on the contested nature between massive resistance and minimum compliance. 
 The first antisegregationist alternative that enjoyed broader support was 
businessman Herbert Thomas’s proposed plan in Spring 1948 to resolve the crisis 
through compromise. Thomas, was helped oversee the University of Arkansas’s 
desegregation process in 1948, proposed establishing an interracial committee which 
would set local guidelines to desegregate in return for withdrawing the remaining Little 
Rock Nine after the end of the 1957-1958 school year. Although the proposed committee 
would not have legal force behind its recommendations, Thomas contended that “because 
of its very nature it would operate with tremendous moral persuasion toward improved 
race relationships.”3 Elizabeth Jacoway wrote that the Thomas Plan had “Brooks Hays’s 
fingerprints” all over it, and the plan echoed many preceding proposals from moderate 
clerics.4 What made the Thomas Plan different from earlier efforts like the Day of Prayer 
was that it bypassed the clergy and emerged from other local leaders. 
                                                
3 Thomas, “The Arkansas Plan,” 7 April 1958, in Herbert L. Thomas Papers, Box 4.  
4 Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 247. 
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 Local white ministerial reaction ranged from eagerness to ambivalence, although 
few dismissed it outright. First Christian Church of Fayetteville pastor James 
Spainhower, who had supported local desegregation four years prior, stated that the plan 
“would encourage the masses as well as our leaders to practice such patience” that was 
“very much needed” in contemporary affairs. Fort Smith Methodist pastor Fred Roebuck 
echoed the moderation line, endorsing the “most excellent” plan as one that local citizens, 
except the “extremists and agitationists on each side,” would willingly support, and 
Bishop Robert Brown also endorsed the plan. J. Hodge Alves, rector of Little Rock’s 
Christ Episcopal Church, explained why many ministers found themselves in natural 
support of the plan: “Christian understanding and cooperation and regard for one another, 
patience and tolerance must all have a part in any permanent solution.” These pastors 
embraced the ever-present ideal of the decent and Christian South marshalling its voice to 
resolve an increasingly embarrassing situation, responding more to the Plan’s reasonable 
rhetoric than its proposed implementation.5 
 While more progressive pastors took heart at the emergence of other 
antisegregationist voices, they opposed the Plan’s proposed implementation. In their 
official report to the Little Rock school board, the ACHR declared that “the sincere and 
devoted work of Mr. Herbert Thomas and his associates… is cause for renewed hope” 
and supported its voluntary commission as an issue “of primary importance” to allow 
dedicated local leaders to assert control. However, it rejected the Thomas Plan’s efforts to 
halt current desegregation efforts, stating that the plan called for “the ending of one plan, 
however inadequate, without another or a promise of another.” Instead, it echoed local 
                                                
5 Spainhower to Joshua K. Shephard, 8 April 1958; Roebuck to Shephard, 19 April 1958, Alves to Thomas, 
22 April 1958; Brown to Thomas, 24 April 1958, Thomas Papers, Box 4. 
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African American criticism that withdrawing the remaining students was too large a price 
to pay.6 
 Donald K. Campbell of Crossett helped explain why progressive pastors found the 
proposed methods intriguing but the overall plan unworkable in a 10 April letter to 
Arkansas Plan proponents. Campbell wrote that while the voluntary committee could not 
hurt, it had to make sure to include NAACP leaders and those who “have a zeal for 
pursuing the rights of their own people even when the dominant majority find this 
unpleasant.” Campbell neglected to specifically mention Thomas’s name, but he wrote 
that those who railed against extremism on both sides and equated the NAACP with local 
Citizens Councils neglected the difference between “those who are bold to seek the rights 
granted them by the law, and who use legal means” with those who “are set up to block 
and hinder the law of the land.” Interracial committees held considerable promise, but 
they had to include the entire community rather than only those voices elites deemed 
acceptable to be effective.  
 Campbell’s also expressed his religiously based discomfort with the moderate 
endorsement of minimum compliance. Specifically, Campbell wrote:  
This document seems to reflect a point of view that segregation is wrong but also 
a desire to have no more integration than absolutely necessary. Though I might 
work with the Arkansas Plan, I can never be satisfied with this attitude. I grew up 
with deep prejudices, and was brought to favor integration because as a Christian 
I became convinced that it is the will of God as taught us in Christ Jesus. I do not 
believe that it is enough for me to merely accept something God wills in a passive 
way, but I feel that I must go out and actively seek to bring it about. Therefore I 
not only will agree to, but want, integration. I can give only qualified support to 
any plan that falls short of this.7 
 
                                                
6 ACHR Suggestions to the Arkansas State Board of Education, [c. May 1958], Box 25; ACHR Minutes, 17 
April 1958, Box 34, ACHR Papers. 
7 Campbell to Thomas, 10 April 1958, Thomas Papers, Box 4. 
  
101 
 
Campbell’s reply reiterated that integration was not only inevitable but desirable, 
revealing the discomfort progressives had with the idea that eight students had to be 
ejected from integrated schools just for an advisory commission.  
 Of course, progressive ambivalence paled in comparison to segregationist 
rejection. The Mothers League of Little Rock sent a telegram accusing the Plan as yet 
another unconstitutional attempt to override local option and that “WE CHRISTIANS OPPOSE 
THE ALIEN PLAN OF MONGRELIZATION.” Missionary Baptist elder R. A. Raney of nearby 
Carthage defended segregation as completely in line with the Bible, and that separation of 
church and state made it crystal clear that local areas had a distinctive duty to defend their 
way of life. He failed to distinguish exactly how Thomas’s plan would bring about 
desegregation, but asserted that it “is a simple plan of weak man, versus God’s plan.”8 
Both of these answers illustrate a hard-line approach that rejected even moderate 
overtures as de facto capitulation to unwanted intrusion into local affairs. 
 Outright segregationist opposition allowed Thomas to present an overture to 
progressive voices that his plan was the best compromise to rally moderate support. 
Thomas assured ACHR members Adolphine Terry, Marion Boggs, and Cartwright that 
he only suggested withdrawal because the Nine’s presence was the sticking point behind 
moderates becoming “vocal and active participants” for an actual solution. However, he 
also added that he did not include Daisy Bates because she was an “extremely well-paid, 
well-trained, guided, and disciplined worker for the National Association,” and one who 
would never compromise. Thomas used a traffic metaphor to explain his views: while 
one definitely has a legal right to cross the intersection when one has a green light, it is 
                                                
8 Mothers of North Little Rock and Mothers League of America to Thomas, 11 April 1958; Raney to 
Thomas, 9 April 1958, Thomas Papers, Box 4. 
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still prudent to wait for speeding oncoming traffic to cross rather than sue the offenders 
later on for damages.9 The NAACP, by supporting local court cases rather than waiting 
for the glacial pace of local opinion to change, was risking an unwelcome collision.  
Therein lay the dilemma for progressives post-September 1957: while Thomas’s 
plan sacrificed the moral justice behind true racial integration, standing firm in one’s 
convictions was apparently not going to quell local resistance. Speaking at a church 
conference, Thomas hammered this point home when he indirectly responded to 
Campbell as an anonymous “extreme white integrationist, who has formed his conviction 
through honest reasoning and sincerity of purpose gas approached closely…the Christian 
philosophy of brotherhood.” Although laudable, such a stance assumed perfection was “a 
state of being” rather than “the longed-for goal” and felt comfortable risking “the tragedy, 
the horror, the sorrow of another ‘Little Rock’ incident.” This argument mirrored Bishop 
Brown’s concerns about “integrationists,” versus the “prudent” moderate approach.10  
While the Thomas Plan was ultimately unsuccessful in winning over Governor 
Faubus’s support, the contentious discourse such a plan generated in religious circles 
reveals that behind-the-scenes coalition work was far from easy. Rather than leading 
similarly motivated Christians like Jonesboro lawyer Bill Penix who believed segregation 
was a heresy, progressive leaders too often found out that the larger coalition was all too 
willing to emphasize expedience and practicality over final solutions aimed also at 
addressing structural injustice. While the ACHR remained sensitive to African American 
                                                
9 Thomas to Terry, 15 April 1958, Thomas Papers, Box 4. In a speech to African American leaders, 
Thomas commented that if they disagreed with “voluntary cooperation, in the spirit of mutual trust and 
good will, then I am persuaded to believe that they have been influenced by a rigid, uncompromising 
element within their own race rather than by their own independent judgment and sense of perspective” 
(Thomas, Speech to Negro Leaders, 16 April 1958, in Faubus Papers, Box 599). 
10 Thomas, A Statement Prepared For a Conference of Protestant Church Leaders At New Orleans, 13-14 
May 1958, Thomas Papers, Box 5. 
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leadership and its categorical rejection of withdrawal, it could not convince moderates 
like Thomas to display similar sensitivity.   
The desire to portray a positive Christian response also prevented local 
progressives from taking advantage of the international interest in Little Rock. According 
to Mary Dudziak, Little Rock “was a crisis of such magnitude for worldwide perceptions 
of race and American democracy that it would become the reference point for the future.” 
Fearing that unwelcome publicity would hurt diplomacy abroad, the State Department 
prepared a list of talking points claiming that Little Rock was an anomaly and that 
“marked progress toward integration” was occurring nationwide.11  
Interestingly, even the ACHR supported the national narrative of progressive 
integration, entertaining international dignitaries who wanted a firsthand look at the city 
because of the crisis. The Little Rock crisis had sparked international interest in the city’s 
race relations, which visiting dignitaries freely admitted. A Japanese economist was 
“even more interested in the matter of race relations” than the local economy, while a 
Pakistani political leader wanted “an objective view of intergroup relations and political 
affairs in the Little Rock area.” Local progressives could have used this global interest to 
put pressure on the federal government to take more vigorous action to enforce its own 
laws and court decisions. By all appearances, however, the ACHR instead promoted the 
federal government’s narrative of local racial progress, Specifically, Nat Griswold 
reported that a Mr. Garba “seemed to be pleased with his experiences here” and received 
word that a Nigerian official thanked him for the chance to meet a charming and “diverse 
                                                
11 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 118, 142-145. Dudziak also quotes a United States Information Agency 
(USIA) memo outlining an overall strategy “to minimize the damage by summarizing anti-integration 
events on a factual basis, supplying facts whenever possible to balance adverse sensational items, quoting 
editorials and official statements which indicate steady determined progress toward integration, and 
informally suggesting to friendly editors possible constructive treatment.” 
  
104 
 
section of the community.” While polite, this is hardly the response one would get when 
detailing a bleak racial situation.12 Although I was not able to find any sources to explain 
Griswold’s motivation, national church prestige also dictated downplaying racism at 
home in order to support missions worldwide, which could serve as a possible motivation 
for his willingness to play along with the diplomatic script.  
Little Rock would again appear in the international spotlight when Governor 
Faubus closed the public high schools in September 1958 rather than obey the federal 
court order to have them desegregated, and local citizens voted on a 3:1 ratio to keep 
them closed in a popular referendum. They would reopen the following year, but only 
after a recall vote ejected the three segregationist members of the school board. 
According to Sondra Gordy, historians have unfortunately neglected the “complicated, 
confusing, frustrating” events of the 1958-1959 school year, otherwise known as the Lost 
Year. She makes a somewhat persuasive case that the Lost Year galvanized local citizens 
to speak out against massive resistance and to build a grassroots campaign aimed against 
political manipulation. In regards to the potential counterargument that the initial vote to 
close the public schools demonstrated widespread support for resistance, Gordy argues 
that the vote is an inaccurate barometer for local attitudes. She observes that local citizens 
believed the governor’s false promise of segregated private schools and the ballot was 
worded such that a vote for public schools was also an endorsement of full integration, 
flattening the continuum of views citizens had into a polarizing dichotomy. In contrast, 
                                                
12 Jerome F. Margolius to Griswold, 29 May 1958; Wilfred R. Brunner to Griswold, 29 September 1958; 
Griswold to F. Lamar King, 3 April 1959; Seidu A. Carba to Griswold, 11 April 1959; ACHR Papers, Box 
14. For one particular visit, American Council of Education staffer Jerome F. Margolius alerted Griswold 
that a Mr. Tamai was going to go to Little Rock regardless of sponsorship, and “it is, of course, much better 
that he will have a sponsor there” (Margolius to Griswold, 16 October 1958, ACHR Papers, Box 14). 
Having a sponsor could make him more comfortable but also could help discourage him from drawing 
negative conclusions while the city was up in turmoil.  
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the recall vote showed that the community was done with massive resistance and 
searching for less extreme alternatives to desegregation that preserved public education.  
Gordy gives considerable credit to the moderate businessmen and to the Women’s 
Emergency Committee to Open Schools (WEC), a local organization of female racial 
liberals who used the school closing to mobilize discontent toward segregationists. In 
contrast, Gordy’s only mentions of clerical involvement were the Protestant churches that 
tacitly supported school closure by opening schools for their high school students. One 
minister Gordy spotlights is Second Baptist Church pastor Dale Cowling, who helped 
open the Baptist High School, which was the second largest private school during the 
Lost Year with about 400 students enrolled, all white. It required its students to pay 
tuition, rejecting public support as violating “Baptist principles of separation of church 
and state,” although Raney offered free tuition.13 Such a portrayal paints clergy as 
indifferent toward the larger question of public education at best, and worse, willing 
allies to keep segregated schools. 
 WEC leader Vivion Lenon Brewer also found the clergy silent on this issue. Her 
firsthand account on the Lost Year recounted the struggle to mobilize local ministers 
behind a drafted public statement claiming that they supported open schools “as citizens 
and as religious leaders.” Despite constantly receiving “replies such as: ‘If you get so 
many signatures, then I will sign’; and out and out refusals,” the WEC persisted through 
several months of dealing with semantic issues over the statement’s wording to placate 
individual objections. Still, out of the four hundred churches in the city, only twenty-five 
ministers—and two rabbis—promised to sign the statement, which Brewer deemed too 
                                                
13 Gordy, Finding the Lost Year: What Happened When Little Rock Closed its Public Schools (Fayetteville: 
Arkansas, 2009), 64-71. 
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few to release. The sparse support was, to Brewer, “one of our disheartening failures.” 
The best exemplars of Christian perseverance and commitment, according to WEC 
sources, were not religious leaders like Robert Brown, but the WEC rank and file, who 
were mostly “church members” in their own right.14  
 Focusing exclusively on the admittedly limited ministerial efforts during the Lost 
Year, however, complicates the Gordy/Brewer narrative. After all, twenty-seven 
signatures were more than the number who signed the two resolutions opposing Governor 
Faubus and the local community’s dismal handling of the Central High crisis the year 
prior. And although numerically small, supportive clergy established what “the church” 
had to say in the local discourse regarding public education and race. Rather, the 
overwhelmingly negative or indifferent response to even their most vigorous clerical 
arguments suggests that the blame also lies among the many local citizens who dismissed 
their moral arguments as wrong, offensive, and/or irrelevant. 
 Clergy tried to build up public support for open schools even before the WEC’s 
creation. As the federal court case to order desegregation loomed, Brown asserted that the 
Arkansas Episcopalian Church “will want to play its part” to encourage peaceful 
resolution and that reconciliation “does not mean conciliation, or peace at any price.” 
Despite his pending reelection campaign, Hays also criticized shutdown, saying “it’s 
terrible to contemplate closing any school,” and Donald Campbell joined other South 
                                                
14 Vivion Lenon Brewer, The Embattled Ladies of Little Rock: The Struggle to Save Public Education at 
Central High, 1958-1963 (Fort Bragg: Lost Coast, 1999), 108-111, 283. Sara Murphy’s Breaking the 
Silence contains numerous accounts about how religious faith motivated many participants. WEC member 
Margaret Kolb recalled that many women were recruited “by word of mouth through the church women,” 
and PTA president Billie Wilson remembered receiving encouragement and public speaking tips from “two 
good Presbyterian ministers” and how her church’s pastor had publicly opposed the school closings despite 
congregational opposition (Sara Alderman Murphy, Breaking the Silence: Little Rock’s Women’s 
Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools, 1958-1963, ed. Patrick C. Murphy II [Fayetteville: Arkansas, 
1997], 98, 135-144). 
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Arkansas Presbyterians in criticizing the “sinister” Johnson Amendment authorizing 
Governor Faubus the power to close integrated high schools.15 On the eve of the Supreme 
Court decision, the ACHR organized an eighteen hour prayer vigil “in hopes that God’s 
Will will prevail at this time, and to purify and strength each Christian Witness in word 
and deed.” Ogden, Griswold, and Pulaski Heights Presbyterian Church pastor T. B. Hay 
were among those who prayed that God would, in the words of Social Gospel theologian 
Walter Rauschenbusch, “help us now to master the social relations of mankind that we 
may gain justice and a world of brothers.”16  
Clerical criticism escalated after Faubus closed the four public high schools in the 
city pending a 27 September local referendum. Methodist bishop Paul Martin retreated to 
the moderate line of prayer and law-abidance, also adding that “as Christians, we must 
remind ourselves that it is our solemn obligation to avoid the world’s evil tempers, its 
hatreds, its prejudices and its pride…. We must recognize and appreciate the dignity and 
integrity of all the children of God.”17 Dunbar Ogden’s local denominational peers in the 
Washburn Presbytery—about fifty members, evenly split between laymen and clergy, 
including T. B. Hay—went further, issuing a resolution on 16 September deploring the 
school closings and urging Governor Faubus to rescind his actions. 
                                                
15 “Bishop Brown Silent on Visit,” Arkansas Gazette, 6 September 1958; Jack Blalock, “Hays Decries 
Amendment As ‘Dangerous’ Rights Curb,” 8 September 1958, “Presbytery Slaps State Amendment,” 11 
September 1958. Jim Johnson, Faubus’s opponent in the 1956 election, was now a state legislator. 
16 William J. Massie, “Keep the Vigil”; Prayer Vigil Signup Sheet, 11 September 1958; Order of Service 
for Keeping the Vigil, 11 September 1958, ACHR Papers, Box 18. 
17 “Prayer, Obedience to Law Stressed by Bishop Martin,” Arkansas Gazette, 15 September 1958. While 
the Washburn Presbytery grabbed headlines, many other ministers also urged local citizens to vote against 
closing the public schools. 65 Hall High School students gathered at Hay’s church to open schools, even 
though organizer David Johnson claimed the church “had no connection to the meeting.” The Gazette also 
reported on two sermons by Kenneth Shamblin and Dale Cowling supporting public education. According 
to Shamblin, the governor “rigged” the upcoming referendum by focusing on integration itself rather than 
the lack of desirable alternatives, while Cowling pointed out that such a measure would undoubtedly hurt 
local high schoolers. See “Hall Students Ask Immediate School Opening,” Arkansas Gazette, 20 September 
1958; “Two Ministers, Boards Of Churches Urge Vote For Reopening Schools,” 22 September 1958. 
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Governor Faubus’s reply that the Washburn Presbytery members were “very 
effectively brainwashed” by “the leftwingers and the Communists” illustrates the 
ministers’ overall lack of influence. After all, most politicians cannot directly slander a 
major denomination’s local leadership because offending particular religious 
constituencies could mean a considerable loss of public support. And as one might 
expect, the Presbytery howled foul, immediately issuing another resolution expressing its 
“regret that in the hour of crisis, with the educational welfare of thousands of children at 
stake, the Governor of Arkansas has resorted to name-calling and slander…. Our great 
church is due an apology.” Five Little Rock Methodists the following day supported their 
Presbyterian brethren, writing an open letter to Faubus contending that “the only basis 
you had for such an accusation of these men was that they disagreed with you.”18 If local 
congregations shared their ministers’ views, then Faubus’s intemperate statement could 
have crippled his political influence.  
That local opinion sided with the governor instead indicates the marginal status 
local clergy had at that time. Faubus received a considerable amount of local and national 
support, much of it repeating common segregationist arguments against the church. Many 
locals advanced the segregationist argument that if the ministers were so concerned, they 
should “open their churches + invite the negro, before trying to tell the schools what to 
do.” This argument ignores local African American voices, which displayed far less 
interest in church desegregation than in abolishing the widely unequal financial 
                                                
18 Resolutions Adopted by the 154th Meeting of Washburn Presbytery held at Central Presbyterian Church, 
Little Rock, Arkansas, 16 September 1958, Faubus Papers, Box 568, “Faubus Resets Election For 
September 27, Rips School Board, Clergymen,” Arkansas Gazette, 17 September 1958; “Presbyterians 
Deny Charge, Demand Apology of Governor,” 17 September 1958; “Methodists Urge Governor to 
Apologize to Ministers,” 18 September 1958. Both Ogden’s son and the Arkansas Gazette suggested that 
Ogden had a hand in convincing his fellow Presbyterians to directly oppose the school closings (Ogden, My 
Father Said Yes, 120-121).  
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distribution between their schools and local white schools. Many of the outside letters 
agreed with Faubus’s claim of brainwashed clergy, citing literature from popular 
segregationists like J. B. Matthews and Carl McIntire that accused the national church for 
taking strong progressive stances because they were infiltrated by Communists.19 
Other letters expressed discomfort with clerical activism in social affairs. One 
local citizen wrote, “I for one, wish the Church would first become a Saint before trying 
to run the State of Arkansas” and another explained that he left Hay’s church when “I 
could no longer stomach the parroting of the theories of Socialism from the pulpit instead 
of the teachings of Jesus Christ.” They would likely be in accord with Memphis resident 
F. A. Brewer, who wrote Hay that “preachers don’t know the facts of life…. Preachers 
know all about the bible and things related but all of you are weak on ethics, logic, 
philosophy, the humanities and sociology, in fact everything that is part of how people 
live and react to one another.”20 Like Robert Brown’s self-styled theologians, these letters 
suggest that white Southerners were willing to disregard, if not entirely oppose, their 
pastor’s political views. As both Cartwright and Ogden discovered, many of these 
socially apathetic congregation members may not have had a strong opinion on their 
pastor’s political views per se but resented how they interfered with the real business at 
hand—the institutional health of local churches. Faubus likely recognized local 
discontent with clerical activism when he redbaited local Presbyterian leadership, and his 
refusal to apologize made him more, not less, popular. 
                                                
19 J. D. McDonald to Faubus, 17 September 1958; John W. Glover to Faubus, [c. September 1958]; Joe K. 
Rowan to Faubus, 18 September 1958; Frank J. Maston to Faubus, 23 September 1958, Faubus Papers, Box 
530. 
20 F. A. Brewer to T. A. Hay, 16 September 1958; Cass Gentry to Faubus, 18 September 1958; J. C. 
Overstreet to Faubus, 19 September 1958, Faubus Papers, Box 530. 
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Of course, what made the September 1958 protests different from years prior was 
that other major voices finally emerged to support the clergy in their efforts to save 
public education. The WEC wrote letters of support commending fourteen of the pastors 
who spoke out in September 1958, recognizing their shared mission.21 It also attempted 
to work with Robert Brown to organize a 26 September television program encouraging 
local citizens to vote against shutting down the high schools. According to Brewer, 
Brown only agreed to participate if the other members of the panel were also ministers, 
forcing a complete re-write of a script and leading to a program that “was poorly timed, 
blurred in expression, and was a great disappointment.” She also had a difficult time 
rounding up the three other religious leaders, exhausting her list of ministerial contacts 
only to find Paul Martin and T. B. Hay. She then turned to Cowling, who had participated 
in an earlier pro-WEC television program, to be the fourth member. Cowling replied that 
he would do it, “but it makes me very sad that you have found so few.”22 
Taken together, the four religious leaders crafted a specific appeal aimed at 
extolling the Christian character of public education, carefully omitting any mention of 
how segregation fit into their scheme. The ultimately moderate message avoided 
prophetic theological pronouncement on desegregation for protecting public education. 
Brown reiterated his message of reconciliation and urged citizens to let Christian faith 
guide their vote, while Martin stated the social benefits of public education. After 
meeting privately with Brown, Adolphine Terry and Dottie Morris concluded that he was 
trying to protect his relationship with Governor Faubus and “is not willing to lose any 
                                                
21 WEC Memorandum On 7 October Meeting. [c. 12-18 October 1958], Murphy Papers, Box 15. 
22 Brewer, Embattled Ladies of Little Rock, 27-29; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 89-90. According to a 
WEC eyewitness account, Brown feared the program would be “too controversial,” and “we were like ten 
minutes from going on the air, and he was trying to talk us out” of doing it.  
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little influence he may have by taking too strong a stand on TV” against him. In contrast, 
the two pastors in the panel made more direct links between Christian faith and keeping 
public schools open. Cowling claimed that “God has given us our American system of 
free public school education” and that “we simply must not allow the heat of our passions 
in this hour to cause us to throw overboard such a priceless heritage.” Meanwhile, Hay 
focused specifically on the high schoolers, observing that the acerbic debate over closing 
the public schools “is like a father and mother who are fighting over their child. When 
it’s all over, perhaps no great harm shall be done to the father or the mother, but the child 
will be terribly wounded.”23  
Cowling’s role in the program is especially interesting given his later role in 
sponsoring Baptist High. Much like other strongly moderate leaders, Cowling’s 
endorsement for public school education triggered local ire. He soon received a unique 
form of harassment, as a small handful of African Americans attempted to desegregate 
his church in protest for his support for public school desegregation. The protesters’ 
arguments were especially odd, giving credence to Cowling’s theory that their views 
were not representative of the larger community and that it was a setup from a “pressure 
group.” African American protester Albert Hudson claimed that he chose Second Baptist 
to show that “integration was impossible at the churches and thus impossible in the 
schools,” and added that Daisy Bates attempted to intimidate him by her suggestion that 
white church leaders “who objected to his effort might beat him up.” Local African 
American leaders supported Cowling over Hudson, as Bates’s husband L. C. denied 
NAACP involvement and that “all we want is integrated public institutions. I don’t care 
                                                
23 WEC Television Program Prior to the Little Rock School Election, 26 September 1958, Murphy Papers, 
Box 15; Murphy. Breaking the Silence, 89. 
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whether they ever integrate the churches.” Roland Smith, African American pastor of the 
First Missionary Baptist Church, also discouraged the protests and that African 
Americans should resist being “pawns and tools” for segregationists.24  
If not a sign of genuine African American discontent, such a protest illustrates the 
ministers’ dilemma. Cowling could have simply welcomed the protesters in to worship 
with the church, as many contemporary observers noted. However, role conflict likely 
discouraged Cowling from taking any action that could trigger explosive discontent in his 
congregation and, in a way, give in to arch-segregationist wishes. The actual 
embarrassment Cowling experienced and the potentially explosive discord suggests that 
Hudson’s attempt was not a mere prank but a serious effort to undermine Cowling’s 
career. 
Given segregationist opposition to Cowling, how should one view his efforts to 
both support public education and later construct an alternate school system? Gordy’s 
basic contention that these pastors abetted local governmental efforts to evade the federal 
court order remains true, as separate private schools had little impact for the African 
Americans thrown out of education and denied access to schools like Raney High.  
However, Cowling’s spirited defense for public education complicates the picture. After 
all, Brewer portrayed Cowling as the rare minister who vigorously supported the WEC, 
in comparison to Brown’s diffidence. Instead of a dream come true, Baptist High was 
more likely the last-ditch remedy for a bad situation, making sure to protect church 
adolescents from the political power plays that would otherwise deny them needed 
education. Cowling and other moderate pastors were not willing segregationist allies but 
                                                
24 “Court Resume School Debates,” Arkansas Gazette, 6 October 1958; “Two Churches Open Classes For 
About 60,” 13 October 1958; “Three Private Schools Enroll More Students,” 27 October 1958, “Negro 
Plans Another Try At Attending White Church,” 15 October 1958. 
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pawns trapped between the distasteful choices of tacitly supporting segregation or letting 
local youth suffer from a situation not of their own choosing.  
Interestingly, the clerics who attempted to rally support for public education in the 
September 1958 vote were more moderate than those who supported the Little Rock 
Nine, suggesting that these ministers believed more in public education generally than 
desegregation specifically. Cowling, Brown, and Martin all fall under Campbell and 
Pettigrew’s definition of “influential” ministers, established ministers who refused to 
endorse desegregation in the Central High crisis. Even as the moderates’ reasoning 
avoided racial reasons, their public support placed them against Faubus and local 
segregationist sentiment. One reason for their greater activism might have been wounded 
pride. After Pettigrew gave an advance paper of his findings criticizing the majority of 
Little Rock’s ministers for failing “to show ministerial courage” during the Central High 
School crisis, Cowling and Brown both gave spirited replies defending their record. 
Cowling complained that Pettigrew subjectively determined “which ministers [are] 
helping and which hindering,” while Brown believed that local ministers showed “a great 
deal of courage and perseverance in seeking a solution to this dilemma.”25 Such 
vehement replies suggest that local clergy were emotionally invested in desegregation, as 
apathetic clergy could have simply dismissed Pettigrew as another clueless academic 
whose focus on “social matters” was irrelevant to the church’s true mission.  
In contrast, progressives mostly kept a low profile during the Lost Year, which 
coincided with Central Presbyterian Church turning away Dunbar Ogden and Brooks 
                                                
25 ‘Courage Poke Draws Replies From Pastors,” Arkansas Gazette, 1 September 1958. The Gazette article 
also quoted Dunbar Ogden’s positive reply, saying that “most of our ministers did very well considering 
that a great many church members exerted a severe pressure to keep them from using their influence 
opening to allow a beginning of gradual integration.” 
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Hays’s election defeat. If progressives led the Fall 1957 efforts and vocally contested the 
Thomas Plan, by Fall 1958 they contented themselves with less public roles. In a 30 
September letter to his family, Cartwright wrote that “I have stayed out of the headlines, 
and have not been subjected to much harassment,” but instead “have been free to work 
behind the scenes in some possibly significant ways, unmolested.” His efforts to secure 
federal intervention by ghost-writing a report for the Civil Rights Commission and 
requesting assistance from Attorney General Rogers proved to be of little avail, but did 
not subject him to Whitaker-level criticism. When Brewer was mobilizing support for her 
petition, Cartwright expressed his own private support but “was not encouraging” 
regarding its chances of success.26 
One possible reason why Cartwright shied away from the public eye was that the 
unfruitful efforts of the past several years left him drained. Cartwright’s letters from 
September-October 1958 reveal considerable mental fatigue, as he flirted with the 
temptation to move elsewhere. Disciples of Christ officer Ralph E. Valentine, hearing 
that Cartwright “might be interested in a pastorate in a University center,” wrote to him 
about an available pastorate in West Virginia. Cartwright observed that the church was 
“pretty good,” but declined because “I don’t see quite how I could leave right now,” 
especially with his church’s building fund campaign. Still, the offer suggests that the 
thought of leaving Little Rock was not a foreign one.27 
Cartwright also declined a proposed educational visit from Lincoln, Nebraska 
Baptist and Disciples youth groups to study the situation in Little Rock, writing that “it is 
difficult to explain to one who is not in the present situation the ‘battle fatigue’ which 
                                                
26 Cartwright to Folks, 30 September 1958; Brewer, Embattled Ladies of Little Rock, 110. 
27 Valentine to Cartwright, 12 September 1958; Cartwright to Valentine, 15 September 1958; Cartwright to 
Folks, 30 September 1958, all in Cartwright Papers. 
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develops in this kind of circumstance.” Specifically, Cartwright noted that the trip would 
not be for Little Rock but for the students’ benefits, and “our immediate task is not to 
educate the world but try to do something here.” Excusing his poor behavior, Cartwright 
wrote that “today I have been harassed on radio and television and in person. It is all 
wearing, and limits what one can do.”28 Much like how later SNCC activists recorded 
burnout for their heroic and lonely stances, Cartwright’s own four-year exposure to 
public scrutiny left him considerably less optimistic, likely contributing to his silence 
during the Lost Year crisis. 
Eventually, massive resistance met its match in May 1959, when the 
segregationist members of the school board refused to renew the contracts of forty-four 
Central High School teachers and staff. The firings gave a race-neutral cause to oppose 
the board, and the WEC combined with business leaders to form the Committee to Stop 
This Outrageous Purge (STOP) in opposition. With the WEC’s mobilization and the 
business community’s funds, STOP took advantage of local outrage to launch a 
successful recall of the three segregationist school board members with moderates.29  
Much like previous efforts to overturn massive resistance, the WEC marginalized 
its progressive voices to maintain a broader consensus. According to Vivion Brewer, 
WEC leaders recognized that “we could afford no hint of being in favor of integration if 
we were to win any election,” and that political viability meant they had to distance 
themselves even from the interracial and red-baited ACHR. However, the WEC 
continued to revisit how to handle practical racial issues like endorsing desegregation in 
the public schools or allowing African American membership in its executive board 
                                                
28 Keith D. Stephenson to Cartwright, 9 October 1958; Cartwright to Stephenson, 14 October 1958, 
Cartwright Papers. 
29 Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 310-327. 
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meetings. Brewer said that “over and over, depressed but realistic, we decided against 
inviting Negro members, against attending inter-racial groups.” While it made practical 
political sense, Karen Anderson claims that its “deference to male civic 
leaders…ultimately limited not only its progressive political vision” but also its 
interracial appeal.30 Much like the Thomas Plan, the WEC failed to make clear that 
desegregation itself was as Donald Campbell claimed, “the will of God.” 
That being said, progressive clergy initially took heart in STOP’s success. 
Cartwright recognized that the successful recall vote had little to do with the clergy, who 
mostly “remained silent on the school issue. When upon occasion they did speak, they 
were not heeded.” Rather, it was the result of a local community “finally learning for 
themselves from the bitter experiences of life what righteousness demands,” and evidence 
that Little Rock had “a new spirit for righteousness.” His initial optimism faded as truly 
minimal compliance reemerged, however. The school board assigned only eight African 
American students to white public schools for Fall 1959, making the number even lower 
than in 1957, and twelve for Fall 1960. Such low enrollment, according to Elizabeth 
Jacoway, was because local “social and business leadership” still viewed “integration as 
                                                
30 Brewer, Embattled Ladies of Little Rock, 11-12, 70-72; Anderson, Little Rock, 13. Brewer claimed that 
Bates once wrote a critical article that the WEC worked “for the Negroes, not with them,” but decided not 
to publish it out of deference to her friendship with Adolphine Terry. The WEC’s decision to ignore race 
has drawn significant scholarly debate. Laura Miller concedes that the WEC “did not set out to redefine 
gender or race relations,” but their campaign to save public education proved an invaluable  training ground 
for developing their political skills and raise a voice “supporting social change, educating the public, and 
mobilizing large numbers of women to work for social justice.” In contrast, Lorraine Gates argues that the 
WEC adopted moderate policies because it was a moderate organization and that its members “opposed the 
segregationists because of what their actions were doing to the community’s economy and reputation, not 
because of any commitment to racial equality.” While disagreeing with Gates that the WEC did not care 
about racial injustice, Anderson agrees that their actions “reinforced the view that race relations were a 
dispute among whites over what to do about blacks,” marginalizing their voices. See Miller, “Challenging 
the Segregationist Power Structure in Little Rock,” in Throwing Off The Cloak of Privilege: White 
Southern Women Activists in the Civil Rights Era, ed. Gail S. Murray (Gainesville: Florida, 2004), 154-
156; Gates, “Power From the Pedestal: The Women’s Emergency Committee and the Little Rock School 
Crisis,” in Arkansas Historical Quarterly 55 (Spring 1996), 40; Anderson, Little Rock, 180-181. 
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distasteful as their less sophisticated neighbors” and purposefully hindered 
desegregation.31  
While an accurate description of the moderate majority, Jacoway’s assertion does 
not cover the progressive clergy and sympathetic women who found the glacial pace of 
desegregation unsettling. The ACHR, in its July-September 1959 confidential quarterly 
report, accused the school board of legal chicanery, claiming that it hoped “to restore the 
‘good faith’ of Little Rock without practicing fair play toward the Negro students” and 
that African Americans and a good percentage of WEC citizens were opposed to the 
board’s policies.32 In efforts to build up more local activism regarding racial issues, the 
American Friends Service Committee sent Thelma Babbitt to organize four interracial 
conferences.  
The four Conferences on Community Unity, as they would be called, provided an 
opportunity for white racial liberals and African Americans to discuss a variety of topics, 
from the semantics between desegregation and integration to use of titles for African 
Americans to structural issues like housing inequality. While these meetings bore 
considerable similarity to previous interracial efforts, Babbitt’s successful efforts to find 
both African American ministers and students gave the white liberals broader exposure to 
larger grievances, and to think about possible action steps. Cartwright recalled that the 
conferences exposed him to “the intolerable ways black students in the high schools were 
                                                
31 Cartwright, “Lessons From Little Rock,” Address Delivered at the International Convention of Christian 
Churches, Denver, Colorado, 30 August 1959, Cartwright Papers; Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 328. 
32 ACHR Quarterly Report, July-September 1959, ACHR Papers, Box 27. According to Anderson, the 
moderate school board, “whose commitment to tokenism was intense, confronted an African American 
community equally resolute in its desire to contest tokenism with whatever tools it had available” 
(Anderson, Little Rock, 208). African American students applied to transfer in considerable numbers, but 
the school board held firm in allowing only a trickle to attend desegregated schools. 
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being discriminated against” without any response from school officials, further pointing 
to the lie of minimum compliance.33  
The Conference of Community Unity provided Cartwright the ideal progressive 
platform to announce his break with the politics of moderation. Cartwright’s concluding 
speech for the final conference on 22 November 1960 started with a call to action, 
observing that his audience had the people and the ideas needed to overcome racial 
discrimination, but that it needed “the guts to act the way we believe.” Much like how he 
had earlier called segregation the root of satanic emotions, he again expressed his 
religious conviction that it was wrong. Cartwright said: 
In the sight of God everything that thwarts the development of a wholesome 
personality in another person is evil and sinful. Yet it is just the nature of racial 
discrimination to din constantly into the ears of the Negro that he is inferior and 
that he is of little worth compared to his white neighbors.34 
 
Like Donald Campbell’s criticism of the Thomas Plan, Cartwright claimed that the 
dedicated Christian would not merely be content with official and legal compliance, but 
that moral compliance would mean completely dismantling even unofficial barriers and, 
by implication, bringing about significant integration into the public school system.  
  The need for action was especially acute because community leaders were hardly 
meeting “the ordinary demands of simple justice and human decency.” Cartwright 
singled out the “legalistic Pharisees” of the school board for special criticism, claiming 
that “they have not acted in good faith either with the patrons against whom they plot or 
with the God who is ever watching and testing the sincerity of each man’s actions.” By 
                                                
33 Report, Conference on Community Unity, Aldersgate Camp, 20 February 1960; Second Conference on 
Community Unity for Adults and Youth, 29 April 1960, Murphy Papers, Box 9; Cartwright, Lonesome 
Valley, 141-142. For example, the second conference focused on African American college student voices, 
significantly in the wake of the sit-ins in Greensboro and in Nashville.  
34 Cartwright, “‘Band Together For Genuine Unity,’ Presented to the Fourth Conference of Community 
Unity,” New South 16 (January 1961), 8. 
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limiting the number of African American students and allowing white students to harass 
them in the schools, the moderate school board created “a policy of equivocation and 
duplicity which can erupt at any time into greater tragedy than our city has yet known.” 
As a call to action, Cartwright urged the participants to join him in pushing for a group of 
religious leaders that stands against “all demagoguery and duplicity—against racists and 
moderates alike—and seeks a just and equitable solution to our racial problems.”35 
The speech’s timing puzzled the New York Times, which called it an ill-timed 
attempt to get local residents “to re-examine the collective attitude that their ‘problem’ 
really had been solved” and also remarked that it was the first time desegregationists had 
criticized the already embattled school board. In response, Cartwright sent off a heated 
letter to the Times editor, charging that the article was “the most irresponsible piece of 
journalism yet to come out of Little Rock.” In particular, Cartwright found fault with the 
article’s portrait that “all is well with ‘token integration,’” ignoring the ways that officials 
openly “discriminate within the law.” Furthermore, the article failed to lay out the 
“religious and moral” dimensions of the issue, which differentiated Cartwright’s 
argument from the segregationists.36 
In a private letter to Progressive editor Morris Rubin, Cartwright further 
explained his break with moderation. While he previously had encouraged moderate 
clerical activism, he now blamed moderates for “stymying [sic] real progress with a holy 
                                                
35 Ibid., 9-10.  
36 “Schools in Little Rock Accused of ‘Cold War’ Against Negroes,” New York Times, 27 November 1960; 
Cartwright, Letter to the Editor of the New York Times, 29 November 1960, SRC Papers. The Times 
responded by giving Cartwright an interview allowing him to explain his opposition to the school board, 
which resulted in the later article “Minister Asserts Little Rock Fails,” New York Times, 4 December 1960. 
Everett Tucker, the school board’s president, also took a swipe at Cartwright, stating that “closed schools 
were a fairly effective bar to racial discrimination per se” and that the criticism was a “harsh disservice” for 
individuals who received their own fair share of opposition from segregationists (Southern School News, 
January 1961, found in Cartwright Papers).  
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righteousness born of a legalistic approach to the whole problem.” The main problem was 
that the moderates’ attitudes basically hoped “that if you just don’t talk about these 
things, they will go away,” as succinct a statement about the “progressive mystique” as 
any. While moderation prevented true change, Cartwright held out hope that a truly 
progressive ministerial push armed with religious truth against racial discrimination could 
bear fruit. Cartwright admitted that he ultimately changed his strategy because his 
previous approach had not produced results. In his words, previous efforts “proved to be 
a dead-end, and so this week I changed my strategy by coming out on a moral basis, in 
the public eye.”37  
Cartwright’s turn from political organizing to moral condemnation triggered a 
new wave of segregationist opposition. Like Ogden, he received a wave of threatening 
phone calls and hate mail, one which stated that “God will burn you in HELL for you 
[sic] attempt to Destroy mankind and making yellow niggers.” His stance also caused 
minor ripples in his church, as moderate voices who believed that Cartwright’s views 
were similar “felt greatly wounded because they were put in the category [by their 
minister] with the racists.”  His later recollections paint a more severe situation, where 
even his wife was “considerably disturbed” by his actions and that while his congregation 
did not publicly oppose him,  they could not “understand my depth of moral indignation” 
and had “no heart for battle.”38  
While Cartwright was able to accurately dissect the weaknesses in the moderate 
approach, his own prophetic stance produced few results. In a 9 February 1961 letter to 
Thelma Babbitt, Cartwright observed that the Conference on Community Unity had not 
                                                
37 Cartwright to Rubin, 6 December 1960; Cartwright to Folks, 25 November 1960, Cartwright Papers. 
38 Cartwright, Lonesome Valley, 147-148; Haney, “Study of Conscience,” 129-130; Cartwright to Thelma 
Babbitt, 9 February 1961, Cartwright Papers. 
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gotten together and “would take a great deal to get us going again.” Lacking 
mobilization, “the community grows more complacent by the day” yet another ineffective 
vehicle for change. In a June 1963 interview with Eleanor Haney, he admitted that the 
last several years had left him “tend[ing] toward despair of the church, despair of white 
persons generally having any effect in the area of radical change.”39  
                                                
39 Haney, “Study of Conscience,” 125, 136. According to Irving J. Spitzburg, Jr., Cartwright and his fellow 
progressives actually hurt themselves by declaring a clean break with fellow moderates because they 
“limited their effectiveness by not restraining themselves at the right time and very often offending instead 
of persuading the influential men in the community. On many occasions, the liberals talked themselves into 
most of the trouble they had” (Spitzburg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 1954-1964 [New York: Garland, 
1987], 175-176). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  In his autobiography, Colbert S. Cartwright succinctly summarized his efforts as 
follows: 
I determined to work within the church and culture to transform it in 
companionship with Christ who had not given up on either. At some points I 
turned to the secular political expediencies of the moment, counseling a school 
board how to survive by a minimal compliance with the Supreme Court school 
decision. Disillusioned with this approach, I turned prophet, attacking those who 
had generally followed my counsel. In the end I tended to conclude that attempts 
to work with Christ to transform the church and society were not adequate.1 
 
Cartwright and his fellow clergy had ample reasons to reach such pessimistic 
conclusions. Their repeated attempts to positively transform their culture resulted in 
consistent failure. Their pleas for Christian brotherhood fell on deaf ears, as the state 
plunged first into massive resistance and then engaged in a winking noncompliance with 
federal laws. The few successes toward building desegregated schools also had little to do 
with clerical involvement. As the drama over school desegregation unfolded on the stage, 
the clergy found out they were not the stars of the show but a peanut gallery ensconced in 
a faraway balcony, whose words did not change the unfolding play. 
That being said, Cartwright’s transparent sincerity and apparent desire to bring 
about truly integrated education illustrates clerical activism’s unrealized potential. 
Religious motivation was what motivated the ministers and dedicated laymen like Bill 
Penix to take courageous stands not just for legal desegregation but for a truly communal 
society. Someone like Cartwright could have seen minimum compliance as significant 
progress except for the spiritual discomfort progressives felt, which Donald Campbell 
described in his statement that he would “give only qualified support to any plan that falls 
                                                
1 Cartwright, Lonesome Valley, 239. 
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short of” truly Christian integration, like the Thomas Plan. Although certainly more 
preferable than legally segregated or shut down schools, token desegregation was hardly 
a snapshot of true Christian society.  
While possessing genuine conviction, local ministers lacked the practical 
understanding needed to constructively challenge racial injustice in their communities. 
Like other clergy locally and nationally, Cartwright initially endorsed voluntary 
desegregation, confident that the fears of resistance were overblown. His journey from 
spectator to advisor to prophet reflects an evolving understanding of the demands of 
social change, learned on the job. The same minister who eagerly endorsed “many 
different types of action” in 1956 stated in 1960 that he was against “all demagoguery 
and duplicity—against racists and moderates alike.” Furthermore, as Cartwright 
explained, his views mostly shifted because previous efforts had ended in failure. The 
events at Hoxie proved that voluntary compliance was more fantasy than reality, while 
the constant struggles that the few token African American high school students endured 
attending desegregated schools after 1959 showed that the moderates’ demand for civility 
trumped their longing for brotherhood. Resorting to prophetic action, however, ended up 
further underscoring his December 1956 observation “that the power of public speaking 
is limited.”2 His final pessimistic comments stand as proof that he, and by extension other 
local clergy, were trying to figure out just how exactly to channel their religious 
sentiment into constructive efforts. 
Much of it was that the people on stage were not used to receiving social advice 
from the balcony. According to Robert Brown, local resistance was evidence of “the 
staggering fact that the Church is largely without influence in the day of society’s 
                                                
2 Cartwright, “What Can Southern Ministers Do,” 1505-1506; “Band Together For Genuine Unity,” 10. 
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trouble,” and that “what it insists upon as truth, not a few are disavowing as moralism and 
mere sentimentality.” Campbell and Pettigrew quoted a contemporary Atlanta Baptist 
theologian, “I often think, ‘Am I the shepherd of my flock or its pet lamb?’”3 While 
Campbell and Pettigrew suggested that the pastor had the ability to decide which role he 
wanted to be, local apathy to ministerial objection proved otherwise. Even as pastors tried 
to shepherd their flock, too many locals remained faithful to theological heresies that 
condemned miscegenation, dismissing the clergy’s views as unwanted meddling. 
The experiences of Arkansas clergy during massive resistance not only inform the 
local arena, but also share similarities with many other stories outside its exact place and 
time. Cartwright was not the only minister in America who tried to “work within the 
church and culture to transform it in companionship with Christ,” nor was Arkansas the 
only state that struggled with massive resistance, yet alone racial prejudice. Three 
observations stand out from this study. 
First, studying how churches conduct social change requires not only 
investigating their theological world views but also their political beliefs. Both moderate 
and progressive clergy affirmed that desegregation was morally right, and took risky 
actions in light of their personal convictions. However, too many clergy did not escape 
their local culture and its impact on their overall worldviews, clinging to their own biases 
and paternalistic attitudes toward African Americans. Bishop Robert Brown echoed 
Biblical truth when he spoke of the urgent need to build true reconciliation and unity 
within communities, but his actual approach neglected including the inconvenient but 
crucial voices needed for the process to succeed. Furthermore, the moderates’ acceptance 
of minimum compliance stems not from Biblical wisdom but rather from a conservative 
                                                
3 Brown, “Little Rock and the Churches,” 21; Campbell and Pettigrew, Christians in Racial Crisis, 131. 
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outlook that prioritized patience over justice. On the other hand, Cartwright’s early 
exposure to radical pacifist circles likely informed his own lifelong resistance to legal 
segregation. While nationally accepted theology spurred local clergy to act, their own 
differing worldviews affected the implementation. 
Second, a religious institution can look drastically different from the national to 
the state to the local level, creating the potential for vigorous internal conflict. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., observed the gap between the national and the local in his December 
1957 speech to the National Council of Churches, saying that “the sublime statements of 
the major denominations on the questions of human relations move all too slowly to the 
local churches and actual practice,” despite the “dauntless courage” of individual 
ministers pleading for desegregation.4 Part of the reason that national resolutions did not 
translate into action is that local people also dismissed national religious opinion as 
irrelevant, assuming that communists or atheists had tainted the larger society. In 
Arkansas, it was a segregationist grassroots movement that united discontented people 
with explosive myths that rejected institutional wisdom for their own narrative of racial 
superiority. Local church and community resistance to clerical leadership, at least in 
Arkansas, also suggests that massive resistance could be just as much a bottom-up 
approach as a top down one. The vigorous contrasts between governing board, pulpit and 
pew highlights the present need for more professional historians interested in religion and 
the movement to adopt a local studies approach. 
Finally, looking at the white southern ministers’ failure lies in the same vein as 
other recent scholarship criticizing the teleological outlook present in textbook accounts 
                                                
4 King, “The Christian Way of Life in Human Relations, Address Delivered at the General Assembly of the 
National Council of Churches,” 4 December 1957, in The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume VI, 
326-327. 
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of the civil rights movement. This paper echoes Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s call to make the 
movement “harder to celebrate as a natural progression of American values,” focusing 
not just on its partial gains but on the considerable effort it took from countless unsung 
activists to overturn their contemporary society.5 While the clergy are far from faultless, 
their failure to persuade locals to accept the Court decision also points to the depths of 
local resistance beyond the lunatic fringe. Their mission, to transform local hearts and 
minds to live up to the religious standard of an all-encompassing community that neglects 
race, class, gender, and language barriers for sacrificial love, remains a pressing one for 
communities all over the country. After all, truly integrated and equal public schools, and 
a society that recognizes the dignity of every person as God’s creation, remains an 
elusive goal for Fayetteville, for Hoxie, for Little Rock, and for towns and cities all over 
the state and the nation.  
  
                                                
5 Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” in Journal of American 
History 91 (Mar. 2005), 1235. 
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